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ABSTRACT
... JAMES WILSON: PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALIST
Bradley Jay Caffee
December, 2003
This essay is a biography and ideological interpretation of James Wilson. Wilson
was an important member of the Revolutionary generation whom historians and political
theorists too often overlook. Moving from the rise of historical interest in Wilson and
reasons why Wilson deserves study, this essay tells the story of Wilson's ideological
development from the opposition Whig struggles of the 1760s until his law lectures in
1790 and 1791. Originally willing to accept Lockean ideas of contractualism in the
British constitution he, like many Americans, rejected such contractualism during the
Revolution in favor of an un-transferrable popular sovereignty that could only convey
instrumental powers. The American constitutions were instruments of the People, not
contracts. The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that Wilson's understanding of
popular sovereignty, instrumentalism and, ultimately, the 1787 federal Constitution, was
couched in a progressive vision of civil society. For Wilson, such concepts were not
clever manipulations used to establish power and conservatism in government, but rather,
appreciable discoveries drawn from the American experience.
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CHAPTER I
WILSON AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
A progressive State is necessary to the Happiness and Perfection of Man.
Whatever attainments may be already possessed, attainments still higher
ought to be pursued. It is our Duty, therefore, to press forward, and to
make increasing Advances in every Thing that can support, improve,
refine and embellish Society.
~ James Wilson, 1788
In 1998, the historians Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood sounded a
pessimistic chord concerning both the state of early American studies and the place of the
United States in the contemporary world. Molho and Wood thought that American selfperception and historic interest were concurrently experiencing a diminution, arguing that
the lack of interest in early American history among students had a direct connection to a
more general disillusionment about the American destiny. They linked the American
sense of importance to a sense of exceptionalism arguing that American exceptionalism
was on the wane.1 But Molho’s and Wood’s analysis can be questioned. Historian
Daniel T. Rodgers, though in agreement with Molho and Wood, admitted that uniqueness
is distinct from exceptionalism. Every nation on Earth can claim some uniqueness, but
exceptionalism is a belief in a culturally inherent immunity to the more general currents
of history.2 It is questionable if exceptionalism was ever that important to the American
psyche, given that uniqueness of any sort may be sufficient to suggest a global mission,

1

Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood, “Introduction” in Imagined Histories: American Historians
Interpret the Past, ed. Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998),
3-16.
2
Daniel T. Rodgers, “Exceptionalism” in Imagined Histories ed. Molho and Wood, 21-22.
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all immunities to history aside.
Nonetheless, Molho and Wood’s implication may be right that Americans are
coming to question exactly what their mission in history is, just as they are coming to reassess the role of the United States in the community of nations. Though interest in early
American history was declining in the late 1990s the decline may have been more due to
the siren’s call of the dot-com boom than a growing pessimism in the American destiny.3
In any case, given that America faces a possible reconfiguration in its own vision, it is
imperative that Americans understand who they are, and what previous generations
hoped they would be. Therefore, the study of history, particularly the American
Revolution, is perhaps more important than ever and it is unfortunate that many potential
students have lost interest.
This essay focuses on the life and intellect of one, key participant in the American
Revolution, James Wilson. Interest in Wilson has steadily increased over the last forty
years because a greater focus on ideology among historians of early America has made
his ideologically astute orations and law lectures more valued.
A Scottish immigrant, Wilson quickly climbed the social ladder of colonial
Pennsylvania and proved to be a dedicated opposition Whig both before and after the
American decision to embrace independence. Broadly acknowledged in his own day to
be one of the best educated and most insightful lawyers in the fledgling United States,
James Wilson played a central role in the 1787 federal convention. He spoke more in the
convention than any other single delegate after Rufus King, and his influence in the
convention was second only to James Madison’s.4 Wilson brilliantly defended the
3
4

Molho and Wood, “Introduction” in Imagined Histories, ed. Molho and Wood, 16.
Robert Green McCloskey, “Introduction” in The Works of James Wilson, Vol. I, James Wilson, ed.
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proposed Constitution in Pennsylvania’s ratifying convention, constructing arguments
that would inform Federalists in later ratifying contests. He remained an ardent
Federalist for the remaining decade of his life and President George Washington
appointed him to the Supreme Court, where he became one of its founding members.5
Wilson accepted the idea of un-transferable popular sovereignty as it arose from
the Revolution, remaining perpetually loyal to broad and equitable representation of the
People in government. What is demonstrated in Wilson’s thought on the Constitution
and its relationship to the people is a philosophy of sovereignty that was uniquely
American, at least in application, and was neither Lockean or Hobbsean in origin. To
make such a claim is not to say that Wilson, or any of the other Founders and their
Revolution were impervious to the currents of history -- they were not examples of
American exceptionalism themselves. Heavily influenced by previous European thought
and history, they grasped at various threads of thought, winding them together into a new
and unique synthesis.6 But the Founders were not always in perfect agreement, and
Wilson certainly varied in his thought from the majority of his colleagues on certain
points while agreeing on others.
Wilson, in both the Pennsylvania ratification convention and his later law lectures
at the University of Pennsylvania, rejected the idea of the Constitution as a contract. For
Wilson, the Constitution, a document that he played a central role in framing, was
Robert Green McCloskey (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), 1-6.
5
Ibid., 28-29.
6
A central assumption of the influential neo-Whig interpretation of the American revolutionary generation
is that they were heavily influenced by European political thought, both common-place and radical. It was
certainly Jean-Marc Pascal’s focus when dealing with James Wilson. See Bernard Bailyn, Ideological
Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967);
Jack P. Greene, The Intellectual Heritage of the Constitutional Era: The Delegates’ Library (Philadelphia:
The Library Company of Philadelphia, 1986; Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic,
1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1969); Jean-Marc Pascal, The Political
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essentially an instrument of the “people at large” rather than a contract between them and
a set of governors.7 Its purpose was not only to secure liberty for Americans but to lay
the foundation of future civil and moral progress.8 This essay argues that Wilson’s
adherence to the sovereignty of the people and the legal instrumentality in
constitutionalism was intimately connected to a belief in a human right to perpetual, selfinitiated progress and the duty of government to facilitate that progress. In short, Wilson
was an eighteenth century progressive.
The significance of James Wilson may seem a strange claim to some because he
has by no means received the same attention as several others such as Thomas Jefferson,
George Washington, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, to name but a few. Yet,
any in-depth reading of Madison’s Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention,
should convince the reader rather quickly of Wilson’s importance, as well as his devout
faith in popular government.9 Similarly, reading Wilson’s law lectures, as unfinished as
they are, suggests why Wilson’s colleagues held his legal understanding in such high
esteem.10 Nonetheless, only two standard biographies, each in a single volume, have
been written on Wilson. The first by historian Andrew Bennett in 1928 was a sparse
account of events in Wilson’s life.11 The second, far better and more involved work of
scholarship was written by Charles Page Smith and published in 1956. Smith’s
monograph filled out the details of Wilson’s life very well, but paid scant attention to the
Ideas of James Wilson, 1742-1798 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991).
7
George M. Dennison, “The ‘Revolution Principle’: Ideology and Constitutionalism in the Thought of
James Wilson” The Review of Politics Vol. 39 (1977), 174-179; Pascal, Political Ideas, 29-44.
8
Mark David Hall, The Political and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson, 1742-1798 (Columbia: University
of Missouri Press, 1997), 179-186; Pascal, Political Ideas, 263-268 and 332-334.
9
See James Madison, Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1966).
10
See Wilson, Works, Volumes I and II, ed. McCloskey.
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details of Wilson’s thought.12 However, Wilson’s law lectures, with some of his core
orations included, have been published four times.13
Part of the reason that Wilson has not received the same attention as other
Founders may be that he died in ignominy. He had vastly over-invested in pyramid
schemes in western lands. Even before the bottom fell out of the market in the late
1790s, Wilson was financially in over his head, having to take out loans just to keep
afloat.14 It was probably his financial difficulties that caused Washington to appoint him
as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, rather than Chief Justice. The fact that he
was not appointed Chief Justice surprised many. When the pyramid schemes in western
lands collapsed, Wilson was ruined. As the historian Charles Page Smith expressed the
situation, Wilson could barely clothe his family when he fled to North Carolina to escape
his creditors. The Associate Justice was eventually jailed there but was bailed out by his
son, Bird Wilson, only to die an untimely death in a hotel room, without a cent to his
name.15
Another reason that Wilson has not received as much attention as he deserves is
that Wilson experienced no achievements that normally draw amateur historians and
therefore the more general book-buying public. Wilson was not a President, a pithy
inventor, a fiery polemicist, a doomed foil for Thomas Jefferson, or a transformative
jurist in the American tradition of law -- though the later was not from a lack of attempt
11

Hall, Political and Legal Philosophy, 3.
Hall, Political and Legal Philosophy, 3; See Charles Page Smith, James Wilson: Founding Father, 17421798 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956).
13
These editions include one published by James Wilson’s son, Bird Wilson in 1804. Also see James
Wilson Selected Political Essays of James Wilson, ed. Randolph G. Adams (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1930); James Wilson The Works of James Wilson, Volumes I and II, ed. James DeWitt Andrews (Chicago:
Callaghan and Company, 1896); Wilson, Works, Volumes I and II, ed. McCloskey.
14
Smith, James Wilson, 304-306, 369-375.
12
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on Wilson’s part. For example, Wilson’s influence was central in the Supreme Court’s
1798 ruling in Chisholm vs. Georgia.16 The state of Georgia claimed that the citizen of
another state could not sue it because it was a sovereign. The Court, led by Wilson,
rejected Georgia’s argument maintaining that the states were not sovereign, rather the
people of the United States were sovereign. The people had established the federal
government to exist over the state governments through ratification. And the federal
judiciary was, by design, established to resolve interstate disputes between parties.
Therefore, Georgia could be sued in a federal court. The nationalistic and judicial
implications of the ruling were far reaching and probably would have secured Wilson’s
place in juridical history as a pivotal Supreme Court justice. But the states reacted by
ratifying the Eleventh Amendment prohibiting litigation by citizens against states within
which they did not reside, blotting out the effect of the entire ruling. The day had been
stolen from Wilson, and the foundation was laid instead for John Marshall with his
unique approach to federalism.17
Historian Robert Green McCloskey has pointed out yet another reason that
Wilson has been often overlooked. Wilson was awful as a correspondent; he would only
write occasionally. Friends often complained that he let too much time pass before
writing. As a result, very little Wilson correspondence has survived, particularly when
compared to that of contemporaries like Madison or Jefferson. It is notoriously difficult,

15

Ibid., 380-388.
Chisolm vs. Georgia, 2 U.S (2 Dallas), 419-479 (1793).
17
Hall, Political and Legal Philosophy, 169-173; McCloskey, “Introduction” in Works, Vol. I, Wilson, 31;
Pascal, Political Ideas, 276-279; Chisolm vs. Georgia, 2 U.S (2 Dallas), 419-479 (1793). For the approach
of John Marshall see William E. Nelson, Marbury vs. Madison: The Origin and Legacy of Judicial Review
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 54-83.
16
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therefore, for historians to comprehend the personal Wilson.18
Nonetheless, some scholarship on Wilson has appeared and the literature has
slowly accumulated, building up more quickly over the last forty years. Numerous
articles and specialized monographs have focused on Wilson’s nationalistic, legal and
political thought. And historical opinions on Wilson, even the briefest, have generally
been far from unkind. Even Charles A. Beard, the godfather of materialist interpretation
in early American history, was compelled to note Wilson’s ideological integrity.
Beard’s 1913 An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States
was a reaction to better than one hundred years of Whig interpretation that was more
patriotic than scholarly. Beard also reacted against the highly formalistic “Institutional”
and “Imperialist” schools. The “Institutionalist” historians focused on the evolution of
governmental institutions, while a sub-set of the “Institutionalists” developed, known as
the “Imperialists,” who saw the Revolution as an episode in the larger, trans-Atlantic
British institution of Empire. Beard wanted to use new historical approaches pioneered
in Europe that emphasized deterministic, material factors in the making of history.19
In An Economic Interpretation Beard argued that personal economic motives
directed the Founders. The Constitution resulted from a need for economic security by
the elites leaders of the Revolution, a security threatened by popular government in the
states. Tension in the convention resulted from competing economic interests, with the
holders of public securities on one side and holders of western lands on the other. Taking
this position necessarily meant arguing or assuming that the Founders, for the most part,
18

McCloskey, “Introduction” in Works, Vol. I, Wilson, 7.
Forest McDonald, “A New Introduction” in An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States, Charles A. Beard (New York: The Free Press, 1986), ix-xii; John Phillip Reid, Constitutional
History of the American Revolution Abridged Edition, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), x19
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did not mean what they said about cultural principles and political ideas such as liberty
and popular sovereignty.
Yet when coming to Wilson, Beard said that he “was among the philosophers of
the period who had seriously pondered on politics. He took a democratic view on several
matters.” After citing some examples of Wilson’s support for popular government, Beard
added “He...opposed...property qualifications of voters.” This last point should have
been a worrisome point for Beard, and yet he passed it by without qualification. Beard
tried to make Wilson fit into his deterministic thesis by pointing to Wilson’s support for a
strong judiciary, reasoning that Wilson thought a strong judiciary sufficient to check the
“democratic legislatures” of the states.20 Though Beard’s interpretation of Wilson does
not hold up to close analysis, as will become apparent in the later portion of this essay,
what is interesting about it is that Beard was willing to take Wilson at his word -something he was not willing to do for many of the other Founders.
Equally interesting is what evidence Beard failed to use, particularly in regard to
Wilson. James Wilson maintained a consistent ideological position throughout the
constitutional convention that was both nationalistic and democratic, but he was also
involved with an incident at the convention that would have supported Beard’s general
view of the Founders quite well. When small-state delegate Daniel Carroll of
Massachusetts suggested that a clause be struck out, protecting the western lands of larger
states from division and use without their consent, Wilson, a holder of western lands,
reacted passionately. Wilson countered that a political society should not be “torn
asunder without its own consent.” Luther Martin then implied that Wilson was guilty of

xi.
20

Beard, An Economic Interpretation, 215-216.
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hypocrisy, saying that “he wished Mr. Wilson had thought a little sooner of the value of
political bodies.” Wilson had, before this exchange, forcefully rejected the claims of the
small states that they required protection from the larger states through the perpetuation
of equal representation.21 Though no reason exists to accept Martin’s accusation as
accurate, the episode would have served Beard well. Yet, in Beard’s discussion of
Wilson, it is never mentioned. One wonders if the omission involved a failure of
research or an uncharacteristic respect for Wilson that made Beard hold back.
In any case, even if Beard had discussed the previous episode, his over all
argument would have still been weak. What is amazing about the Beardian argument is
not how easily it was pulled apart by revisionists in the 1950s and 60s, but how long it
retained ascendancy. Beard’s argument held sway over historical thinking about the
federal constitution for most of the first half of the twentieth century. And it gave
preeminence to materialistic interpretations of the whole Revolutionary era. One
explanation put forward by historian Forrest McDonald for the fall of the Beardian thesis
is that following World War II the number of historians began to increase and that, by the
1950s, primary records, and even secondary works, had become vastly more accessible to
the body of historians. These changes, combined with the weakness of Beard’s chief
work made revision likely in the 1960s.22 The implication of McDonald’s explanation
then is that Beard’s argument had been protected by fifty years of too few historians with
too little access to primary sources.
During the same period that Beard’s interpretation gained acceptance

21

Calvin C. Jillson and Cecil L. Eubanks “The Political Structure of Constitution Making: The Federal
Convention of 1787” American Journal of Political Science, 28 (August, 1984): 452-453; Madison, Federal
Convention, 555-557.
22
McDonald, “A New Introduction” in An Economic Interpretation, Beard, xxiii-xxvi.
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Progressivism became a force in American politics, and some historians interested in
supporting the Progressive movement took an interest in Wilson. Such historians were
particularly interested in Wilson’s support for a powerful nationalistic government as
well as his devotion to democratic principles.23 The legal historian Randolph C. Adams
is an excellent example of this type of Wilson scholarship. He focused on Wilson’s
democratic and nationalistic thought, but more important for Adams was what Wilson
had to say about international law. Adams, a supporter of a more proactive body of
international law, showed how Wilson thought international law was possible without a
superior governing body to administer it. Indeed, Adams implied, echoing Wilson, a
strong and democratic international law would be a natural outgrowth of the fundamental
principles of American politics.24
Another distinctive group of historians showed interest in Wilson during the first
half of the twentieth century. Religious scholars took interest in Wilson’s theology and
epistemology and how the Founder connected that thought to his political understanding.
Several articles and two monographs were produced by this group.25 Perhaps the most
important historian in this group, for later Wilson scholars, was the historian Arnaud B.
Leavelle. Leavelle introduced the idea that Wilson was heavily influenced by Scottish
Common Sense thought. Leavelle outlined the link between common sense philosophy,
as perpetuated by Thomas Reid, and Wilson’s acceptance of concepts such as popular

23

Hall, Political and Legal Philosophy, 2-3.
Randolph C. Adams, “The Legal Theories of James Wilson” in University of Pennsylvania Law Review
and American Law Register, 68 (June, 1920): 337-355.
25
Hall, Political and Legal Philosophy, 3. Hall cited two monographs from the group: William F. Obering,
The Philosophy of Law of James Wilson (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1938) and
May G. O’Donnell, James Wilson and the Natural Law Basis of Positive Law (New York: Fordham
University Press, 1937).
24
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consent, nationalism and judicial review.26 Late twentieth-century scholars still accepted
that common sense had an influence on Wilson though they argued who in the tradition
had the most influence. The historian Jean-Marc Pascal argued convincingly that Francis
Hutchison had been a far greater influence on Wilson than Thomas Reid.27 Fifteen years
later, Mark David Hall argued that though Hutchison’s influence was dominant, Reid’s
thinking was also important to Wilson.28 The common sense influence on Wilson’s
thought will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 2 and 7.
When Leavelle wrote, economic and social historians with deterministic
assumptions still dominated in academic histories of the Revolution, but that was about to
change. In 1956, the historian Edmund S. Morgan spoke at a meeting of the Mississippi
Valley Historical Association, calling for a general re-assessment of the Revolution.
Morgan pointed out that interpretations of the Revolution throughout the first half of the
twentieth century had generally called into question the sincerity of the Founding
generation, and had pointedly attacked the older Whig interpretation. But these later
revisions had serious holes from his point of view, giving numerous examples within the
context of each school of interpretation.29 Particularly interesting to him was how many
historians had argued that a conflict existed between human rights and property in the
Revolution. To the contrary, Morgan pointed out that in the eighteenth century, “liberty
and property rights were one and inseparable.” He went on to discuss how broadly land
26

Arnaud B. Leavelle, “James Wilson and the Relation of the Scottish Metaphysics to American Political
Thought” in Political Science Quarterly, 57 (September, 1942): 394-410.
27
Pascal, Political Ideas, 59-92.
28
Hall, Political and Legal Philosophy, 68-89.
29
Edmund S. Morgan, “The American Revolution: Revisions in Need of Revising” in The American
Revolution : Two Centuries of Interpretation ed. Edmund S. Morgan, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall
Inc., 1965), 166-179. Morgan refers to a school of social interpretation and a school of economic
interpretation that this author has combined under the label “materialist.” He also mentions other schools of
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was distributed in eighteenth-century Massachusetts, and accused his colleagues of using
nineteenth and twentieth century paradigms to judge a very different eighteenth-century
America. He ended declaring that “the Whig interpretation of the American Revolution
may not be as dead as some historians would have us believe.”30
Even as Morgan called for a new interpretation, some historians were providing
the first important answer to it. The first revisionism to effectively challenge the
Beardians and other materialists (not all materialists held to Beard’s specific arguments)
was the “liberal interpretation.” This school, that tended to focus on the importance of
John Locke, did not topple the predominance of the materialists but it played an
important role. The liberal revisionists dared to take the Founders at their word and tried
to make connections between the Revolution and the liberal tradition developing in
England. These historians saw the Revolution as essentially conservative -- Lockean
ideas became broadly accepted in British America because the colonies already lived in a
very Lockean political reality within their respective colonies. When the Revolution
became necessary, the colonists used Lockean, liberal principles to justify and guide their
activity.31 The colonists launched the independence movement, and fought its appended
war attempting to preserve a liberal status quo, rather than produce a revolution in
politics and society. Another important element of the liberal revision was that it offered
an essentially ideological model. Contrary to the materialist school, which assumed that
human history was primarily a reaction to material stimuli acting on individuals and
groups, liberal revisionists emphasized the power of political culture to restrain or compel

thought that are less relevant to this essay and so have been omitted from the discussion.
30
Morgan, “Revisions in Need of Revising,” 177.
31
Daniel T. Rodgers, “Republicanism: the Career of a Concept” in The Journal of American History, 79
(June, 1992): 12-13.
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historic activity.32
However, as historian Daniel T. Rodgers argued, the liberal re-interpretation had a
central weakness in that it could not explain the revolutionary generation’s anxieties or
their internal conflict. Materialist historians were too happy to point out that if the
revolutionary generation had been consistently dedicated to, and overwhelmingly
motivated by the same rationalistic, Lockean political doctrine, then the internal strife
that they had documented would not have occurred. The liberal revisionists had a
difficult time explaining away the revolutionary generation’s in-fighting -- particularly
when dealing with the eventual divide between Federalists and Republicans.33
It was within this environment that the historian Bernard Bailyn first published
The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. The implications of Bailyn’s
arguments have served as lightning rods for re-interpretation of the Revolutionary Era
over the next thirty years. Looking at hundreds of pamphlets from the Revolutionary Era,
Bailyn came to the conclusion that the Revolutionary and Founding generation had been
heavily influenced by the anti-authoritarian literature of the Glorious Revolution and the
opposition Whigs that followed. No single monolithic doctrine existed, but numerous
political and social assumptions did, that together, created a distinct political culture for
eighteenth century British Americans. It was an opposition Whig political culture,
exported from England that informed the colonists, first in opposition to Parliament, and
then in open rebellion against Parliament and the King.
Bailyn’s interpretation was similar to the early attempt of the liberal revisionists
in numerous ways. He saw the initial motivations of the Revolutionaries as essentially
32
33

Jillson and Eubanks, “The Political Structure of Constitution Making,” 436-437.
Rodgers, “Career of a Concept,” 14.
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ideological and conservative, and Bailyn operated on the presumption that, for the most
part, the men who wrote the pamphlets that he studied meant what they were saying. The
colonists did what they believed they had to do to protect their liberty, which was
threatened by an aggressive and overreaching British Parliament. But the role of Locke
was minimized in The Ideological Origins as was the importance of contract theory, and
concepts of natural rights. Civil property rights as a guarantee of liberty, representation
as a guarantee of property rights, and an abiding belief in, and anxious fear of the
corruption of power, took central importance.34
Bailyn additionally argued that Whig principles radically transformed in the battle
for American independence and the political experimentation that accompanied it. The
Whig heritage was diverse, and as Americans tried to make sense of that heritage in their
new situation, ideological fissures developed.35
It was on this foundation that what eventually became known as the republican
consensus was built. Following The Ideological Origins, students of Bailyn began to
publish influential books that supported, while extending and diversifying, Bailyn’s
original view. Like Bailyn, Gordon S. Wood argued in The Creation of the American
Republic, 1776-1787 that opposition Whig thought had dominated the political culture of
the Revolutionaries and that the struggle for independence forced transformations in that
thought. Wood, however, gave additional emphasis to the importance of virtue, equality
and antique models of civil society, pointing out the importance of republican Rome as
an ideal vision. And he, perhaps inspired by the historian Cecelia M. Kenyon,36 gave
34

See Bailyn, Ideological Origins.
Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 272-319.
36
See Cecelia M. Kenyon, “Republicanism and Radicalism in the American Revolution: An Old Fashioned
Interpretation” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 19 (April, 1962): 153-182. Kenyon was operating
35
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these convergent threads of political thought a name -- republicanism.
Republicanism was the chief driving and restraining force of the Revolution, and
yet was itself transformed by the Revolution. But the greatest transformation that that
ideology had undergone in the Revolutionary Era, came about with the creation and
ratification of the federal Constitution of 1787. The men who desired the new
Constitution had grown fearful that excessive democracy had grown up in the states,
according to Wood, and sought a new, more aristocratic federal structure as a check to
state democratization. Necessarily, Wood had to emphasize the ideological differences
between “republicanism” and “democracy.” Implicitly, of course, Wood’s analysis was
somewhat neo-Beardian, having to assume that, when coming to the Constitution, the
revolutionaries had ceased saying what they meant, and viewing the chief struggle over
the Constitution as a struggle between pro-democratic state and anti-democratic
nationalistic forces.37 James Wilson offers a counter-point to this part of Wood’s
argument as will be seen in Chapter 5. In any case, the republican model embodied in the
Constitution differed from classical republicanism in many of its political assumptions,
according to Wood, and unintentionally laid the foundation for the future liberalization of
society.38
Three years after Wood published The Creation of the American Republic,
within the Lockean-centered liberal school of the period. Long before Bailyn’s focus on Whig ideology,
Kenyon used the term “republicanism” to describe the attitude of the Revolutionaries toward government
following Independence in which they embraced pure republican forms of government. She thought that
the Revolution began as a conservative reaction based on Lockean principles, but it developed into a radical
movement based on the same principles afterward. It is an interesting foreshadowing of very similar
arguments within the later republican interpretation.
37
Wood, American Republic, 513-516.
38
Ibid., 606-615. Also see Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York:
Vintage Books, 1991). In this later monograph, Wood focuses on the socio-political developments of the
Revolution rather than the institutional and constitutional changes. Nonetheless, it may be considered an
appendage to his earlier work. In Radicalism, Wood expands and develops his argument that an
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Pauline Maier published another influential book, From Resistance to Revolution. Maier
focused on British American opposition to Parliament from 1765 to 1776. She argued
that republican ideology was indeed important to the development of the colonial
opposition, going into deeper detail about the opposition movement, and the civil unrest
that it often produced, than had either Bailyn or Wood.39 Though Maier did not offer a
discussion of the Constitutional Convention, her brief comments suggested a more
optimistic view than Wood. She viewed the Constitution as a logical culmination of
constitutional and political experimentation that began with the decision to embrace
independence.40
Another important tome was added to the republican interpretation with the
publication in 1975 of The Machiavellian Moment by J.G.A. Pocock. Pocock argued that
“country opposition” ideology guided the American Revolution, and had its cultural roots
in the Renaissance political thought of the Florentine commune. It was an anti-corruption
philosophy centered around concepts of civic virtue and a fear of societal decay.
Florentine thought had been adopted by opposition Whigs in England who in turn
inspired the thinking of the American Founders. The Revolution could be explained in
terms of court versus country as could the eventual polarization of the Founders into
Federalists and Republicans. Unlike Bailyn and his students, however, Pocock was not
interested in how the experience of the Revolutionaries transformed Whig political
assumptions, but was instead fascinated with continuity. Pocock focused on how
opposition Whig thought (that he called “country ideology”) was not fundamentally
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changed by the Revolution and even, he believed, still resided at the core of American
civic religion well into the twentieth century. Pocock also drew a strict division between
Whig thought and liberalism, wholly rejecting the importance of John Locke in any
aspect of the Revolution. For Pocock, liberalism was a pointed antagonist of the Whig
tradition. A circle quickly formed around Pocock in St. Louis that included historians
such as Lance Banning and Andrew McCoy.41
According to the historian Daniel T. Rodgers, a rivalry developed between the St.
Louis circle and Bailyn’s old students, over the postwar history of republicanism in
America. Nonetheless, a kind of consensus did eventually form between these groups, as
the St. Louis scholars recognized that Pocock’s “country ideology” was Wood’s
“republicanism” and they quickly picked up the term “republicanism” in their own
works.42
Fortunately, disagreements between historians of republicanism were not the
weakness for that school of interpretation that it would have been for others. All of these
historical interpretations had always recognized that republicanism was not a monolithic
doctrine, but a political worldview that drew upon numerous strands of thought. The real
disagreement for these historians (and the men they studied) was on which strands of
thought had the most importance and how. The influence of the republican, ideological
model(s) of the Revolution expanded throughout the 1970s, winning over first social and
then numerous legal historians in the late 1970s and early 1980s.43
It was in the 1980s that the republican consensus gained an ascendancy
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comparable to the one that the Beardians had enjoyed in the early twentieth century. The
Beardian interpretation had been left shattered in the dust, and interpretations of the
Revolution that tried to explain it in purely materialistic ways became eclipsed. The shift
in historiography did not mean that economic or class related conflict became irrelevant
to historians, because they did not. But economic causes and class tensions were more
often placed within an ideological context, or at least the concurrent importance of
ideology became almost universally recognized. Economic causes and conflicts became
a current within the broader ideological views of what the Revolution was about.44
The republican consensus was not without its detractors, but even its most
consistent antagonists like the historian Joyce Appleby did not proffer neo-Beardian or
materialist alternatives, but rather has argued for ideological alternatives. More recently,
in the mid-1990s, the legal historian John Phillip Reid argued that political historians
within the republican consensus tradition had underplayed constitutionalism while
emphasizing factional political thought. According to Reid, constitutional thought played
a key role in the fissures that developed between Britain and British America in the 1760s
and 70s, and ultimately led to the Revolution. Yet, even Reid professed no desire to
supplant the republican consensus, rather he saw his work as a corrective to an oversight
within the broader tradition, that had ignored legal thought as its own force.45
A pejorative term, “neo-Whig” had been sometimes used for these contemporary
ideological interpretations, implying that they simplistically accepted the words of the
44

Ibid., 28-29.
Joyce Appleby, “Republicanism in Old and New Contexts” in The William and Mary Quarterly Third
Series, 43 (January, 1986): 20-34; Lance Banning, “Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical
Ideas in the New American Republic” The William and Mary Quarterly Third Series, 43 (January, 1986):
3-19; Issac Kramnick “Republican Revisionism Revisited” The American Historical Review 87 (June,
1982), 629-664; J.G.A. Pocock, “Between Gog and Magog: The Republican Thesis and the Ideologia
45

18

Revolutionary generation as truth. Yet, as of 1987, the legal historian Stephen A. Conrad
used the term neo-Whig in a purely descriptive sense, applying it to a general school of
thought, with which he clearly identified.46 The neo-Whigs, if indeed that is what they
were, had come far.
The general ascendancy of ideological interpretations of the Revolution, in the
later half of the twentieth century, has had an effect on the popularity of Wilson among
scholars. Indeed, the peaked interest in Wilson over the last forty years can be partially
attributed to the neo-Whig atmosphere in history.47
For all of the political and institutional experimentation of the Revolutionary era,
and the anticipated improvements in society that those changes would instigate, the
Revolutionary generation never produced a Locke or a Machiavelli. No one but John
Adams tried to produce a representative treatise of fundamental political theory for his
generation. But Adams’ attempt, A Defense of the Constitutions of the United States was
a failure among the generation that it proposed to represent. The treatise held old, even
reactionary thinking by the time it was penned in 1787, enough so that contemporaries
gave A Defense a cold reception.48 Thomas Jefferson used it to factional ends, blasting
the treatise as the product of a monarchist mind.49
Other than Adams, James Wilson came the closest to penning a treatise for his
generation. And Wilson’s philosophy, though in some ways eccentric, was perhaps more
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representative of his generation’s thought following the establishment of the 1787 federal
Constitution than was Adams’. Wilson, in his law lectures given at the University of
Pennsylvania in 1790, brought together the various threads of radical American political
thought, both “republican” and “liberal.” He forcefully rationalized these political views,
interconnecting them with a philosophy about humanity and its society that was both
metaphysical and practical. Historians can never know what would have been produced
if he had not been interrupted by his mounting financial difficulties, but even in their unedited and half completed condition, Wilson‘s law lectures are an impressive testimony
to his conceptual abilities.
Another reason that Wilson’s popularity has grown may be the fact that Wilson’s
highly democratic and progress-centered vision of the United States government
coincidentally matched what the United States government has become in the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries, better than the visions of any of the other Founders. Wilson
envisioned a nationalistic and democratic federal government, replete with a powerful
judiciary.50
Since the late sixties a flurry of articles on Wilson have been produced, and five
monographs focusing on Wilson’s thought have been published. Historian Mary T.
Delahanty’s monograph on Wilson was the first of these in 1969. In The Integralist
Philosophy of James Wilson, Delahanty focused on Wilson’s ability to unite apparently
contradictory threads of thought, particularly “Aristotelian” civic humanism and
Christian morality. Like Aristotle, Delahanty pointed out, Wilson emphasized the
importance of civil society in achieving the good life and a secular moral code that
50
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perpetuated civil society. Wilson integrated these Aristotelian ideas with traditional
Christian moral precepts. Delahanty marked the similarities in argument between Wilson
and Aristotle on the one hand, and certain religious thinkers on the other. But, ultimately,
Delahanty is not convincing, because the very premise of her work is plagued by oversimplification. Certainly parallels can be found between Wilson’s thought and thinkers
such as Aristotle or the early church fathers, but this parallel does not suggest an
immediate, formative influence per se. What Delahanty’s work really demonstrates is the
dual influence of both Aristotle, Christian decretists and protestant writers on the whole
canon of Western thought, a tradition of thought that Wilson drew from as a Westerner.
In his law lectures Wilson occasionally quoted Aristotle and religious theorists but he
used Enlightenment philosophes, English opposition writers and British jurists even
more. Therefore, calling Wilson an “Aristotelian,” as Delahanty does, is deceptive.
Nonetheless, the idea that Wilson is important as an integralist thinker has not gone
away.51
Even before Delahanty, Robert Green McCloskey had noted Wilson’s ability to
“synthesize” various threads of thought. For McCloskey, the tenuous forces that Wilson
integrated were concerns for property rights versus localism and a desire for a stable,
commercial society versus populism in government. Ever since, the issue of Wilson’s
integration and synthesis of such “contradictory” thoughts has been an underlying theme
of most histories on the Founder. Though that theme has been consistently more of the
McCloskey mold than the Delahanty mold.52
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The legal historian Stephen A. Conrad latched onto Wilson’s tendency toward
intellectual integration in his article “Polite Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense
in James Wilson’s Republican Theory.” Conrad described a Wilson, conscientious of the
conflict between liberal thought and republican thought, determined to find a unifying
thread to bind the two contradictory philosophies together. Wilson found a solution,
according to Conrad, in an optimistic vision of polite citizenship, by which, individuals
would rationally consent to evident social need, and society would allow room for
individual sensitivities and industry.53
The problem with Conrad’s hypothesis is that no evidence exists for it in the
primary sources. Wilson never acknowledged the existence of two monolithic political
philosophies, pulling apart his generation. Wilson never worried in his writings over the
contradictory attractions of “liberalism” and “republicanism” or “democracy” and
“commercialism.”54 And, though a man very willing to brag on the apparent
achievements of his generation, Wilson never noted a conciliation between any such
“contradictory” political philosophies as being part of those achievements. The fact that
Wilson did not see the contradictions between what contemporary historians might deem
as “liberalism” and “republicanism” is highly suggestive. As the most concise and indepth political and legal philosopher of that generation, Wilson would have perceived the
intellectual conflicts if anyone was to see them.
Historian Lance Banning, in answering the criticism of historians Isaac Kramnick
and Joyce Appleby, has been compelled to blur the lines between “liberalism” and
“republicanism” that republican historians of the Pocockian school have traditionally
25.
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drawn so darkly. Banning admitted that,
Logically it may be inconsistent to be simultaneously liberal and
classical. Historically, it was not. Eighteenth-century opposition
thought was always a complex blend of liberal and classical ideas.
So was the thought of America’s Revolutionary generation.55
The overarching argument of Banning’s article is that the inherent differences between
republican civic philosophy and liberal humanism were never realized by the Founders
because their English intellectual heritage had been mercifully ambiguous.
A problem exists with Banning’s supposition when approaching Wilson,
however. Wilson was far from ambiguous in his political philosophy, and drew definitive
connections to “liberal” ideas such as the human compulsion, even right, to progress and
the need for civic virtue among the nation’s citizenry. Wilson’s work suggests that
Banning is not going far enough. In fact, “liberalism” and “republicanism” may not have
even been logical contradictions, as the Founders utilized them. Though radical, the
Revolutionary generation was not extremist -- except for their willingness to act
militantly, when scruples necessitated such action. For example, no evidence exists that
they ever envisioned the personal sacrifice involved in civic virtue to be all consuming
within times of peace. Civic virtue was never trumpeted to extremes, any more than was
profiteering individualism. Indeed, a contributive factor in the success of the American
Revolution is that the Revolutionary generation understood practicality as a virtue and
did not fall into the trap of dogmatic extremism that defined so many failed revolutions in
history. These points move far beyond the goals of this essay but Wilson’s intellectual
discourses are suggestive on these points. Hopefully, that suggestiveness will be
54
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apparent in this essay.
The next Wilson monograph to be published, after Delahanty’s, was Geoffrey
Seed’s James Wilson. Seed concerned himself with Wilson’s political thought, focusing
on its democratic nature and ideological consistency. The biography lacked depth on the
whole, but gave a thorough analysis of Wilson’s activity in the federal convention of
1787.56 Most important in Seed’s work is his treatment of Wilson’s support for common
law. On the surface, Wilson’s support for strong common law seemed to contradict his
devotion to popular sovereignty and legal instrumentality. But as Seed demonstrated, on
deeper analysis, the contradiction did not exist for Wilson. For Wilson the common law
was simply the product of the popular sovereignty of past generations. Present
generations continued to exercise their sovereignty over it through the rare exercise of
legislation, but more importantly through sitting as jurors. In regard to the last point,
Seed reminded the reader that in Wilson’s time juries found for points of law as well as
fact, and therefore had a potentially transformative power over points of law. And this
legal process Wilson wholeheartedly supported as necessary in a free society.57
One of the better works on Wilson’s thought was Jean-Marc Pascal’s 1991 book,
The Political Ideas of James Wilson, 1742-1798. Pascal placed Wilson within the
republican tradition, connecting his thought with Enlightenment thinkers in continental
Europe, as well as opposition Whigs in Britain. Another historian, George M. Dennison,
had argued fourteen years earlier that Wilson propounded a “revolution principle.” The
revolution principle was grounded in an instrumental view of law, and ultimately
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constitutionalism. Government and law were simply instruments of the people that could
be changed whenever the people felt it to be necessary. For Wilson, this principle had
been properly embodied in the amendment process of the Constitution of 1787 -- a
process that would allow for peaceful and popular “revolution” in the system. Pascal
concurred with Dennison on this point, comparing Wilson’s legal instrumentalism and
popular sovereignty to Jean Jacques Rousseau's, and drawing a strong contrast between
Wilson‘s constitutional philosophy and Lockean contractualism.58 Wilson’s ideas about
popular sovereignty and constitutional instrumentality will play a crucial role in this
essay, and will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters.
Historian Mark David Hall has brought together the various studies on Wilson’s
thought while correcting what he thinks to be certain imbalanced views of Wilson’s
philosophy. Nothing particularly unique can be found in Hall’s Wilson monograph, so
that the value of his work is as a historiographical synthesis and minor corrective.59
Perhaps most important was Hall’s discussion of Wilson’s federalism, which rescues
Wilson’s view from mere metaphor or the misguided interpretation that Wilson was
promoting divided sovereignty. Wilson thought that sovereignty resided in a single
source -- the people at large. When Wilson spoke of the people distributing power as
they wished between the federal and state governments he was not speaking of sovereign
power, but day to day instrumental powers.60 Though Hall agreed with the legal historian
Stephen A. Conrad that Wilson hoped the federal nature of American government would
help to cultivate good citizens, Hall would not relegate Wilson’s “federalism” to a
metaphorical status, symbolizing the general concept of constitutional republicanism.
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Hall recognized the more practical role of the states in Wilson’s thinking, as additional
countervalence in government (versus the federal government) to guard against official
corruption.61
The latest monograph to be published on James Wilson focuses on four of the
Founders, including Wilson. James H. Read’s Power vs. Liberty: Madison, Hamilton,
Wilson and Jefferson compares the thought of these men concerning the relationship of
liberty to political power. Jefferson provides the ideological backdrop to the others
because, according to Read, Jefferson, unlike the other men, continued to see political
power as an inherent bane to liberty. Hamilton is Jefferson’s polar opposite, who
assumed that the entire idea of power contradicting liberty was either archaic or
universally incorrect. Madison and Wilson hold the middle ground in Read’s
interpretation. These two acknowledged that power could destroy liberty, but that power
was also necessary to sustain it.62 Necessarily, Read discusses topics related to power
and liberty, including sovereignty and rights. The work does not disclose anything new
about Wilson, but it is valuable as a comparative study.
In the present thesis the view of Wilson as consistently democratic and
nationalistic, as provided in the previous described works, will be embraced. As Pascal
and Dennison assert, Wilson did not think of the Constitution of 1787 as a contract, and
Wilson’s instrumental approach to the Constitution was heavily influenced by his
concurrent dedication to contemporary popular sovereignty. These arguments bear
60
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restatement and have an important place in the overall thesis of this essay. However, an
additional intellectual element existed, directing Wilson’s instrumental approach to
constitutional government. The purpose of government and law, according to Wilson,
was not only to protect the good order of society, but was to facilitate its civil progress.
Contractualism of any sort would have been too rigid to sustain such a progressive vision.
In a contract, the people would only have a right to actively change government if
the government committed a breach of contract. For Wilson, not only was it
unacceptable to think that sovereignty had been transferred to the government under
contract, it was also unacceptable that instrumental powers be conferred contractually.
The people had to be empowered to change their government whenever they found it
advantageous for their progress.
For the purposes of the present argument the terms progressivism or progressive
is meant to indicate a general philosophical sensibility contradistinguished by
conservatism. The word “progressive” specifically has been chosen because it generally
implies a willingness to affect rapid change and because it was Wilson’s word of choice
in presenting his own philosophical position. (Progressive will not mean anything
necessarily reflecting the very particularistic political platforms of the early twentiethcentury Progressive movements.)
Conservatism is an ancient world-view demanding that slow or non-extant change
is always preferable to rapid change -- rapidity always doing more harm than good. So
governmental activity to affect rapid change should be avoided and revolutionary
changes in private society should be resisted. The progressive sensibility, on the other
hand, considers rapid change as capable of being overall productive, and even preferable
Press of Virginia, 2000).
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in many instances. Government, or other forces in society, may legitimately and
hopefully exert positive force to begin or exacerbate proper advances in society with all
due haste. It will be shown that Wilson’s thought was, at center, progressive. In
Wilson’s usage “progress” referred to a pro-active advancement of either a material,
sociopolitical or moral nature. But Wilson’s thought interwove these categories of
progress -- understanding them to exist in a symbiosis. And the nexus of every truly
progressive movement was to be found in the will of the People at large; advancement
was derived from the liberal activities of the People and their instruments.
Two general formats were available to choose from for discussing Wilson’s life
and thought. The first, and perhaps most popular in intellectual biographies, was used by
Seed and Hall in their monographs on Wilson. The first sections of the monographs were
general biographies of Wilson and his career. Each chapter afterward involved some
aspect of Wilson’s philosophy. Both Seed and Hall used this style very effectively, but it
is not without its dangers. The thought of the subject might be represented, incorrectly,
as independent of the larger historical changes surrounding him. And, connected to this,
the subject’s philosophy might appear unchanging, which is rarely the case. For
example, when reading either Seed’s or Hall’s work, the reader gets the impression that
Wilson’s thought concerning popular sovereignty was unchanging, but that was not the
case. Though it is not the central goal of this work, it will be shown that Wilson initially
embraced a contractual theory of government, at least loosely. It was sometime between
the controversy over independence and the federal convention of 1787 that Wilson
rejected contractualism, adopting an instrumental view of constitutionalism.
The second possible format is well represented in historian Eric Foner’s
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intellectual biography of Thomas Paine.63 This style describes the thinking of the subject
while chronologically describing the events in their lives. It is a style that can best reflect
the changes in a subject’s thinking, and emphasize what led them to their new
conclusions. It is this later stylistic format that will be employed to tell James Wilson’s
story and describe his thought. At times it may seem as if Wilson’s story has given way
to the larger stories of the Revolution in Pennsylvania or general American constitutional
development. At others, the story will appear repetitive. If so, it is only because Wilson’s
thinking cannot be truly appreciated if separated from its historical context. At times it
will be expedient to dwell on certain tangential issues, the relevance of which will
become apparent later in the text.
The next chapter of this essay examines Wilson’s first years in America. After a
brief discussion of Wilson’s life in Scotland and immigration to British America in 1765,
the narrative progresses up to 1777 when Wilson’s first Congressional career came to an
abrupt end due to factional travails. It was in this time frame that Wilson adopted radical
Whig principles. Chapter 2 also demonstrates Wilson’s early acceptance of contractual
principles of government, at least in relationship to the British monarch. Though the
precise experiences that convinced him to embrace instrumentality in the law cannot be
known, some informed speculation will be proffered.
In Chapter 3 Wilson’s continued dedication to American revolutionary principles
is demonstrated, while explaining the reasons for popular suspicion against him. At first
being misunderstood as an aristocrat, Wilson was able to re-obtain a seat in Congress.
And by 1786 Wilson’s second Congressional career became secure from the factional
strife between Constitutionalists and Republicans in Pennsylvania.
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Building worries over the health of the American states under the Articles of
Confederation is central in Chapter 4. Wilson proved to be a continental nationalist
supportive of stronger central government. Yet, unlike many others who came to support
stronger central government by 1787, Wilson was not goaded by a fear of socio-political
dissolution in the United States. Wilson saw the United States as a single political
society long before the constitutional convention of 1787. As a result, Wilson did not
value the new constitution as a conservative instrument, but an instrument reflecting
progressive realities.
Chapters 5 and 6 examines Wilson’s career as a constitution maker and his
understanding of popular sovereignty and legal instrumentalism within the context of
those constitutions. His dedication to popular sovereignty and centralized government
dictated that he champion continental and democratic institutions. The depth of Wilson’s
sincerity becomes apparent in Chapter 5 when looking at his activities in the federal
convention of 1787. This work will not attempt to re-interpret the whole of the
constitutional convention, that would be a goal too great for this essay. For a more
general and in-depth interpretation of the constitutional convention, this author suggests
the work of historian Jack N. Rackove.64 However, the activity of Wilson in the
convention will be extensively explored. James Madison’s Notes On The Debates Of
The Federal Convention is the key primary source for Wilson’s activity, and indeed, on
the activity of the federal convention in general.
Wilson’s continued dedication to popular government is demonstrated in Chapter
6. His partisanship during the ratification controversy, and his leadership in framing the
64
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Pennsylvania state constitution of 1790 will be the focus.
Chapter 7 focuses on Wilson’s progressivism and his law lectures given at the
University of Pennsylvania toward the end of his career. In his lectures Wilson brought
rhetorical clarity to his philosophy and vision for an American future. Wilson makes
clear the constitutional connection between popular sovereignty and civil progress, and
how they were to be understood within the American system that he helped mold.
Chapter 8 concludes with a restatement of the thesis. And the present author’s
precise understanding of Wilson’s importance will be clarified.

CHAPTER II
FROM OPPOSITION WHIG TO REVOLUTIONARY

Wilson’s dedication to the American colonial cause stretched back to at least the
1765 Stamp Act controversy. Always a staunch Whig, Wilson would, over time, prove to
be one of the most convinced populists and nationalists of the revolutionary generation.
In the first years of Wilson’s life in America, the Scottish immigrant achieved
prominence as a lawyer and dedicated Whig, was branded an aristocrat by his enemies,
and became an experienced and well-liked member of Congress.65
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Born in Fife, Scotland, in 1742, James Wilson was the son of conservative
Presbyterians. William and Alison Lansdale Wilson, his father and mother, were
dedicated to retaining the old strict covenant in the face of a rising trend of liberalism and
centralization in the Scottish Church. James Wilson had been marked by his parents for
an ecclesiastical career from an early age. His family sent him and his three younger
brothers to a grammar school near their home in Caskardy, and it was there that Wilson
was first introduced to Latin writers such as Cicero and Sallust. At the age of fourteen
Wilson won a bursar’s scholarship from the University of St. Andrews only a few miles
from Caskardy, and matriculated to the University in 1757 to study for the ministry.66
In the College of Saint Salvator at St Andrews the young and impressionable
Wilson submersed by his teachers in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Historian
Charles Page Smith argued in his biography of James Wilson, Wilson’s thinking was
lured away from the strict Calvinism of his parents to the “softer...doctrines of the
Enlightenment.” James Hutchison, Thomas Reid, Hugo Grotius, David Hume, and other
Enlightenment thinkers were doubtlessly made available to Wilson in his philosophy
classes. These theorists would later prove prominent in Wilson‘s thinking.67
Wilson’s academic career at St Andrews abruptly ended, however, when his
father died. Being the eldest son in a family that had no other males in their majority, his
father’s death forced Wilson to attend to the economic well being of his mother, brothers
and sisters. He left school to support his family and he secured a job tutoring young
While a democrat is certainly a populist, a populist is not necessarily a democrat -- broader community
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boys. During his short career as a tutor Wilson made up his mind that he would never
become a minister. In addition, he found teaching relatively unrewarding. He wanted
more than the life of a countryside grammarian. Wilson was finally freed from the
bondage of low-paying pedagogy in 1765 when one of his sisters married and some of his
brothers having become older, became economically viable and supported their mother
without James’ help. He traveled to Edinburgh to study bookkeeping and accounting.68
Though he found Edinburgh sufferable, Wilson’s attention was gradually turning
to British America. Before Wilson had come to Edinburgh his cousin and friend Robert
Annan had achieved the Presbyterian ministry and relocated to southern Pennsylvania.
Other relatives had made their way across the Atlantic as well and sent back positive
descriptions of their new homes. Finally, becoming determined to make the crossing
himself, he had only to overcome the protestations of his mother and obtain the money to
make the crossing. Once he convinced his mother, Wilson’s relatives in Fife raised
money for his voyage.69
Arriving in New York in the fall of 1765, Wilson continued on to Philadelphia.
Bearing a letter of introduction to Reverend William Smith, the trustee of the College of
Philadelphia, Wilson secured a position as a Latin tutor. The College proved kind to
James Wilson and he must have impressed the faculty. Just one year later, in 1766, he
received an honorary masters degree from the College along side Joseph Reed.70
Yet, Wilson was again feeling restless. In the land of lawyers that was colonial
America it became evident to Wilson that the most prominent men in Pennsylvania were
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lawyers. The respect, wealth and power that many lawyers held must have been
attractive to Wilson, who was beyond doubt an ambitious young man. So, later in the
same year that he received his master’s degree from the College of Philadelphia, Wilson
left the College and apprenticed himself under John Dickinson to study law.
In order to pay Dickinson’s fee, Wilson bought a small farm on credit from his
cousin Robert Annan. Wilson then sold the farm to Dickinson for money to pay
Dickinson’s fee and have money to live on throughout the apprenticeship.71 It is ironic
that this introduction to land speculation as a source of wealth allowed Wilson to enter
the world of law. Just as most of Wilson’s later accomplishments involved law and the
philosophy of law, he was financially troubled and then ruined in later life by incredibly
reckless land speculations. That financial failure stagnated his judicial career, tarnished
his reputation and eclipsed his significance.72
Wilson’s study of the law under Dickinson ranged from procedural matters of
contract and torts to the 1701 constitution of colonial Pennsylvania and the history of the
colony’s governors. Wilson was also immersed deeply into legal theory. Looking for
evidence of what Wilson studied in his meticulous study notes, Wilson’s biographer
Charles Page Smith found a broad treatment of legal theory. Hume, Montesquieu,
Ferguson, Blackstone, Hooker, Bacon, Bolingbroke, Locke and Sidney all share
influence on Wilson’s notes according to Smith. Wilson also wrote down general
categories of law. Probably suggested to him by Dickinson, these categories of law were
Natural, Revealed, “General Customs, Maxims, Particular Customs, (and) Statutes.”73
Twenty-four years later Wilson would again put great importance in such a categorization
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of the law in structuring his law lectures at the College of Philadelphia. The particular
categories had, however, changed. By 1790, Wilson had decided to organize law in a
way closer to Richard Hooker’s: law eternal, law celestial, laws of matter, laws of natural
man and oracular law.74
Dickinson’s influence aside, the colonial world in which Wilson lived was
transforming his thinking. When he landed in New York angry mutterings continued to
abound over the Sugar Act of the previous year. And opposition politics reached a
fevered pitch throughout the colonies over news of the Stamp Act by the time Wilson
received his M.A. from the College of Philadelphia.75 Though Pennsylvania’s
conservative, Quaker dominated Assembly failed to send delegates to the Stamp Act
Congress, radical politics was alive and well in Philadelphia. Joseph Galloway’s
conservatives had won the day in the Assembly by only one vote, but through the use of
committees, Philadelphians organized to resist Parliament. They convinced the city’s
appointed stamp agent, John Hughs, not to exercise his duties and the city’s merchants
formed a boycott against imported British goods.76
Wilson’s newfound mentor, John Dickinson, was drawn into Philadelphia’s
radical committee politics by the mid-1760s.77 It was shortly after Wilson finished his
tutelage that Dickinson penned his famous “Farmer’s Letters” to defend the cause of
Whig resistance in colonial America. The public success of the “Farmer’s Letters” in
1767 inspired Wilson to pen his own opposition piece, Considerations on the Nature and
73
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Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament, later in the same year. Yet,
Considerations on...Parliament would not be published until 1774.78
Wilson had finished his apprenticeship under Dickinson by February of 1767,
approximately half a year after he had begun. Soon after, Wilson was practicing in the
Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia and was, by summer, working his way out into
the western circuit. Shortly after Wilson moved his practice to Reading, on the borders
of the Pennsylvanian frontier, he submitted his Considerations on...Parliament to Dr.
Francis Alison for an opinion. Alison was an older professor of Metaphysics and Logic
and vice-provost of the College of Philadelphia. Billy White, through whom Wilson sent
his work, criticized Wilson that it should have gone instead to Dr. John Ewing, professor
of Natural Law. The reason why Wilson did not prefer to send Considerations
on...Parliament to Ewing is unknown.79 He may have developed a closer relationship to
Alison while at the College. And Wilson was probably sure of his work’s natural law
foundations, but was still concerned whether or not he had reasoned well from those
foundations.
Wilson’s choice in the matter may seem of small consequence but it is in fact very
telling of the young Wilson’s thinking on epistemology and law. An older Wilson,
delivering law lectures at the College of Philadelphia, elucidated on these issues,
demonstrating a deep grounding in Scottish common sense thought. He asserted that
Thomas Hutchinson had been right when he said that morality was the perception of
God‘s law or natural law (Wilson never made a distinction between the two.) In addition,
Wilson thought that all human beings had this moral perception. But what could actually
78
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be perceived were fundamental moral precepts (an example for an older Wilson would
probably be sovereignty.) But taking those fundamental precepts and applying them to
specific situations in the ever-changing world required reasoning. And, unlike moral
perception, reasoning was not an equally distributed faculty. Though reason was
necessary for human beings to apply their moral understanding to the day to day world,
poor or corrupted reasoning was the root of corruption and evil in the everyday world.
Poor reasoning could corrupt the application of morality or even cloud moral perception
itself. Indeed, later on, corruption would be how Wilson explained not only evil in the
world but immorality among the uncivilized -- their power to reason had not been
cultivated and refined.80
Though Wilson did not write on epistemological issues until he was an older man,
he had probably come early to his concept of moral perception, reason, and their
relationship to law. He had been exposed to these concepts originally as a boy at St.
Andrews. And his immersion in law under Dickinson probably inspired Wilson to an
early effort to fit together Scottish common sense thought and law as it existed in the
trans-Atlantic British world. In looking for criticism, it was consistent for Wilson to seek
out advice on his reasoning, but not the fundamental precepts upon which he based his
argument. To believe Wilson’s own claims in the Advertisement at the front of
Considerations on...Parliament when he finally published the pamphlet, the conclusions
he reached had surprised even him.81
Alison claimed to like Considerations on...Parliament but thought it overly
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radical.82 He warned Wilson against publishing it because conservatives still controlled
politics in Philadelphia. The response to Dickinson’s “Letters” had by no means been
entirely positive in the city.83 When the non-importation agreement between Philadelphia
merchants fell apart from factional in-fighting, Wilson conceded to Alison’s opinion.
Wilson would later cite the failure of the non-importation agreement as the central reason
for not publishing in 1767.84
When Considerations on...Parliament was published, many in the radical
movement were already coming to the same conclusions that Wilson had in his pamphlet.
By 1774, it held no surprises.85 But within the context of 1767, Wilson’s reasoning had
been far ahead of its time.
Dickinson, in his “Letters” had argued that Parliament could legislate for British
America in cases of external regulation in the interest of promoting the wealth of the
whole empire. They could not regulate the internal affairs of the colonies and especially
could not do so to raise revenue. Otherwise, the colonists would be denied their core
English right to be taxed only by their own representatives. Wilson’s argument was not
dissimilar but went much further than Dickinson’s and denied Parliament the right to
regulate for the colonies in any case whatsoever.86
First, Wilson moved through examples of how Parliament could be as corrupt and
threatening to liberty as the King. According to Wilson, Parliaments could be kept
virtuous only through frequent elections, among other checks on power. The British
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constitution guaranteed the election of parliamentary representatives by free, propertied
Britons. Parliament had an authority to legislate because “the commons” had given their
consent to it in the understanding that their liberties would be protected. That trust could
be extended because Parliament’s “interests, and that of their families, friends, and
posterity, cannot be different from the interests of the rest of the nation.” Popular
representation in the legislative process was not only a right of all propertied British
subjects but a constitutional check on the power of Parliament. Legislative power could
not be constitutional if it was not established and maintained by consent. Wilson ignored
the idea of parliamentary sovereignty and assumed that parliamentary power was purely
delegatory. He did not yet use the words “sovereignty of the people” or “popular
sovereignty,” but Wilson was implicitly arguing that the supreme power had been derived
from the people, and had been vested in the British constitution, not British Parliament.87
Using these principles, firmly rooted in British constitutional thought as colonists
understood it, Wilson cited cases in law that supported British America’s Whig
opposition. Central in Wilson’s examples was Lord Coke’s judgment that the Irish could
not be taxed because they had no representatives in Parliament. Wilson concluded that
“The American colonies are not bound by the acts of the British Parliament, because they
are not represented in it.” Wilson made no distinctions between internal and external
regulations.88
Yet like most British Americans -- even British American radicals until 1775 -Wilson was still willing to pay deference to the authority of the monarchy, and the idea
that contractual obligations between the King and his subjects existed. The obligation of
87
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dependence that the colonies owed to Great Britain only existed through the person of the
King. Citing Francis Bacon for legal support, Wilson argued that “the only dependency
which they (the colonists)...ought to acknowledge, is a dependency on the crown.” It was
the only dependency that had precedence and “the colonists ought to be dependent on the
king, because they enjoy...his protection.” The allegiance of subject to monarch existed
within a reciprocal relationship. In return for protection, subjects owed their king
obedience and the protection of the king was a birthright. “An Englishman, who removes
to foreign countries” Wilson continued, “owes the same allegiance to his king...(and
is)...still entitled to the advantages promised by law (and) to the duties of it.” Wilson
even sounded what appears to be an ultra-conservative note concerning monarchy.
Because the King protects subjects even when they are children, before their allegiance
can be meaningful, every subject had a debt of allegiance to the king for services already
rendered.89
Nonetheless, the power of the monarchy was also limited by the British
constitution -- the embodiment of the contract between the King and his subjects. The
British monarchy did not exist to protect life alone, but also existed to protect liberty.
The constitution dictated that not even the king could compel the colonies to
unconstitutional actions like obeying Parliament. As Wilson pointed out in the middle of
his discussion on Parliament’s authority “the Americans are bound neither by the assent
of the king, nor by the votes of the lords, to obey acts of British Parliament.”90
In his last paragraphs Wilson described a federal idea of empire predating John
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Adam’s argument for the same thing six years later.91 Describing the appropriate
imperial powers of the king, Wilson wrote “he has a negative on the different legislatures
throughout his dominions, so that he can prevent any repugnancy in their different laws.”
The British King’s purpose was to ensure imperial comity and equity, while British
Parliament is denied special status in this statement. Britain’s Parliament was merely one
of a multitude of legislatures in the King’s dominions. Under the British constitution,
King and Commons were to act as countervailing powers that “checked the progress of
arbitrary power” and the colonies had their own Commons in the form of their local
assemblies. These local assemblies had the sole right to legislate for their respective
colonies and should exist in a constitutional balance with the monarchy, like British
Parliament in Great Britain.92 Historian Mark David Hall has written that Wilson
“developed the concept that would be later known as the...‘commonwealth’ status of
English colonies.” “Developed” is probably too strong of a word. Wilson was
proposing a hazy vision deeply rooted in a well-remembered pre-existing tradition of
imperial/colonial interaction. Wilson, and later Adams and Jefferson, described the
actual nature of the empire before war debt made Parliament more jealous of its own
imperial influence; the empire had been better for British Americans before the Seven
Years War.93 But they were also arguing for something new because their immediate
peril forced them to envision a new, positive codification of that older arrangement that
would extend even into “external” regulation. British Americans wanted an arrangement
that would guarantee British American liberty from the avaricious powers that appeared
to be growing in Britain itself.
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Considerations on...Parliament is interesting for a number of reasons. It suggests
the speed with which Wilson embraced radical thinking in British America as well as his
ability to think ahead, particularly on key theoretical issues. A blend of general
influences can also be seen in this work from Enlightenment thought to the concerns of
the Commonwealth writers with corruption. A strict adherence to what legal historian
John Philip Reid has called the common law constitutional tradition, can also be seen.
Wilson’s pamphlet places great emphasis on legal precedence as would be expected in a
common law argument. Most important, these passages evidence Wilson‘s continued
dedication to the monarchy, as well as his implicitly contractual conceptualization of
government and popular rights.94
After deciding not to publish his first opposition pamphlet, Wilson turned to his
business in Reading, Pennsylvania. Reading was a western town with an economy based
in farming and the processing of beaver pelts.95 Moving into western Pennsylvania,
Wilson hoped to make his legal practice more profitable by taking advantage of land
controversies between litigious settlers. But this idea was the hope of many lawyers.
Wilson found the western settlements well populated by fellow professionals.
Nonetheless, Wilson proved a highly proficient practitioner and his business profited. He
intermittently rode the western circuit while maintaining his Philadelphia contacts. In
1769, he began arguing cases in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court at Philadelphia. By
1770, when he moved to the Cumberland Count seat at Carlisle, Wilson’s legal career
was in rapid ascension. In 1771 he married his first wife, the prominent Rachael Bird of
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Berks County, bringing with her the wealth of an heiress. And by 1772, James’s and
Rachael’s first child, Polly, was born.96
The British American colonies also reached a new bar in 1772. Parliament had
retained the tea tax from the failed Townshend Duties in 1770. Yet, as was always the
case with Britain’s attempt to establish duties over the colonies, the tea duty proved
difficult to enforce. Parliament was, nonetheless, determined to see the tax enforced and
in 1772 tried to empower its colonial officials to enforce it. British Americans reacted.
The British vessel, Gaspee ran aground chasing a ship in Rhode Island and was burned by
a crowd. And Sam Adams went to work forming Committees of Correspondence to
promote uniform resistance throughout the colonies.97
Philadelphia’s opposition leaders, reacting to Sam Adam’s call, set up their own
Committee of Correspondence and reinvigorated their resistance movement. Under the
shadow of Parliament’s Coercive Acts against Massachusetts in 1774, the Philadelphia
Committee effectively usurped much of the political influence of the intransigently
conservative Governor and colonial Assembly. The various counties of Pennsylvania
formed committees as well, connecting outlying towns to the committee movement in
Philadelphia.98
Many prominent citizens in Carlisle involved themselves in the standing
Cumberland Committee of Correspondence. Wilson was one of the movement’s
formative leaders. He helped draw up the resolutions creating the Cumberland
Committee. Echoing the Committee in Philadelphia, these resolutions condemned the
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Coercive Acts and called for a Continental Congress. Within days after its formation, the
Cumberland Committee sent out a group of delegates, that included Wilson, to convene
with others at a Provincial Convention in Philadelphia, and discuss the upcoming
Continental Congress.99
Events moved quickly in Philadelphia and in British North America in general.
The Provincial Convention in Philadelphia drafted instructions to the Pennsylvania
Assembly. Primarily the work of John Dickinson, and edited by a special committee that
included Wilson and Joseph Reed, the instructions demanded the appointment of
delegates to the Continental Congress. The Assembly, feeling intense political pressure,
acquiesced to the Convention’s demands.100 But to mitigate the effect of the first
Continental Congress, conservatives in the Assembly appointed a heavily conservative
delegation that included Joseph Galloway himself. Only one member of the delegation,
Thomas Mifflin, was known to be sympathetic to the radical committee movement.101
Fortunately for the Pennsylvania Whig opposition, Galloway and his allies did not
undermine the pro-active nature of the Congress. Though conservatives dominated the
Pennsylvania delegation, Mifflin and Dickinson were better connected politically with
the delegates of the other colonies than Galloway and his followers. The radical
committeemen had been communicating for years with opposition leaders in the other
colonies while inward looking conservatives, like Galloway, ignored external relations.
Galloway also miscalculated the popularity of the opposition movement in the other
colonies. He assumed (wrongly it turned out) that the delegations from the other colonies
would be predominantly conservative like his own. The fact that they would convene in
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Philadelphia also probably gave Galloway a false sense of security. The cold truth of
Galloway’s political impotence probably began to occur to him when the Congress chose
to convene in Carpenter’s Hall, the headquarters of radical committee activity in
Philadelphia since its inception.102
Emboldened by the Suffolk Resolves, the Continental Congress recommended a
non-importation agreement among the colonies and Committees of Association to
enforce it.103 Radical committeemen called another Provincial Convention in
Philadelphia to support and act upon the recommendations of Congress in January 1775.
The second Provincial Convention also suggested that programs be established to
promote domestic production.104 Wilson again played a key role, this time by delivering
the Convention’s only formal oration. Shortly after the first Provincial Convention,
Wilson had finally published his Considerations On...Parliament. Perhaps the timely
pamphlet, exceedingly well argued though no longer ahead of its time, was enough to win
him the honor of delivering the singular oration. And Wilson’s dedication to the
committee movement would have also been apparent, by this time, to the rest of the
radical leadership. In his speech, Wilson outlined the complaints of British America
against a tyrannical British Parliament, described the events that necessitated the
acceleration of American resistance, and lamented the lack of understanding that the
British people themselves had shown. He re-argued his main theme in
Considerations...On Parliament, but more boldly implicated that the king may be at fault

101
102
103
104

Ryerson, The Revolution is Now Begun, 62.
Ibid., 90-91.
Burnett, Continental Congress, 42-47.
Ryerson, The Revolution is Now Begun, 101-102.

45

and referred to the colonial assemblies as parliaments.105
In the summer of 1774, as the Continental Congress was still meeting, radicals
won an electoral victory in Pennsylvania. They took many seats in the colonial
Assembly, Dickinson himself winning a seat.106 By mid-1775, in the wake of the
bloodshed at Concord and Lexington the colonial assemblies agreed to convene another
Continental Congress. Again, the Pennsylvania Assembly sent delegates to Congress, but
this time the delegation would be dominated by dedicated opposition Whigs. The
Assembly appointed Benjamin Franklin, James Wilson, and Thomas Willing to the loss
of the Galloway conservatives.107 With this appointment, Wilson took his first step into
continental politics.
In Congress, Wilson busied himself with committee work. Congress first
appointed Wilson to a committee for considering a letter from Massachusetts's Provincial
Congress at Watertown. The letter asked two questions: should the Provincial Congress
take over governing Massachusetts? And, would the Continental Congress send someone
to take over the army surrounding Boston? On the later question Congress answered in
the affirmative, eventually selecting a Virginian with extensive military experience,
George Washington.108 On the first question, however, the congressional committee’s
answer was nebulous. It advised that the Assembly take on whatever responsibilities they
thought necessary to save their country and maintain the union of the colonies.109 Yet,
Congress placed an interesting caveat on its advice. The Massachusetts Provincial
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Congress was to act defensively only until “a Governor of His Majesty’s appointment,
will consent to govern the colony according to its charter.” The mentality of the
congressional majority rings out in this statement. As late as the Spring of 1775, the
colonies were still uniting, and fighting to get back into the British Empire on more
equitable terms, not out of the British Empire -- yet. They continued to hope that King
George III would come to their rescue.
The King could not and did not want to help the cause of local representation in
British America. Though British Americans did not acknowledge it, Parliament was
sovereign in Britain, not the King or the mixed constitution.110 Paradoxically, though
George III certainly wanted to control Parliament he had no aspirations of becoming a
supreme monarch. The King disliked the American idea of multiple assemblies under the
Crown because it would have strained his ministry’s finances. Sustaining the necessary
systems of patronage to keep them all in line would have been too difficult and
expensive. It was simply easier to focus on a single Parliament than many.111
But few colonists understood this new British reality. Even if they had, it would
have offended them. So, when George III ignored the Olive Branch Petition it irritated
the colonists. And when he declared the colonies to be in rebellion, most in the colonies
were dumbfounded. The one constitutional connection that British Americans believed
existed between themselves and Great Britain was the monarchy.112 After the King
condemned them, their own constitutional arguments left them with only two options:
either capitulate or declare war on the monarch. In doing the latter, geography made it
110
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impossible to overthrow the British monarch and replace him with another. Therefore,
making war against the king would have to mean separation -- independence.113 The fact
that they eventually chose the latter says a lot about them, but so does their reticence in
accepting that ultimate solution.
Shortly after the King’s rejection of the American cause and his concurrent
accusation that their goal was independence, Continental forces met disaster in Canada.
Canadians repelled the American attempt to liberate Quebec, resulting in the maiming of
one of America’s finest military leaders, Benedict Arnold. It was in this disheartening
atmosphere that James Wilson moved to make a declaration in response to the king’s
charges. In his motion Wilson acted as if Congress should prepare a rebuttal to the king’s
claim that they wanted independence. This alarmed John Adams whose thinking was
ahead of most of his associates. Adams had already come to the conclusion that
independence was not only plausible but preferable. He had already proposed a
committee to draft articles of confederation but conservatives, marshaled by John
Dickinson, had blocked the move. Adams in turn tried, but failed to block the drafting
committee for the proposed rebuttal. It was just more conservative stalling in the eyes of
Adams. And any official rebuttal of the idea of independence could only undermine
America’s future position, which Adams understood to rest with independence.114
The document that the drafting committee produced was primarily the work of
James Wilson. Adams came to realize that he had misunderstood Wilson -- he would not
be the last to do so.115 Completed by February of 1776, it was titled “An Address to the
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Inhabitants of the United Colonies.” Adams must have been relieved because it was no
more a condemnation of the idea of independence than it was a promotion of it. The
rhetorically thick, 6000-plus word document was nebulous in its handling of the two
opposing positions. Conservatives were certainly disappointed in “An Address” as
evidenced when the document was tabled and forgotten, surely to Wilson‘s irritation.116
“An Address” attempted to issue a consensus message by Congress to the people
of the colonies, and in doing so, diffuse the confusion that many feared was gnawing at
the foundations of colonial solidarity. But new factions had formed, and began to
dominate Congress by 1775. Anti-independence conservatives led by Dickinson and proindependence radicals led by Adams had no use for consensus messages to the public that
did not strongly support their particular factional views. And “An Address” may not
have served its purpose well in any case, because the document could itself be confusing.
Congress was equivocating over the issue and “An Address” reflected the confused
opinions of Congress too well to simplify the controversy for any common reader. It was
perhaps Wilson’s lone dialectic failure in the arena of written political controversy.
In “An Address,” Wilson argued the justice of the colonial cause: “The Calamites
which threaten us would be attended with the total Loss of those Constitutions, formed
upon the venerable Model of British Liberty” he wrote. In this statement the committee
reminded the reader of the threat to the colonial charters as well as the British
constitution as a whole. They also direct the reader to the meaning of those constitutions
-- “British Liberty.”117
Perhaps answering Tory criticism, the committee added, “To avert those
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Calamities we are under the Necessity of making temporary Deviations from those
Constitutions.” It had long been the argument of British America’s Whig opposition that
they were dedicated to protecting the British Constitution against the caprice, first of an
overreaching monarchy, and then of an overbearing Parliament. Colonials saw their
charters as being extensions of that larger constitution and therefore constitutions in
themselves. Liberty, of course, depended on the integrity of those constitutions and had
to be defended.118 Yet, many Tories rebutted the Whig argument in the later phase of
colonial struggle by pointing out that many opposition actions were technically
unconstitutional. The opposition had, after all, set up extra-legal committees that usurped
official governmental powers even within the purely local context. The Sons of Liberty
that had evolved out of the Loyal Nine in Boston was an obvious example119 as was the
burgeoning and ever more radical committee movement in Congress’s host colony of
Pennsylvania. And indeed, the Continental Congress itself could be cited as an
unconstitutional institution!120
The standard Whig counter-argument was twofold. “Necessity” was part of the
British Constitution. Legal precedence existed for justification by necessity in
temporarily suspending laws and even constitutional forms. The argument for necessity
had been made by the winning sides of both the English Civil War and the Glorious
Revolution. It was particularly justifiable if the greatest possible good of the British
Constitution, liberty itself, was at stake.121 It is important to note that the colonial Whig
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opposition claimed to be deviating from “those Constitutions” but never admitted to
acting unconstitutionally. The second, potentially more radical argument, was based on a
natural right of rebellion against injustice. This rationale was assumed to exist at the
primeval root of the British constitution, the liberty it protected.122 The natural law
foundations of the constitution were accepted in Britain as well as British America. To
base the justification of American opposition solely on natural law, however, would have
been unusual. Congress would not make such an argument until July of 1776.123 “An
Address” referenced the earlier purely constitutional argument to justify extra-legal
activity by the opposition.
Yet, perhaps most important was the committee’s description of authority.
Toward the end of “An Address” the power of Congress was justified with “the sacred
Authority of the People, from whom all legitimate Authority proceeds.”124 Here, the
committee moved beyond the representative ethic of the common law British
Constitution. It is one thing to argue that legislatures must be elected by the people they
tax to protect property and therefore liberty, quite another to say that “all legitimate
Authority” must be founded on the people. The first is a constitutional check on
legislative authority; the later implied a popular check on all forms of governmental
authority. John Dickinson, in editing the committee’s work tried to strike out the entire
sentence, but Wilson was adamant about retaining it.125
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Another curiosity of the statement is the use of present tense. The committee
maintained that authority “proceeds” rather than proceeded from the people. Previous
political philosophers and jurists from Hugo Grotius to David Hume and John Locke
agreed that authority had historically or prehistorically been derived from human society.
But in the case of Grotius and Hume, it was thought that when the people gave away
power to government the transferal was permanent. Locke and his later followers Jean
Jacques Burlamaqui and Emmerich Vattel, would suggest otherwise. This later cadre
also argued that authority had been transferred from the People to governments at some
earlier period. Yet, the transfer was not necessarily permanent. That transfer had been
achieved through contract, and if any government broke that contract then the contract
was dissolved and sovereignty returned to its original source, the People.126 The contract
theory, of course, is the root of the natural law theory of rebellion that would find
expression in the Declaration of Independence. It does not find expression in “An
Address.” What is significant is that the reference to popular authority in “An Address”
suggests popular sovereignty as a contemporary root of authority rather than a historic
one, contrary to the views of Locke, Burlamaqui and Vattel.127 Normally, a single verb
such as “proceeds” would not be worth so much interpretation. But, considering the
intellectual trajectory of the founding generation, the analysis is justified. The wording in
“An Address” is representative of a growing new political concept among American
Whigs in 1776. Throughout the colonies, in the struggle over independence, many began
embracing the concept of a contemporary and un-transferable popular sovereignty.128 It
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also suggests that Wilson’s thinking was moving ahead of many others in Congress, most
notably John Dickinson’s, and that Wilson was beginning to reject the idea of
contractually transferred sovereignty as early as February, 1776.
The document’s conclusion is that the goal of the colonies is the “Reestablishment of the constitutional Rights of the Colonies.” And that, though the colonies
wanted to do so within the Empire, their first priority was “that America may be Free;” in
other words, with independence if necessary.129
1775 was not an unusual time for ideological innovation. The entire eastern
seaboard of British North America was undergoing a transformation in thinking. As
Wilson worked on “An Address,” Thomas Paine‘s Common Sense offered a newer more
radical possibility to Americans. Paine whipped the whispered argument for
independence into a flame that burned across the ideological landscape of the eastern
seaboard. Through masterful polemics, Paine told Americans that the British constitution
had never been perfect, or even worthy of affection, and that all monarchy was evil. Pure
republicanism could work according to Paine, particularly in America. Common Sense
filled the void that followed George III’s rejection, and the American mind embraced it.
The treason of the King and the impassioned plea of Thomas Paine would finally push a
great number of Americans into a new vision.130 But a convinced people would have to
cajole, threaten and pull their colonial governments and their Congressmen to the
forefront.131
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Yet, even in the wake of popular acceptance of Common Sense, many in
Congress were not convinced, and their reticence in taking up the cause of independence
is understandable. Whether considered contracts or instruments, the constitutions that
opposition Whigs had been defending were more than plans of government or sets of
rights, they were bonds of association with Great Britain and her Empire. Dissolving that
association meant, at least partially, dissolving those constitutions that Whigs in America
had fought for so long to preserve. Independence aimed at a paradoxical goal of
dissolving those constitutions to preserve the liberties that they had historically preserved.
Whigs had also glorified the mixed nature of the British constitution. Monarchy,
aristocracy and democracy, they told themselves, had been balanced to perfection in the
King, House of Lords and Commons. The British constitution represented the height of
governmental achievement and yet in the years after the Seven Years War something had
gone terribly wrong. Parliament had become tyrannical. Some blamed the Ministry
while making excuses for the king.132 Paine had tried to debunk the old Whig myth cycle
of constitutional disintegration and reconstitution, but some like Dickinson continued to
resist the lesson; it was a difficult vision for old Whigs to let go of even in 1776.133
Many who were radicals in the early 1770s because of their support for resistance
to British parliament and support for colonial unity, became the new conservatives of
1775 and 1776. This transformation was what happened to John Dickinson and Thomas
Willing. They did not revert to conservatism; rather, colonial radicalism had outpaced
them in the debate for independence. Dickinson could not support independence though
he continued to fight for the American cause outside of Congress. He clung to the hope
132
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that a peace, advantageous to American rights within the Imperial structure, could be
achieved. And he was not the only one. Most of the Pennsylvania delegation could not
bring themselves to vote for independence when the time came. They would not agree to
independence, even though Pennsylvania‘s Assembly rescinded the delegates’ original,
prohibitive instructions, in a vain attempt at political self-preservation.134
Dickinson’s refusal to embrace independence in 1776 temporarily cost him his
political career in Pennsylvania, and the failure of the colonial Assembly to embrace it
eventually led to the dissolution of the Assembly and the colonial charter of 1701.135
Wilson’s friendly association with the conservatives almost ended his career as well.
In May of 1776, a radical committee of one hundred, supported by the militia and
a majority of Philadelphians, voted to hold a constitutional convention to frame a new
state constitution. Pennsylvania’s peaceful coup was partially enabled by John Adams
who stealthily pushed a resolution through Congress that advised all of the colonies to
support only governments that supported colonial rights.136 It was custom-made to
undermine the Pennsylvania government that had so vocally opposed independence, and
thereby terminate Dickinson’s conservative network. Wilson, understanding the
resolution’s import, tried to postpone it, saying that it placed the people of Pennsylvania
“in a state of Nature.” For Wilson, his attempted postponement was not a conservative
counter-ploy but proceeded from an honest fear of violent anarchy.137
Yet, radicals in Pennsylvania certainly saw Wilson’s failed attempt at
postponement as a betrayal. Responding to the angry reaction of Pennsylvania’s radicals,
134
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Congress produced an apology for Wilson entitled “In Defense of James Wilson.”
Suggestive of the respect that even radical Congressmen held for Wilson, it was signed
by every member of Congress.138
On June 10, 1776 Congress passed portions of a pro-independence resolution
proposed by Richard Henry Lee. Congress formed two committees -- one to consider a
Declaration of Independence and the other to draft Articles of Confederation. But the
definitive question of independence itself was postponed until July.139
As the date of the vote approached, Wilson asked that the vote again be
postponed. The Pennsylvania delegation had not yet received the repeal of its earlier
anti-independence instructions and Wilson wanted the postponement to wait for new
instructions. Impatient radicals in Pennsylvania viewed this request as another betrayal.
He was refused the postponement but, fortunately, the Pennsylvania Assembly’s new
instructions arrived before the vote.140
When Congress cast the vote to accept or reject the Declaration of Independence,
Dickinson and Robert Morris refused to vote, while Charles Humphreys and Thomas
Willing opposed it. James Wilson, John Morton and Benjamin Franklin, unshackled by a
fearful Pennsylvania Assembly, supported it. By a slim margin, Pennsylvania‘s single
vote was cast for independence. Wilson and Dickinson had parted ways, at least on the
issue of independence.141
Of course, Wilson did not escape from the controversy of independence wholly
unscathed. Regardless of bi-partisan support for him in Congress and his eventual
138
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support for independence, radicals in Pennsylvania had come to distrust Wilson. And it
would be the radicals who controlled Pennsylvania after 1776, under their controversial
constitution of 1776. Pennsylvania’s new radical Assembly returned Wilson to Congress
in February of 1777 only because their first choice for Wilson’s replacement, William
Moore had declined.142
During his first career as a Congressman, both before and after the independence
controversy, Wilson proved to be an active member and a consistent populist. He was an
active member of numerous committees including the Committee on Indian Affairs and,
along with just four others, he served on the Board of War that oversaw military affairs.
In the debates over the proposed Articles of Confederation, Wilson was one of those who
campaigned for proportional representation by population in Congress, rather than equal
state representation. And it was Wilson who made a failed motion, seconded by John
Adams, to open Congress to the public. But, regardless of Wilson’s energy or populism,
radicals in Pennsylvania continued to dislike him. In addition, Wilson’s behavior shortly
after his return to Congress appears to have been fatalistic, as if he deliberately intended
to commit political suicide. Perhaps he thought his removal from Congress was
inevitable or his scruples necessitated a certain forwardness. Whatever the case, as soon
as the radical Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 was complete Wilson began to criticize
it in public and in his correspondence. Reacting, the state Assembly removed Wilson
from Congress in September of 1777.143 Wilson’s first career as a continental statesman
had come to an end.
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Wilson’s first years in America were filled with excitement, transforming Wilson,
as well as the North American continent. The majority of Europeans living on the eastern
coast of North America convulsively turned from British Americans, dedicated to the
mixed government of the British Empire, into Americans dedicated to creating lasting,
pure republics. Amid all of the tumult, however, some consistencies can be found. Many
political ideas, certainly those that had motivated the Revolution, remained an influence.
A belief remained in the corrupting influence of concentrated, unchecked power, the
requirement of constitutionalism and the centrality of positive rights, embodied in actual
representation in government for the preservation of liberty. “Liberty” itself was,
perhaps, the most important consistency. Whigs had tried to preserve the British
constitution and the colonial charters to preserve liberty, but once the constitution proved
too corrupt to preserve they embraced independence and pure republicanism to preserve
liberty as well. So, if consistency counts for authenticity, the American Revolution
would be better known as a “liberty revolution” than a “republican” or “constitutional
revolution.” Such was the spirit captured by Wilson when he wrote during the
independence controversy that it was preferable to remain in the Empire, but if necessary,
they would leave to secure their core goal -- “that America may be Free.” The
preservation and even progress of “liberty” was the goal. First mixed government and
constitutionalism, and then republicanism and constitutionalism were the tools that
American radicals alternately depended upon to achieve the goal.
Of course, some were slower than others to accept that the preservation of liberty
required independence and the construction of pure republics. Some would never accept
this end at all and became Tories. Wilson certainly lagged behind the Adams’s in the

58

realization that independence was a necessity, but so had most in Congress. In the end,
before the Declaration of Independence was voted on, Wilson had decided for
independence. He probably had also come to think of sovereignty residing
contemporarily and un-transferrably in the people at large by 1776, like many other
American revolutionaries.144
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CHAPTER III
WILSON: EVOLVING DEMOCRAT OR CONSPIRATORIAL ELITIST?

Though a pivotal political figure of the revolutionary cause, Wilson’s enemies in
Philadelphia often reviled him as an aristocrat, even accusing him of being a closet Tory.
Nothing could have been further from the truth. But Wilson’s sloth in embracing
independence had made him suspect, and his resistance to the 1776 Pennsylvania
Constitution and the later price control movement nearly cost the statesman his life.
As Wilson protested Pennsylvania’s constitution of 1776 from Congress,
Pennsylvania became more factionalized over the issue. Anti-constitutionalists began to
organize against the new constitution, proclaiming that their goal was to amend or replace
the radical constitution. This movement took on the title of the “Republicans.” In
reaction, pro-constitutionalist forces rallied as the “Constitutionalists.”145
The committees that seized control of Pennsylvania had depended on the support
of the lower classes that were composed mainly of Presbyterians. These radical
committees had been opposed by the older Quaker/Anglican political order that had
controlled the colonial government under the charter of 1701. The constitution that
radicals designed in 1776 reflected the previous decade of struggle, and can be viewed as
a logical outcome of those struggles. It was also one of the first new state constitutions
following independence, and therefore one of the first constitutional experiments in pure
republicanism in America. Like most of the new state constitutions, Pennsylvanians
crafted their constitution of 1776 to maximize the powers of the assembly while
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minimizing the powers of the executive, but the radical Pennsylvanians took these
precepts to extremes. The Pennsylvanians also tried to construct constitutional
mechanisms to realize popular sovereignty in the highest echelons of the political
process.146
To assuage the lower class supporters of the radical cause, the state convention
expanded suffrage in the new state constitution to include all adult, male inhabitants who
had resided in the state for a year and had been assessed for any tax. Because of this
innovation, the Pennsylvanian constitution is commonly thought to be one of the most
democratic constitutions produced by the states, as it was then. Yet, the test oath,
specifically designed to alienate the Quakers and their allies (Quakers considered the
taking of oaths to be prohibitively impious), makes the overall democratic nature of that
constitution questionable. The structure of government required by the constitution
involved a unicameral legislature, a plural executive of twelve called the “Supreme
Executive Council,” and a “Council of Censors” to assemble every seven years with the
option of remaining in session for a maximum of one year.147
The legislature proved the most dominant force in the government. Each county
was equally represented in the assembly, but that would change after two years when a
census was to be taken, after which representation was to be in proportion to population.
The population of the counties would be re-assessed every seven years.148
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The Pennsylvanian President was the chairman of the Supreme Executive
Council. The Council was a plural executive that was elected by popular vote. But the
Council’s President was selected jointly by the Councilmen and the Assembly. The
President could do nothing without the consent of his Council, and the whole executive
was without a veto and nearly powerless to act without the express consent of the
legislature. The Council appointed all non-elected officers, including judges who would
sit for seven-year terms rather than during good behavior.149
In an attempt to institutionally realize popular sovereignty Pennsylvania radicals
had established two political mechanisms aside from the popular election of key
government officials. First, the legislature could not pass legislation into law without
first publishing and distributing bills for public perusal and approval. Second,
amendments to the constitution could only be made by special conventions elected by the
People to make amendments. However, only the Council of Censors had the
constitutional right to call for such conventions.
The Council of Censors would be popularly elected septennialy (one
representative being sent from each county), to sit for one year and review laws already
passed to determine their constitutionality. In this way, Pennsylvania radicals searched
for a mechanism to counter-act the constitutional decay that they believed had come to
corrupt the British constitution -- the Censors was their solution. If the Censors found a
law unconstitutional then it became void. They could also call for special conventions to
make amendments in the constitution.150
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The Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 proved a clumsy instrument of
government, particularly in times of emergency. And the sloth and impotence of the
government that it created would only be exacerbated by the factional struggles that its
passage initiated.
Analyzing votes in the Pennsylvanian Assembly along lines of wealth, regional
affiliation and religion, historian O.S. Ireland has shown that religion was the most
prevalent predicator of factionalism between Constitutionalists and Republicans on a
state wide basis. The centrality of religious issues makes sense within the context of
Pennsylvania’s history up to 1776. The Anglican/Quaker alliance that had controlled
colonial politics under the old charter had been ostracized from their dominant political
positions in 1776. The radicals who replaced them under the new constitution of 1776
were predominantly Presbyterian, Calvinist and Lutheran, and had placed a test oath in
the constitution that alienated Pennsylvania’s Quakers. Many still active Anglicans
reacted by organizing opposition that coalesced into the anti-constitutional, Republican
party. Republicans focused most on the test oath over the next thirteen years of factional
strife.151 Of course, not every Republican was an Anglican or Quaker. Exceptions
existed such as James Wilson, who was a Presbyterian, but the majority of core
Republicans were certainly children of the older religio-political alliance.
Nonetheless, the religious and constitutional factionalists of Pennsylvania adopted
other issues, either to bolster support for their factions or because their own convictions
dictated that they promote an additional agenda. The issue of price controls provides an
excellent example. In 1778-79, Pennsylvania, and particularly the artisans and laborers
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of Philadelphia, groaned under the pressure of run-away inflation. They demanded action
and claimed that price-gouging Tory merchants were to blame. Their solution was price
controls. The Constitutionalist legislature balked and the Constitutionalist Joseph Reed,
by then President of Pennsylvania, thought the idea of price controls foolish.
Nonetheless, in Philadelphia Constitutionalists like Tom Paine and Charles Willson Peale
rushed to the common man’s cause of price controls, eventually setting up an extra-legal
committee to issue and enforce prices. These men may have had humanitarian
convictions concerning price controls as poor relief, but many Philadelphia
Constitutionalists saw price controls as a way to bolster support for their faction in the
city.152
The factional issues of the Republicans and the Constitutionalists became even
further complicated because elites in the respective factions often had additional scruples
against the 1776 Constitution. Benjamin Rush despised the constitution on the grounds
that it was too democratic and threatened anarchy in government. It was bad enough that
most Republicans represented the dominant religio-political faction of pre-independence
Pennsylvania, but when claims such as Rush’s came out of Republican meetings,
Constitutionalists took full advantage of the anti-popular rhetoric. Constitutionalists
pigeonholed Republicans as closet Tories and aristocrats.153
James Wilson’s complaint against the 1776 constitution was three fold. First, like
almost every Republican, he focused on the unfairness -- the illiberality -- of the
constitution’s test oath. Second, Wilson complained that the various offices and powers
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of the constitution did not have the appropriate institutional checks and balances to guard
against corruption. Wilson disliked the unicameral legislature and was particularly
suspicious of the Council of Censors, which, in its yearlong session, would hold
exceedingly great powers. The 1776 constitution was also, quite simply, impractical.
Legislation was an exceedingly slow process and the septennial limitation on the
amendment process was overly rigid. Unlike his friend and factional compatriot Rush,
Wilson never argued that the 1776 constitution was too popular.154 Nonetheless,
factional strife was no place for refined discernments. Wilson had taken up the mantle of
a leading Republican partisan and his opponents labeled him an aristocrat for it.
Ejected from Congress and returning to his law practice in Carlisle, Wilson took a
leading role in Cumberland County‘s anti-constitutional movement. Carlisle proved to be
predominantly Constitutionalist. The hostile environment of Carlisle, combined with
new business opportunities proffered by his friends in mercantile ventures, made the idea
of returning to Philadelphia attractive. But Philadelphia had been occupied by the British
in 1777. It would only be days after the British evacuation of Philadelphia in June 1778
that Wilson would sell his house in Carlisle and return to the city.155
Returning to Philadelphia, Wilson began arguing cases in the Courts. Wilson had
become one of the most successful lawyers in Pennsylvania before he had entered
Congress, and his reputation had not faded during his time in government service.
The people of Philadelphia had been enraged by the British occupation, and once
the troops had gone, they turned their wrath against those in the city who were thought to
be Tory. Wilson, believing that many of the “Tories” had been wrongfully accused,
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joined with like-minded lawyers George Ross and William Lewis to defend them. All of
their defendants were accused of treason because they had aided the British during their
occupation of the city. Many were neutral Quakers who had, like others, cooperated with
the British when it was expedient. The defense attorneys put forth their best effort but in
some instances an unfriendly, politicized jury (something that Wilson complained of
more than once to the Court) found the accused guilty.156 It was a noble action,
comparable to John Adam’s defense of the British soldiers and an officer following the
Boston Massacre, but most Tory baiters in the city surely did not see the behavior so
benignly.157 Also, when the state of Pennsylvania seized the property of the Penn family
under the divestment act of 1779, Wilson and his friends argued before the state assembly
in favor of compensation for the Penns. So, Wilson’s loyalties must have appeared
suspect to the majority of people in Philadelphia -- certainly the agitated lower classes.158
Wilson also allied himself with his Republican compatriots on the issue of price
controls in 1779. Republicans in Philadelphia formed a united voice against price
controls, in defiance of the Constitutionalists and their extra-legal Committee of Trade.
Merchants such as Robert Morris or men intimately involved in mercantile ventures such
as Wilson made up the Republican leadership.159 They advocated free markets. Wilson
had been an advocate of the ascending theory of self-regulating markets at least since
1774. In his revised Considerations...On Parliament, Wilson included a footnote at the
end that anticipated criticism of his theory of confederated Empire. Because he had
denied British Parliament the right to regulate American trade, Wilson understood that
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some would think that he was arguing for anarchy in trans-Atlantic trade. Pre-supposing
this criticism, Wilson rebutted, arguing that Atlantic markets could regulate themselves.
“The stream of commerce,” Wilson had told the reader in 1774, “never flows with so
much beauty and advantage, as when it is not diverted from its natural channels.”160
Wilson agreed with Morris that inflation had been caused by the excess issuance of paper
currency and not unscrupulous merchants operating within a British plot. But the
rejection of price controls by Morris, Wilson and the Republican Society of Philadelphia
must have made them appear to be cold aristocrats indeed, particularly in the eyes of
desperate laborers -- a newly politicized class of men that dominated the militia.161
To understand Wilson’s idea of progress, at least economic progress, it is
necessary to understand that Wilson, at least partially, embraced a rising new ideology
that contemporary historians have called “political economy.” The tension that existed
between this new ideology and older, traditional socio-economic ideas, that historians
call “moral economy,” acted as a force on both sides of the Atlantic. Historian Eric
Foner demonstrated that the problems of 1779 Philadelphia were connected to this larger
current and problem of civil development. For centuries, economic concerns had been
merely another moral consideration of the community and part of the moral cosmos that
the hierarchical structure of society was supposed to maintain. Certain economic
arrangements existed in communities that most perceived to be beneficial to the good
order of society. The common people had a right to these “moral economy”
arrangements while their social betters had a duty to maintain them. An English example
would be the maintenance of accessible, well supplied, farmer’s markets that opened their
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business for small buyers before allowing access to merchants. If farmers tried to sell
their goods away from markets, or showed preference for bulk-purchasing London
merchants, their communities might react violently to protect their eroded rights,
particularly in times of dearth.162
As the eighteenth century progressed, moral economy and its national,
imperialistic cousin, mercantilism, was ever more challenged by a rising philosophy of
free-market trade and private self-regulation known as “political economy” or freemarket capitalism. This new manner of thinking about economics had been in
development for at least a century before it found its most famous proponent in Adam
Smith. It was a philosophy chiefly promoted by the merchant-dominated gentry of the
British trans-Atlantic world. As it gained force among government officials the tension
increased between supporters of political economy and moral economy, usually pitting
gentry against commoner respectively. That tension was very observable in the political
struggles of 1779 Philadelphia.
Wilson’s economic thought was most influenced by the writings of James
Stewart, another lowland Scot. Wilson’s economic thought was nothing unusual because,
until Adam Smith published Wealth of Nations, Stewart had been the most influential
economist in America. In his Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy, Stewart
described an economy driven and stabilized by private credit. It was to be fiscal strength
and expansive credit that could provide society with the surplus materials that it needed
and wanted, not trade or price regulations. Yet, Stewart was no Smithian, or laissez-faire
economist. With one foot still in the realm of moral economy, Stewart thought that
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162

Rosswurm, Arms, Country, and Class, 66-108.
Foner, Tom Paine, 146-149; E. P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the

68

government had a role and duty in creating a powerful economy. It continued to be a
moral duty of rulers to the broader community. He also feared a deficit of exports in
comparison to imports, believing, like mercantilists, that specie would be drained away to
the detriment of the state. But the best way to correct or guard against such trade deficits
was to maintain a healthier economy than competitor states -- through credit. And the
best way to promote credit and fiscal strength in the private sector was through strong
banks, according to Stewart. Government’s role was to be in helping these banks get
started and lending them specie in times of economic stagnation.163
Wilson’s thinking was identical to Stewart’s, always insisting that strong credit
created by strong banks was necessary for the material progress of the United States.
And like Stewart, Wilson did not think that government interference with trade was wise,
limiting government’s role to the promotion and regulation of banks. It is therefore
understandable why Wilson opposed price regulations in 1779 -- he thought the entire
movement for price regulations foolhardy. It was an opinion that he was outspoken on,
and it placed him, along with many others on a collision course with the lower classes of
Philadelphia.164
The lower classes of Philadelphia suffered from rampant inflation in 1779. Grain
and produce had been drained from the markets of Philadelphia by the demands of the
Revolutionary war -- Continental Army troops, active militia and French troops had to be
fed. Inflation had also been exacerbated by an excessive issuance of paper currency by
the Pennsylvania Assembly. In addition, some merchants may have taken advantage of
the situation to turn a profit, or at least, unintentionally deepened the economic crisis by
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continuing to export. The merchants, nonetheless, were probably the lesser part of the
problem, but in the view of laborers and small artisans in the city wealthy merchants were
the chief cause. And as the economic crisis deepened it became difficult for the
Pennsylvania Assembly to supply its troops.165
A popular cry went out for price controls to force merchants to sell at fair prices.
The Assembly, though controlled by Constitutionalists, failed to pass price control
regulation. Local Constitutionalists in Philadelphia, however, proved more receptive.
Constitutionalists like Charles Willson Peale began to organize laborers, small artisans,
and ultimately militiamen, into an energetic price control movement. Leading
Constitutionalists formed a standing committee in May of 1779, known as the Committee
of Trade. The Committee was to produce extra-legal price regulations, enforceable by
either militia or civilian crowd action. Following the Committee’s first proclamations, an
angry crowd swarmed down to Philadelphia’s market where they forced bakers and
butchers to lower their prices.
On the other side of the Atlantic an unbroken tradition of crowds enforcing price
controls onto sellers had long existed, particularly in times of dearth. These traditions
provided a kind of customary law for crowd action and price controls in pre-industrial
England. But no such traditions existed for the Philadelphians, who had never known
similar economic hardships before the Revolution, so no spontaneous crowd actions
occurred before the formation of the Committee of Trade in May. Legitimacy for crowd
actions in Philadelphia could not be drawn from traditional law, but was to be drawn
from popularly elected institutions like the Committee of Trade. For Englishmen, custom
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gave them the authority to riot; for Philadelphians in 1779, institutionalized popular
sovereignty replaced that traditional force.166
Unfortunately for the radicals, the price control movement would never be as
effective as it was energetic. As early as September of 1779, the Committee of Trade had
dissolved indefinitely over internal divisions, and perhaps the realization that price
controls could not be consistently enforced. Many merchants continued to defy the price
ceilings that the Committee had mandated.167
Because inflation was hurting the war effort, many militiamen began to associate
the apparent greed of certain wealthy merchants with Toryism. In October, frustrated
militiamen seized four prisoners and paraded them in a rogue’s march through the streets
as Tories. Those paraded were all wealthy and suspect merchants, though none of them
were members of the Republican Society, the local Philadelphian arm of the Republican
Party. Objected to by Peale because of its rashness, the goal of the parade was to
disgrace the intransigent merchants in front of the community. But a rumor had spread
that the militiamen were after Wilson. Wilson himself had petitioned the Assembly for
protection earlier in the day but was ignored. When the parade could not be diverted
from moving up Chestnut Street, where Wilson lived, Wilson’s Republican allies thought
that their worse fears had been confirmed. Between twenty to forty men ran ahead of the
militia and, with their guns ready, awaited the anticipated attack of Wilson’s home.168
When the militia reached Wilson’s house they continued marching -- they had not
set out to attack any homes, not even Wilson’s. But as the rear guard of the militia
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column reached the front of the house a Wilson supporter yelled out from an upstairs
window. An argument began and a shot was fired, though no one later could be sure who
fired the shot first. The militia column stopped and came back toward the house to lay
siege to it. The Republican partisans in Wilson’s home had made their worse fears come
true.
Wilson and his allies kept the militia at bay. The mob breached the house only
once, and was then pushed out. The enraged militia commander, Captain Ephraim
Faulkner, sent a small group to attain a cannon. Before the artillery could be brought,
however, Pennsylvania’s Constitutionalist President Joseph Reed arrived and dispersed
the militia at the head of a cavalry charge. Many of the militiamen were arrested but
those who had defended Fort Wilson were allowed to go free. The Wilson defenders then
marched in a victory parade through the streets.169
The militia riot has become known to history as the “Fort Wilson Riot” or “the
Fort Wilson Incident” and it was the end of the price control movement. The riot
stigmatized the issue of price controls, causing elites like Peale to separate themselves
from it and the politicized laborers/militiamen on whom the Constitutionalists had
depended. The removal of price controls and the lower orders from the factional arena
opened Pennsylvania up for a sweeping Republican electoral victory seven years later
after Robert Morris and James Wilson gave the Republicans an issue to finally win on -the Bank controversy.170
Robert Morris, Thomas Willing and James Wilson were among the creators and
charter members of the Bank of Pennsylvania in 1780. They hoped that the bank would
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establish credit that could be used to pay war expenses and stabilize the Pennsylvanian
economy, all while turning a nice profit. Yet, the bank failed because the
Constitutionalist dominated Pennsylvania Assembly refused to support it and withheld
capital that Morris and his friends had depended upon. Constitutionalists feared the bank
because Republicans controlled it and because such a large concentration of capital could
be used to corrupt state politics.171 So again, Republicans and Constitutionalists divided
on an economic issue, this time the bank issue. And again, the Constitutionalists had
chosen the wrong side of history, but this time the ramifications would be more painful
for them.
Small artisans had been an important group within the Constitutionalist ranks in
the days of price controls. They had been hurt by rampant inflation and had pre-existing
suspicions of their suppliers that were only exacerbated by accusations of price gouging.
On the Bank controversy, however, small artisans began abandoning the
Constitutionalists to support Republicans. Artisans agreed with Republicans that a bank
could renew the energy of the Pennsylvanian economy. The Republican argument was
powerful enough to win over radicals like Tom Paine but not the Pennsylvanian
Assembly. As the 1780s progressed the Republicans gained political ground on the
Constitutionalists while the Constitutionalist Party became marginalized as an anti-bank
western party.172
The first bank, spearheaded by Robert Morris, Thomas Willing and James Wilson
was supposed to be a temporary institution to raise funds for the war effort. It succeeded
in raising money while the Pennsylvania Assembly proved incompetent to do the same.
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All of a sudden the merchants, when operating through the bank, appeared to be the best
friends of the Revolution. The Constitutionalists, dominating the Assembly appeared to
be bunglers. The failure of the Constitutionalist dominated Assembly was instrumental
in giving the Republicans a majority in the Assembly in 1781.
After the first bank had dissolved, Morris and Wilson continued to strive for a
more permanent bank. Morris took advantage of his position as Superintendent of
Continental Finances to propose the idea of a national bank to Congress. Needing
money, Congress agreed and granted Morris a charter in 1781. Wilson was made a
member of the Board of Trustees and began borrowing money for his own land
transactions.173
The elections of 1783 gave the Republicans a solid majority in both the
Pennsylvania Assembly and the Supreme Executive Council. And John Dickinson,
recently returned to Pennsylvania politics as a Republican, was selected as President of
the Supreme Executive Council. Late in the previous year Wilson had served as an
attorney for the state in a territorial dispute between Pennsylvania and Connecticut.
Arguing before a special court established by Congress at Trenton, New Jersey, Wilson
spearheaded Pennsylvania’s legal team to win a noteworthy victory for his state. Soon
after, the Republican majority in the Pennsylvania Assembly rewarded Wilson by
sending him back to Congress as a delegate.174
Republicans also managed to gain a majority in Pennsylvania’s first Council of
Censors in 1784. Predictably, they issued a call for a new constitutional convention, but
Constitutionalists undermined the process at the county level and the convention never
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materialized. To many the Republicans had overreached by trying to call for a
convention and, in 1785, Constitutionalists had regained a narrow majority in the
Assembly. As a result, Republican and Constitutionalist bickering over the Republican
controlled bank reached a new apex. Constitutionalists, once again in control of the
Assembly, tried to repeal the Bank’s charter in Pennsylvania.
Wilson, still a member of Congress but also the Bank’s lawyer, argued in the
Assembly and in print that the Pennsylvania Assembly could not repeal the charter.175
Through a broad interpretation of the second clause of the Articles of Confederation, he
claimed that the power to establish the National Bank was implicit to the powers of the
confederal government. After establishing the constitutionality of the bank, Wilson
maintained that confederal law was implicitly superior to state law and that Pennsylvania
could not repeal a Congressionally established institution such as the National Bank. In
addition, Wilson pointed out that the charter of the bank was a contract, and it was
contrary to common law that a legislature could dissolve contracts without due
process.176 Moving from a legal argument, Wilson ended by describing the benefits of
the bank to both Pennsylvania and the Confederation.177
Though Wilson’s argument was overwhelming, the Assembly, nonetheless,
repealed the bank charter in Pennsylvania. But the evermore pro-bank electorate of the
state would not prove forgiving.178 In the 1786 elections, Republicans enjoyed a massive
victory and Wilson’s continued career in Congress was assured.179
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Because of his caution in accepting independence, his outspoken criticism of the
Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 and the price control movement of 1779, and legal
defense of accused Tories, many in Pennsylvania thought of him as a pro-British
aristocrat. But their prejudice against Wilson was unfounded. Wilson always proved to
be, philosophically, a populist. And while others in the states grew reticent of the People
between 1776 and 1787, Wilson was not one of them. As will be seen in Chapter 5,
though Wilson saw first hand the wrath of the mob he was one of the most devoutly and
consistently democratic delegates at the federal convention of 1787. He remained
optimistic that the people could govern themselves, and would play a key role in the next
great American experiment in pure republicanism.
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CHAPTER IV
WILSON THE CONTINENTALIST AND THE CONFEDERATION

The pan-state convention that met at Philadelphia in 1787 to suggest changes in
the Articles of Confederation was the culmination of frustrations and fears that had been
developing since before the Articles had gone into effect in 1781. When the problems of
the Confederation continued to grow after the end of the war in 1783, the inefficiency of
the confederal system could no longer be blamed on the tumults of war. And the inability
of advocates for more centralized power to push amendments through the state
legislatures, even during the post-war crisis years of the mid eighties, compelled them to
revive the use of special conventions to solve the Confederation’s governmental
problems. Supporters of a stronger confederation grew until enough political impetus
existed to form a working convention for reform in 1787 that represented every state but
Rhode Island. This Constitutional Convention, as it would later be called, proposed an
entirely new constitution that through popular ratification, became the federal
Constitution of 1787.180
Early in the Imperial and constitutional crisis that turned, finally, into a war for
independence and republican revolution, James Wilson developed a continental
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sensibility like many other veterans of Congress and the Continental Army. Still, among
many in Congress and the states the continental spirit waned as the war dragged on, and
was eclipsed by a new localism fearful of greater Congressional authority and the designs
of other states.181 Wilson was not the victim of such an entropy of unifying spirit. His
pan-state view was more constant and emphatic than that of many of his compatriots. So
in 1787 Wilson would not need a fear of continental anarchy to revive his dedication to
centralized, continental government. Consequently, his view of the purpose of the
resultant 1787 constitution never had the decidedly conservative coloring that appeared in
the thinking of some of the Founders.
Two facts of Wilson‘s life may explain his early continental disposition. First,
Wilson was not native to his home state of Pennsylvania but had emigrated there from
another region of the British Empire in young adulthood. Before independence he
probably had a more cosmopolitan view of Pennsylvanians as subjects within an empire
and after independence he naturally developed a broader view of Pennsylvanians as
continental citizens. Second, Wilson was alienated from governmental politics in
Pennsylvania through much of the war and was a leader of the opposition movement that
antagonized the Pennsylvanian establishment. At one point a crowd that had, in his
opinion, been misguided by Constitutionalist partisans, attacked his house. So to Wilson
state politics were by no means inherently preferable to continental politics.
As early as 1777, in the debates over the Articles of Confederation, Wilson
expressed a continental view to the chagrin of others who were already beginning to
worry about the evolution of Congressional power. Along with John Adams, Wilson
argued that Congress should approach the United States as a single political society rather
181
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than many.182 And as noted previously, Wilson advocated a proportional allotment of
representation between the states in Congress based on population.183
Like at the Philadelphia Convention ten years later, the continentally-minded
were most emphatically opposed by small state delegates who believed that their
communities would be eclipsed if not absorbed by the larger states under a more
centralized political structure.184 They demanded that representation of the states in
Congress remain equal and that Congress be given as little power as possible. But the
small state delegates were not alone in their distrust of Congressional power. It was
Thomas Burke of North Carolina who added the finishing touch to the confederacy’s decentralized structure in the Articles of Confederation. His amendment, passing against
the lonely protests of James Wilson and Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, stated that
Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.185
When Congress finally agreed to the Articles in 1777, those who opposed centralized
power and a national structure had won on every key point. The proposed Articles did
not form a new nation but codified the loose military league of independent states that
had already formed -- a league that would prove ever more fiscally inefficient as the war
progressed. Though notably weak, distrust of Congressional power grew fast enough in
the states that it would still take four more years for all the states to ratify the Articles.186
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The Articles of Confederation divided legislative power between Congress and
the legislatures of the states. Each state in Congress was to have a single vote, though
contributions were to be in proportion to surveyed lands within any given state. And
revenue bills had to be agreed to by the delegations of nine states in Congress and by all
of the state legislatures before becoming law. Congress also needed better than a simple
majority to exercise other key legislative powers. Without the assent of at least nine state
delegations Congress could not,
engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque or reprisals...nor enter into any
treaties or alliances, nor coin money...nor ascertain the sums and expenses
necessary for the defense...of the United States, nor emit bills, nor borrow
money on the credit of the United States...nor agree upon the number of
vessels of war, to be built or purchased...nor appoint a commander in chief
of the army or navy.
Amendments to the Articles, like revenue bills, had to be agreed to by both Congress and
all of the state legislatures.187
As may be expected among a military league of states the Articles mandated
comity between the states in numerous instances. “All privileges and immunities of free
citizens” within any state including “free ingress and regress” and “all the privileges of
trade and commerce” were to be observed in every state. Each state was to accept the
judgments and records of other states with “full faith and credit.” In addition, states were
forbidden to place imposts on goods moving from one state to another. They were also
forbidden to form treaties with one another or any other nation, or wage war without
Congressional consent. The states were to obey treaties “entered into by the United
States in Congress.” Unfortunately, the impotence of Congress made these regulations
unenforceable. Though the Articles proclaimed that they should be “inviolably observed
187
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by every State” there was no mechanism to realize the claim. The Confederation had no
national executive or courts, or any express right to coerce individuals in the states or the
governments of the states.188
When James Wilson returned to Congress in 1782 he found an inefficient and
frustrated confederal government. Congress had consistently proven ineffective at
paying and supplying their troops. In 1783, Congress moved to Princeton from
Philadelphia, avoiding angry militiamen who had gathered outside the Pennsylvania State
House. The troops disbanded only when they were told that Continental troops were on
their way to route them.189 Later in the same year, near the end of the war, Congress’s
failure to pay troops nearly led to a general mutiny of the Continental Army at
Newburgh, Pennsylvania. Numerous officers had decided to abandon Congress for the
West if the war continued and march to force funds from Congress if the war was ended.
If it had occurred, the mutiny would have probably ended the American experiment in
pure republicanism with dictatorship. But the mutiny was diffused non-violently by the
clever leadership of George Washington. Even Robert Morris and Alexander Hamilton
dreamed of uniting civilian creditors and Army officers to achieve a coup d’etat,
fortunately to no avail.190
Yet, a small but dogged cadre of men had developed inside and outside of
Congress dedicated to making the confederation more effective by increasing the powers
of Congress. The committee appointed by Congress in 1781 to put the Articles into
effect (that included James Madison) had proposed appointing Congressional tax
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collectors and amending the Articles to give Congress the power to seize the property of
states that refused to pay their assigned contributions. Congress ignored the proposals.191
Re-entering Congress in 1782, Wilson, always the continentalist, joined this group of
centralizers. In 1783, with the support of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison,
Wilson proposed an amendment to the Articles that would have increased the
confederation’s power significantly. It involved a general fund for disbursing the
Confederation’s debt to be raised by a general tax and collected by agents of Congress.
To assuage fears of economic predation by one economic region against the other,
Wilson included the suggestion of a compound tax on land and certain imported goods
such as salt and wine that would distribute, he thought, the tax burden fairly among the
states. The Wilson amendment was agreed to by Congress and sent to the states for
ratification where it was defeated by the lone dissent of Rhode Island. Shortly after,
Virginia repealed its initial acceptance of the Wilson amendment. The unanimity
required by the Articles and a paranoid localism in the states made the confederation
impervious to improvement.192
To fully appreciate the depth of Wilson’s early support for continental
government it will be productive to return to the bank controversy in Pennsylvania,
already discussed in the previous chapter. The present goal requires a more involved
description, however, and from a different angle of analysis. In 1785 a frustrated James
Wilson pioneered a new potential way to increase the powers of the confederal
government. He advanced his new doctrine within the context of the bank controversy
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between Constitutionalists and Republicans in Pennsylvania.193
Pennsylvania Constitutionalists distrusted the bank as a Republican tool to corrupt
officials and electors, by which Republicans might usurp power in the state. The
initiators of the idea of the bank and its key officials were Republicans after all, most
notably James Wilson and Robert Morris. Congress had established a national bank and
the Pennsylvania Assembly, under Republican control in 1782 provided a state charter
for the bank. By 1785, however, Constitutionalists had won back the Assembly. They
decided to repeal the state charter for the bank and declared that the national bank was
unconstitutional. Both as a Congressman and a lawyer for, and stockholder in the bank,
Wilson defended the institution publicly and before the Pennsylvania Assembly.
Wilson argued that the power of Congress to establish a bank was implied in the
Articles of Confederation. Looking to Article II of the Articles of Confederation, he
tackled those clauses guaranteeing state sovereignty and restricting Congress to powers
“expressly delegated to the United States in congress assembled.” The power to establish
a North American bank over all of the states had not existed in any one of the states,
Wilson happily pointed out, so no such power could be delegated by the states.
Therefore, the restrictive “express powers” clause in the second Article had no relevance
to the issue of the Bank of North America. Continuing, Wilson contended that,
Though the United States in congress assembled derive from the particular
states no power...which is not expressly delegated..., it does not thence follow,
that the United States in congress have no other powers..., than those delegated
by the states.194
Wilson cited Article V, that gave one of the purposes for Congress as “the more
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convenient management of the general interests of the United States.” So there were
“more general rights, general powers, and general obligations, not derived from any
particular states...but resulting from the union as a whole.” A North American Bank was
necessary for “the general interests” of the confederacy, and yet the individual states had
no power to institute one, so the power to institute the Bank became implicit in the
powers of Congress. In concluding statements that must have chilled the blood of the
more locally minded among Pennsylvanians Wilson declared that “To many purposes,
the United States are to be considered as one undivided, independent nation...possessed
of all...powers...by the law of nations incident to such.”195
Second, Wilson argued against the Pennsylvania Assembly’s power to dissolve
the charter of the state bank. The state bank charter could not be repealed because it was
a contract. It was not within the appropriate parameters of legislative power to be able to
dissolve contracts. Rather, a firm and certain precedent existed in common law that
contracts were under the jurisdiction of judicial review. For the Pennsylvania Assembly
to arbitrarily repeal the charter would set a precedent endangering “the sure anchors of
privilege and property,” exposing them to “every varying gust of politicks, and will float
wildly...on the irregular and impetuous tides of party and faction.”196
Wilson’s argument of implied powers was an innovation, but his argument
concerning the contractual nature of the state bank charter was not. Nonetheless, the
Pennsylvania Assembly dissolved the state bank charter just as they publicly disavowed
the national bank.197
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Wilson’s well organized and well reasoned argument of implied Congressional
powers was the first meaningful argument for implied powers in American constitutional
history. Within the Pennsylvanian context, his willingness to make such an argument
shows a desperation to preserve an institution necessary for the stability and progress of
Pennsylvania. Within the broader continental context, Wilson’s ideas about implied
powers show not only a desperation to preserve the Bank, but a strategy born of
frustration to promote the powers of Congress.198
A doctrine of implied powers, accepted by the majority, may have succeeded in
increasing the powers of Congress, bypassing the hopelessly difficult amendment process
designated by the Articles. But it is questionable if the majority could have been
convinced. Enough in Congress were convinced in regard to the Bank, but if the doctrine
of implied powers had been extended to other issues it would have probably proved
untenable. History will never know for sure whether it would have worked because those
most dedicated to increased central power under the Articles never seriously tried to
apply it outside of the Bank controversy. It is even uncertain how far Wilson would have
been willing to push implied powers. The doctrine was not embraced by those trying to
increase the powers of Congress for two reasons. First, most of the centralizers among
the founding generation were also rigorous constitutionalists. They valued constitutions
as necessary for the preservation of liberty; constitutions were instruments of the People
that set parameters for government -- the delegates of the People. Those parameters only
had value when observed and enforced, however, and a doctrine of implied powers could
result in a soft constitutionalism in which the parameters were disregarded by those
198

Randolph G. Adams “Introduction” in Political Essays ed. Adams, 16-19; Jensen, American
Constitution, 26.

85

sophistic enough to style the right arguments. Implied power, in other words, could
quickly slip into arbitrary power and a new parliamentary tyranny. The doctrine was too
dangerous to use as a foundation of Congressional power.199
Second, another, safer way existed to by-pass the inane process of the Articles -the special convention. The special convention, drawing its legitimacy either from
established and legitimate governments or directly from the People, was a method that
must have appeared conservative if not strictly constitutional in every instance by 1785.
It had been used repeatedly by British American opposition Whigs and then
revolutionaries during the war. Indeed, Congress itself had begun as a (presumably
temporary) convention of state delegates. And most of the leadership in the United States
had earlier either involved themselves with special local conventions or been a part of
committees that acted on their recommendations. Even before the Articles had been
ratified, in the four years that they hung in legal limbo, some had suggested special
conventions to solve the impasse over the Articles. So it was not unusual that frustrated
supporters of Congressional power embraced the idea of a special convention to agree on
alterations in the Articles.200
As early as 1783, an irritated General George Washington, fretting over the
condition of his troops, had suggested an amending convention to alter the Articles. In
the same year that Wilson was arguing implied powers in Pennsylvania, the legislature of
Massachusetts suggested a convention for amending the Articles to Congress, but the
suggestion was rejected.201 And at a convention of officials from Maryland and Virginia
to resolve navigation disputes at Mount Vernon, a proposal was made to have a more
199
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general convention of the states at Annapolis in the following year to discuss continental
economic and trade policy. The Annapolis Convention in 1786 would only be attended
by delegates from five of the states but would produce an influential proposal for a
convention to modify the Articles of Confederation at Philadelphia, in 1787. It was the
seed of the Constitutional Convention.202
Yet, the precedents of special conventions and the impossibility of reform under
the Articles cannot alone explain why the American leadership sought a more powerful
central government or why they achieved it in 1787. Special conventions and a defunct
amendment process only formed the parameters of their activity, the impetus of their
success lay in a political will for stronger central government that steadily increased
among Americans throughout the period. Fear was the foundation of that will.
The situation of the states, individually and as a confederation, appeared more and
more dire to the American leadership. As the 1780s progressed, it appeared to many that
the thirteen American experiments in pure republicanism were on their way to selfdestruction and were about to take property, the foundation of liberty, to hell with
them.203 Though the revolutionary generation had chosen to embrace pure republicanism
as the surest security for American liberty, they understood pure republics to be at special
risk. Republics were the best form of government for the maximization of liberty
because, being based immediately on the general community, they responded better to the
needs of the general community. But republican government was also the weakest
because it might respond to the community’s irrational whims. In the long run, only an
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essentially virtuous people could sustain a pure republic and its greater liberty. Though
some vice might be inevitable and non-catastrophic and institutional checks might be
erected to counter-act vice, an excess of popular vice would always lead to the failure of
a republic. When vice ran amok the people divided into antagonistic factions, sacrificing
the good of the whole for their own narrow gains. The inevitable result would be the
dissolution of a republic, resulting in the arbitrary rule of the strong.204
Before the revolution, British Americans would have argued that the mixed
constitution of Britain was better than any hypothetical pure republic for the prolonged
promulgation of liberty, because the weakness of republics condemned them to short
lives ending in tyranny. Partially republican, the British constitution sustained liberty
through representation of the Commons in Parliament. Partially aristocratic and
monarchial, it provided stability and long-term security for the liberty that Britons
enjoyed. Stability came from the counterbalance of three distinct classes of society in
Britain, each institutionally represented in government -- the monarchy found in the
Crown, the nobility found in the House of Lords and the commoners found in the House
of Commons.205
But most of the Americans who fought British aggression had, by the late 1770s,
rejected the perfection or even the basic propriety of the British constitution. They
became convinced that Britain's mixed constitution had never worked the way it was
supposed to work or was corrupted beyond repair. Equally important, they became
convinced that pure and lasting republicanism was plausible in America. The American
people were virtuous enough. And many Americans came under the influence of a new
204
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school of governmental thought, most effectively discussed by the philosoph Baron de
Montesquieu, that balanced powers could be effectively established in government even
when countervailing institutions did not represent distinctive and opposing classes within
society.206 America did not have the hereditary class of aristocrats to build a mixed
constitution in any case. Yet, in the later phase of the war and in the years following,
American virtue and class-disassociated balances of government in the states did not
seem to be doing so well.207
By the mid-1780s the highly inflationary post-war economy pitted debtors and
creditors against one another. Many state legislatures made inflation worse by producing
too much paper money to assuage anxious debtors. In some states crowds of debtors had
threatened officials and shut down state courts to prevent judicial proceedings against
them. To ease the pressure on debtors many legislatures began to over produce paper
currency, purposely driving down the value of currency. Security of property itself
seemed threatened by state legislators who spoke loosely of forgiving debts, effectively
dissolving contracts between creditors and debtors. Wilson had experienced this kind of
arbitrary parliamentary power with the dissolution of Pennsylvania’s state bank charter in
1785. When government arbitrarily dissolved contracts no security for property existed,
and no security for liberty could be maintained as a result.208
Congress could not solve its own problems much less help the states. Congress,
unable to draw sufficient funds from the states, faced a gigantic war debt. And in the
tense economic and political environment of the mid-1780s, various states also began to
206

Greene, Delegate’s Library, 43-44; Wood, American Republic, 237-255.
Edward Countryman, Americans: Collision of Histories (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), 66-73;
Wood, American Republic, 396-425.
208
Morgan, Inventing the People, 266; Reid, Concept of Liberty, 68-73; Wood, American Republic, 396207

89

violate the Articles only to underline the impotence of a Congress that could do little
more than verbally admonish them. Some states placed tariffs on each other’s goods,
made treaties or contemplated making treaties with foreign powers and violated the
earlier Congressional peace treaty with Britain, all in violation of the Articles and the will
of Congress.209
The result was a growing chorus of fearful men agreeing with continental thinkers
like Hamilton, Madison, Wilson and Washington that the powers of Congress had to be
increased. Chances of an amendment to the Articles attaining the unanimous consent of
the states continued bleak however, and in 1786 an amending convention was suggested
by the convention at Annapolis. Congress publicly supported the Philadelphia
Convention, mandating that it would propose amendments for the Articles to Congress
for consideration. A final, catastrophic event occurred that provided additional support in
the states for the convention because it seemed to confirm the fears of those who wanted
to increase the powers of Congress. In January, 1787 an ex-Continental Army Captain,
Daniel Shay, led a large rebellion in Massachusetts that had to be suppressed violently by
the state militia. The rebellion probably convinced many states to participate in the
convention that would not have otherwise sent delegates. When the Philadelphia
Convention convened in May, 1787 all the states but Rhode Island would send
delegations. Wilson, the continental nationalist, would play a central role in the
convention.210
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CHAPTER V
WILSON AT THE 1787 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

The federal constitution of 1787 did not create a purely national political structure
out of the thirteen states, but one that was partly national and partly federal and placed
significantly greater power in the central government of the United States than had the
earlier Articles.211 The new central government realized the principle of popular
sovereignty by mandating immediate popular elections of the House of Representatives,
possible mediated popular elections of the President, popular ratification of the
constitution by special convention and the option of popular special conventions to ratify
future amendments to the constitution.212 Some may have also thought that popular
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sovereignty had been realized through the continuation of notable powers in the hands of
the state governments. Many American leaders presumed states to be more
representative of the people because of their greater locality. The hopeful result of
greater locality was a greater intimacy between state representatives and the
represented.213 Though on this last point James Wilson certainly would not have agreed.
During the Philadelphia Convention Wilson proved to be as continentally minded
as his Virginian contemporaries and even more dedicated to populism in government, to
the point of being a true democrat. The proposed constitution that the Philadelphia
Convention produced would not be as free from state interference or as democratic as
Wilson wanted, but he considered it sound enough in its functions and underlying
principles to become one of its leading advocates during the contest for ratification.
Three years after Pennsylvania ratified the new federal constitution Wilson led a
constitutional convention to frame a new constitution for the state similar to the federal
one. Throughout this transformative period Wilson rejected Lockean contractualism in
favor of a democratically instrumental understanding of constitutionalism within a
national United States.
Set for May 14, 1787, not enough delegates had appeared from the various states
to begin the Philadelphia Convention until May 29. Nonetheless, the delegation from
Virginia arrived early and well prepared, James Madison being at the core of their
preparedness. Madison had dedicated himself to studying the history of confederations to
prepare for the convention, and was already a highly experienced continental statesman
who had been struggling to increase the powers of Congress for years. Madison had
designed a general blueprint for a wholly new central government. It would be strong to
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solve the problems of Congressional weakness, republican to perpetuate American
liberty, and involve mechanisms of institutional countervalence and filtration to insulate
the new government from both magisterial and popular vice.214
James Wilson, by this time a veteran Congressman and continentally renowned
lawyer, arrived at the Convention on May 25th with the rest of the Pennsylvania
delegation. It had been little more than a month since his wife Rachael died. As the
delegates descended on the Pennsylvania State House in May, Wilson and his six
children were still in mourning but sorrow was not going to keep Wilson away.215 His
appearance underlines the weight that Wilson understood the event to have.
A quick analysis of the debates of the Convention will make apparent Wilson’s
sincere dedication to continental nationalism and popular sovereignty. No evidence
suggests that Wilson involved himself in a special study of confederations leading up to
the Convention as did Madison. But Wilson had dedicated his life to the study of law,
government and its philosophy as few others had. Throughout the Convention Wilson
repeatedly supported Madison’s vision for a national federal government free from state
domination, proportional representation in Congress, a joint executive-judicial veto over
federal legislation, a powerful federal judiciary and ratification of the proposed
constitution by special popular conventions. Occasional disagreements appeared between
the two statesmen but their disagreements were never divisive, and the fundamental
principles that they operated from were alike. Both of them embraced popular
sovereignty, pure republicanism, institutional counterbalances based on function rather
214

Ketchum, Madison, 188-195; Madison, “Preface” in Debates, 28-33; James Madison, “To George
Washington, 16 April 1787” in The Papers of James Madison, Volume 9, ed. Robert A. Rutland (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), 383; Read, Power vs. Liberty, 25-29, 47-53; Wood, American
Republic, 499-528.

93

than class and the concept of a national American people. Yet, on at least one
fundamental point Madison and Wilson diverged.
Madison believed that the people had to be protected from their own passions.
The “republican remedy” to popular irrationality was institutional “filtrations” of the
popular will and the propagation of inherent political friction in the legislative process.
Achieving an appropriate amount of filtration would require, among other things, putting
some legislators one step away from the people by having them appointed rather than
elected, and extending the terms of office for legislators and other magistrates to insulate
them from temporary public clamor. Conservatism could also be achieved by
“expanding the sphere of representation,” allowing for so many factions that one could
not dominate the governmental process thereby slowing changes and preventing
extremism in policy. A bicameral legislature would also increase conservative policymaking, specifically in the legislative process.216
This way of thinking was alien to Wilson. Wilson’s concern with corruption
during the Convention focused solely on magisterial corruption. The corruption of those
who held power was to be checked through the counterbalance of independent and
functionally limited branches of government as well as a counterbalance between the new
federal government and the states. Wilson trusted the general populace more than did
Madison, and never admitted the existence of representatives between the people and
governmental policy to be a positive good. So when Madison proposed that
representatives in the lower camera of the legislature have terms longer than one year,
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Wilson came out against it.217 However, Wilson supported the idea of Senators having
six-year terms, but for very different reasons than did Madison. Madison wanted
Senators to have longer terms and be elected in staggered elections to insulate the Senate
from popular passions and facilitate conservatism in the body. New Senators would enter
a body in which one third of its members had already been there for two to four years.
Wilson saw the extended terms of the Senators as a necessity to gain the respect of
prejudicially aristocratic foreign powers that would, he thought, be dealing with the
Senate. Staggered terms would also facilitate a more informed handling of diplomatic
affairs over time but allow for the entry of fresh approaches into the institution.218
Representation was, for Wilson, an incidental attribute of free government
necessitated only by the largeness of population. Wilson put this populist point of view
best himself:
Vigorous authority (ought) to flow immediately from the legitimate
source of all authority. The Government ought to possess not only the
force, but the mind and sense of the people at large. The legislature
ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole Society. Representation
is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act
collectively.219
Fortunately for Wilson and Madison, who often looked to each other for support during
the Convention, their philosophical differences never led to a breach between them.
Their historical situation allowed them to sidestep their differences over the precise
reliability of the “people at large.” They were faced with greater worries, by men who
resisted the centralization of power or the realization of other fundamental principles in
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the new federal structure that Wilson and Madison did hold in common.220
When the business of the convention opened, Edmund Randolph proposed
Madison’s plan for the Virginia delegation. What historians have come to call the
Virginia Plan envisioned a highly nationalistic government with representation in a
bicameral Congress, proportionally distributed between the states, based on either free
population or annual contributions. Congress would have the power to lay and collect
taxes from individuals in the states as well as enforce federal laws on individuals in the
states. Congress could veto state legislation that contradicted the new federal constitution
to ensure comity among the states. Congress could also establish an army and a navy that
could be used against intransigent states. The people would elect the lower house for an
unspecified term and the lower house would select the members of the smaller, upper
house for an unspecified term.221
Madison proposed a “National Executive” selected by Congress for an
unspecified term, “to execute the National laws...(and)...enjoy the Executive rights
vested in Congress.” The executive, together with members of the “National Judiciary,”
would form a Council of Revision that could veto federal legislation that it considered
unconstitutional, though the veto could be overridden by a second Congressional vote.
The “National Judiciary” was to be appointed by Congress “to hold their offices during
good behavior.” The high court was to have jurisdiction over federal impeachments,
cases “of a dernier sort,” cases involving international waters, and cases involving two or
more states or parties from two or more states. And the plan called for inferior courts
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with local jurisdiction over federal cases in the states.222
Madison’s plan guaranteed “Republican Government” to the new states that
would soon be culled out of the western territories. An amendment process existed to be
used “whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature
ought not to be required.” The final resolution of the plan called for ratification by
special conventions following Congress’s approval.223
The Virginia Plan expanded the perceived mission of the Convention, turning it
from an amendment convention into a constitutional convention. A few resisted while
most at the Convention accepted the idea that proposing revisions could also mean
proposing a complete replacement of the old Articles. On May 30 Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney of South Carolina and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts voiced doubts that the
Convention had the authority to make such radical suggestions. The convention ignored
them, their suggestions going unanswered in Madison‘s notes. Neither did the two men
breach the issue again -- others would however. Frustrated small state delegates, led by
William Paterson, used the idea that the Convention was overreaching its bounds as an
excuse for presenting their own counter-plan, known to posterity as the “New Jersey
Plan.” Paterson’s plan gave more powers to Congress but representation in Congress
would continue to be equal among the states and would be appointed by the state
legislatures, as it was under the Articles.224 Paterson put it flatly when he said,
A federal compact actually exists, and consult the articles of it we will
still find an equal sovereignty to be the basis of it. No alteration shall be
made without unanimous consent. This is the nature of all treaties. If the
sovereignty of the states is to be maintained, the Representatives must be
drawn immediately from the States, not from the people: and we have no
222
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power to vary the idea of equal sovereignty.225
Wilson immediately took up the task of answering Paterson. He drew from the same
doctrine of moral necessity that he and other opposition Whigs had drawn on in the
controversy with British Parliament. In the interest of preserving liberty, necessity could
allow temporary variations from common law norms or contractual requirements -radical committees were justified in 1774 using such arguments, and it was why the
activity of the Convention was justified in 1787.226 In addition, Wilson “conceived of
himself authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at liberty to propose anything.” It was a
fine but important point. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina and Randolph of Virginia
echoed Wilson. “When the salvation of the Republic was at stake” Randolph argued, “it
would be treason...not to propose what we found necessary.”227
The eventual product of the Convention was very different from the Virginia
Plan, but the influence of the Plan’s outline and underlying assumptions on the federal
Constitution of 1787 is evident. The similarities between the two can be attributed to the
fact that the Virginia Plan dominated the format of the entire Convention, the
mischievous (as Madison and Wilson doubtlessly thought of it) New Jersey Plan not
withstanding. Moving from resolution to resolution in the Virginia Plan, the delegates
discussed and voted on each one. As changes were made the resolutions were re-drawn
to reflect the changes and discussed again.
Resolutions dealing with the legislature cultivated the first formative debates.
Election of legislators and the distribution of representation, particularly in the Senate,
225

Ibid., 123.
Ibid., 123. Wilson’s argument of necessity is not actually supplied by Madison, but it is implied by
Paterson’s attempted rebuttal in which “Mr. Wilson” is specified.
227
Ibid., 125-127.
226

98

drew heated and intricate debate throughout the Convention, filling more space in
Madison’s notes than any other single issue. It was in these debates that Wilson exerted
most of his efforts, as a passionate advocate of popular election, liberal suffrage and
proportional representation in both legislative houses.
On May 31, Gerry of Massachusetts and Roger Sherman of Connecticut “opposed
the election” of the lower house “by the people.” “The evils we experience” Gerry
exclaimed, came “from the excess of democracy.” He went on,
The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots.
(Gerry) was still however republican, but had been taught by experience
the danger of the leveling spirit.228
George Mason of Virginia rebutted, playing upon notions of mixed constitutionalism -here is evidence that, even in 1787, the last vestiges of that antiquated way of thinking
continued to be habitual for some. Mason maintained that the lower house ought to be
directly chosen by the people because it was “to be the grand depository of the
democratic principle -- our House of Commons.”229
Wilson rebutted Gerry and Sherman without references to mixed government.
His comments predicate Wilson’s spirit throughout the Convention. Madison wrote that
Wilson,
contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of the
Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising the federal
pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished to give it
as broad a basis as possible. No government could long subsist without
the confidence of the people. In a republican Government this confidence
was peculiarly necessary. He also thought it wrong to increase the weight
of the state legislatures.230
On the same day, the debate moved to the selection of members of the upper house, that
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would eventually be the Senate, and Wilson took a populist stand again.
Wilson opposed selection of the Senate by either the states or the lower house, as
suggested in the Virginia Plan, because the Senate “ought to be independent of both.” He
contended that “both branches of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the
people.” Otherwise “the two branches will rest on different foundations, and dissentions
will naturally arise between them.” Anticipating a problem between proportional
representation for the large population of America and the desirable smallness of the
Senate, Wilson suggested that special large districts could be drawn, transcending the
borders of the states, for the election of Senators. Madison protested Wilson’s idea.
“Such a mode” Madison argued, “would destroy the influence of the smaller States
associated with larger ones in the same district.” It was an odd argument for the
Virginian to make considering later arguments between him and small state delegates
over the need for mutual trust between large and small states.231
Wilson then butted heads with his old mentor in law, John Dickinson, who had
been sent to the Convention from Delaware. Dickinson must have been surprised by
Wilson’s stance on the election of the Senate, and the argument between Dickinson and
Wilson over popular election quickly became a heated discussion over the nature of
America’s impending federalism. Dickinson favored selection of Senators by the state
legislatures. The state legislatures would make better choices than the people, Dickinson
thought. The Senate should “consist of the most distinguished characters” and bear “as
strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as possible.” He also wanted state
selection of Senators because “the preservation of the states in a certain degree of agency
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is indispensable.” He spoke allegorically that the various states were like planets. The
confederacy was a solar system and the planets “ought to be left to move freely in their
proper orbits.” He accused Wilson of wanting “to extinguish these planets.”232 Wilson
answered his mentor that,
the British Government cannot be our model. We have no materials for
a similar one. Our manners, our laws, the abolition of entails and
primogeniture, the whole genius of the people, are opposed to it.
Adopting Dickinson’s allegory, Wilson observed that just as the planets are subordinate
to the sun, so should the states be subordinate to the central government. And it would
not be the states that would be “devoured” by the new federal government. “On the
contrary” he demanded, “he wished to keep them from devouring the national
Government.” But Dickinson’s caution won the Convention over in the end, and they
voted in favor of his proposal.233
Even after he knew that Senators would not be popularly elected, Wilson
continued to promote proportional representation based on population for the Senate. In
early arguments with Paterson over proportional representation, Wilson took a truly
democratic and passionate stand over proportionality in the legislature. Proclaiming that
“all authority was derived from the people” Wilson demanded that “ equal numbers of
people ought to have an equal number of representatives.” “This principle had been
improperly violated in the Confederation” that Paterson wished to imitate, “owing to the
urgent circumstances of the time.” Paterson had claimed that “New Jersey will never
confederate on the plan before the committee.” Wilson countered that “Pennsylvania
and...some other States, would not confederate on any other” and that “if New Jersey
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would not part with her sovereignty it is vain to talk of Government.”234
However on the following day, June 11, Roger Sherman of Connecticut proposed
that the lower house have proportional representation while the Senate would have equal
representation between the states, as a compromise to break the impasse between the
large and small states. Wilson, with Alexander Hamilton of New York, made a counterproposal “that the right of suffrage in the 2nd branch ought to be the same rule as in the
1st branch.” And it was agreed to but Wilson’s victory regarding the Senate would be
short lived. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut was re-galvanizing Paterson’s small-state
block around the idea of equal suffrage in the Senate as a necessary compromise.
Wilson, along with Madison, would struggle vigilantly to the end to avoid such a
compromise.235
When the issue of equality in the Senate reached a heated stalemate on June 29
and 30, Wilson warned that if equal representation of the states was allowed in the
Senate the “minority (would) controul in all cases whatsoever.” “Is it for men” that they
were forming a government, Wilson sarcastically asked, “or for the imaginary beings
called States?” If the legislature of the new government was not laid upon the
appropriate principles of popular suffrage, Wilson warned “it can be neither solid or
lasting.” Madison sided with Wilson, saying that a majority of states might obstruct and
“extort measures repugnant to the wishes and interests of the Majority” of the People.
Striking at the factional assumptions of the small-state delegates, Madison made a
prophetic statement to a twenty-first century observer. If “great divisions of interest in
the United States” developed it would be between “the Northern and Southern” not the
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small and large states. Madison’s speculation was ignored and Ellsworth simply denied
that the minority would dominate the majority through the Senate. Rather, Ellsworth
claimed, the Senate would be a defense for the minority.236
On the heels of this exchange between the two blocks, William Richardson Davie
of North Carolina pointed out that if proportional representation were to be had in the
Senate, the senatorial body would have to be very large. A large Senate ran contrary to
the desire of the majority in the Convention including Wilson, that the Senate was to be
small, or at least smaller than the House. The Senate was supposed to be a more
conservative body to stabilize the legislative process and deal more consistently with
foreign powers. The smallness of the body was supposed to result in greater
conservatism, either because it filtered the factional interests of the people into a few
representatives who would then have to consider all factional perspectives or because
fewer men would have more intimate professional relationships.237
Wilson admitted that the problem was real and “embarrassing.” It was a problem
that he had anticipated when, in his bid to make Senators popularly elected, he suggested
that the states be divided into larger districts for electing Senators. What was
embarrassing was that Madison, his chief ally in proportional senatorial representation,
had earlier argued forcefully against the idea of special larger districts. Now Wilson
suggested a different method of overcoming the problem that he presented as an alternate,
more moderate compromise to the concerns of the small states. He proposed that each
state could have one Senator for every “100,000 souls,” every state with less receiving
one. Benjamin Franklin then proposed a different compromise that gave each state an
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equal number of Senators with a varying number of ballots to cast depending on the
subject of the vote. On issues involving state sovereignty, state government or state
citizenship, and the appointment of federal officers, each state would have an equal vote.
On all other matters, each state would have votes proportional to wealth. No one
seconded Franklin’s somewhat idealistic solution. Rufus King and James Madison did
agreed to support Wilson’s compromise if, Madison added, the Senators could be made
independent of the states. Otherwise, Madison pointed out, the Senate would just be
“another edition of (the Confederation) Congress.” The small-state delegates, however,
refused any compromise other than equal representation in the Senate and the stalemate
was unbroken.
The frustrated Convention finally decided to form a special committee to decide
on a compromise on the Senate. Both Madison and Wilson knew that the committee
spelled disaster for them and they protested it, but to no avail. The product of the
committee, together with a general fatigue in the Convention over the issue, would be
catastrophic to the Madison/Wilson led large-state block, giving the day to the small-state
delegates.238
On July, 5 the committee delivered its “compromise.” Indeed, historians have
come to call it the “great compromise.”239 It proposed proportional representation in the
House and equal state representation in the Senate. But, as a sop to the large-state
delegates, only the House could originate money bills. Madison claimed that the
committee had went beyond its purpose. Nonetheless, the Convention agreed to discuss
the committee’s proposed compromise and it would dominate the rest of the discussion
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over the Senate. Over the following days, a tired Convention accepted the clauses of the
committee report into the new Constitution over the protests of Wilson and Madison.240
Wilson also took a liberal stance on suffrage and office qualifications. Early in
the debate over equality of the Senate Rutledge of Virginia and Pierce Butler of South
Carolina sided with Sherman’s proposed compromise, and they additionally moved that
proportional representation in the House be based on “quotas of contribution” because
“money was power.” Wilson with Rufus King of New York tried to block the later
proposal by calling for a vote to the effect that “the right of suffrage in the first branch of
the national Legislature ought not to be according to the rule established in the Articles of
Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio of representation.” After Benjamin
Franklin threw his weight behind Wilson and Rufus, a vote was made in their favor.241
Rutledge and Butler proposed adding “according to quotas of contribution” to the
end of “some equitable ratio of representation.” But Wilson and Charles Pinckney of
South Carolina postponed a vote to make their own proposal based on the “Act of
Congress agreed to by eleven States, for apportioning quotas of revenue on the States.”
Following “some equitable ratio of representation” they proposed adding
in proportion to the whole number of white and other free Citizens and
inhabitants of every age sex and condition including those bound to
servitude for a term of years and three fifths of all others persons not
comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying
taxes, in each State.
And there should be a Census “every 5-7, or 10 years.” The vote was again made in
Wilson’s favor, nine states to two, the two dissenters being New Jersey and Delaware.242
Later in the debates Governeur Morris of Pennsylvania objected to the method of
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determining representation in the House because he thought that “the people of
Pennsylvania will revolt at the idea of being put on a footing with slaves.” And he was
against basing representation on numbers of inhabitants in any case, preferring
contributions of wealth. Morris raised the specter of future western states. “The Busy
haunts of men not the remote wilderness” produced the “proper political Talents” claimed
Morris. And “if the Western people get the power into their hands,” Morris continued
“they will ruin the Atlantic interests.”243
Madison leapt to diffuse Morris first. As a southerner, Madison claimed to trust
the “Northern Majority” and the easterners should trust the westerners for the same
reason -- they were all economically connected. Westerners would always want the
markets and waterways of the “Atlantic States” for their goods, making eastern interests
always relevant. Once more, Madison implied, the Senate could probably be trusted to
filter the factional vices of the people.244 Wilson admitted that no principled logic
underlay the “admission of blacks.” Numbers, not property was to be the basis of
“computation,” yet chattel was being included in the formula. Or were Blacks being
“admitted as Citizens?” No. The purpose of the three-fifths clause was pragmatic -- a
compromise. Wilson then asserted that over broad regions the holding of wealth and
inhabitants tended to change at the same rate. As an example he compared Philadelphia
with the western counties of Pennsylvania. The only difference between the wealth of
the two was that “property was more unequally divided...here than there.” Wilson could
not reject the idea of representation based on wealth as being wholly onerous because it
was too generally accepted as a morally valid method. So, to preserve the more
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democratic principle in the House, Wilson skewed wealth and population together. The
efforts of Madison and Wilson paid off and their preferred method for computing
representation made its way into the finished Constitution.245
Wilson made his firmest stand on suffrage based on numbers of inhabitants on
July 13, when the issue returned concerning Congress’s right to re-estimate proportions.
A clause had been added giving Congress to re-estimate based on “wealth and numbers
of inhabitants.” Randolph proposed striking out “wealth” and Wilson supported him.
Wilson compared the fears of some delegates toward growing western influence to the
“jealousy” that “misled the policy of Great Britain with regard to America.” “The fatal
maxims” that molded Britain’s policy “were that the Colonies were growing too fast” and
had to be guarded against. “Enmity” and separation was the result.
The majority of people wherever found ought in all questions govern
the minority. If the interior of the Country should acquire this majority,
it will not only have the right, but will avail themselves of it whether we
will or no. Property was (not) the sole or the primary object of
Government or society. The cultivation and improvement of the human
mind was the most noble object. With respect to this object, as well as
other personal rights, numbers were surely the natural and precise
measure of Representation.
It was a startlingly democratic statement and connected the purpose of government to
civil improvement. Though most surely saw Wilson’s position as extreme, in the vote
that immediately followed “wealth” was struck out.246
Wilson wished to have few restrictions on legislative officeholders, thereby
expanding the pool of possible talent from which the people and state legislatures had to
choose. He was against age restrictions, property qualifications, financial qualifications
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and a restriction to prevent pluralism between federal legislative office and other federal
positions. And Wilson, an immigrant, agreed that there ought to be residency
requirements but preferred them to be shorter than many others. He wanted the residency
requirement for legislators to be three years as opposed to the seven that many others
wanted.247
Wilson resigned himself to connecting the elector qualifications for federal
legislative elections to those in the states for state legislative elections. Any standard set
by the Convention, he probably assumed, would run the risk of being more restrictive
than state qualifications. Discussions on elector qualifications in the Convention were
probably leaning in a conservative direction -- statements by Ellsworth and Mason
support such an analysis. On August 7, Governeur Morris suggested that the “right of
suffrage” should be restrained to “freeholders.” Wilson disliked “the unnecessary
innovation.” It would be too “difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications for all
the States.” Additionally, it “would be very hard and disagreeable for the same persons
at the same time, to vote for...the State Legislature and to be excluded from a vote
for...the National Legislature.” On the heels of Wilson came supporting and telling
statements from Ellsworth and Mason. “The right of suffrage was a tender point”
Ellsworth said, and “the people will not...subscribe to the National Constitution if it
should subject them to be disenfranchised.” “Eight or nine States have
extended...suffrage beyond the freeholders” Mason added. “What will the people there
say, if they should be disenfranchised?” Madison was divided over the idea.
Contemporarily, he thought that freeholders would “be the safest depositories of
Republican liberty.” However, he thought that land would become more and more
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unequally distributed over time. So that, in the future, such restrictions on elector
qualifications might give rise to “Aristocracies...built on the ruins of popular forms.”
Finally, Morris‘s proposition was voted down.248
Discussion over the shape and nature of the new executive, was another area of
intense involvement for Wilson. When discussion of the executive opened on June 1,
Wilson moved that the executive be a single person. A nervousness poured through the
room, so much so that a “considerable pause” occurred in the discussion. To relax his
fellow delegates, Wilson explained that he preferred a single executive because it would
give the “most energy of dispatch and responsibility to the office.” He did not “consider
the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide. Some of these prerogatives
were of a Legislative nature. Among others that of war and peace.” Wilson envisioned
the executive to have “only powers...strictly executive (such as) executing the laws, and
appointing officers, not appertaining to or appointed by the Legislature.”249
Edmund Randolph objected to “a unity in the Executive” as the “foetus of
monarchy.” He implied that Wilson was being “governed by the British Government as a
prototype.” And though he claimed to have respect for the “Excellent fabric” of the
British constitution, “the fixt genius of the people of America” Randolph observed,
“required a different form of Government.” “Dispatch and responsibility could...be
found in three men, as well as one” Randolph asserted, and greater independence from
the legislature would be an additional result of a plural executive. Gerry supported the
idea of a single executive, but wanted to “annex...a Council...in order to give weight and
inspire confidence.” It was between these three ideas of a single, multiple or council
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appended executive, that the arguments over the executive’s form would move over the
following days.250
Wilson answered Randolph that he was “not governed by the British Model,”
agreeing with Randolph that “the extent of (the Country) was so great, and the manners
so republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic would do for it.” But a
“unity in the Executive” would not result in monarchy, rather Wilson claimed, it “would
be the best safeguard against tyranny.” When the issue returned three days later Wilson
continued in this sentiment when he added, “All know that a single magistrate is not a
King.” On June 1, the vote on Wilson’s proposal was postponed. Madison suggested
that the powers of the executive be decided on before its form was decided and the
Convention agreed.251
At the end of the discussions on June 3, Randolph returned to the form of the
executive, proposing that three executives exist, each “drawn from different portions of
the Country.” Pierce Butler of South Carolina contrarily said that he was for “a single
magistrate,” echoing Wilson’s concern for dispatch. The issue was postponed until the
next day when Wilson took the floor. Randolph had mentioned that “the temper of the
people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy” so they would not approve of a
single executive. Wilson demanded that it was not true. The people would embrace a
single executive just as they had in the states. “All the 13 States tho agreeing in scarce
any other instance, agree in placing a single magistrate at the head of the Government,”
Wilson pointed out. “Vigor” would be the result of a single executive, but three
executives would be slowed by internal struggle and even fall victim to divisive
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factionalism. Making their number odd, so that there would hypothetically always be a
majority on any issue, was no solution because there would “commonly (be) many sides”
to an executive issue rather than just two as in “Courts of Justice.”252
The elder but spry Sherman observed that all of the states also had councils
appended to their executives, declaring that he would prefer a council. Hugh Williamson
of North Carolina asked Wilson if he “means to annex a Council.” He did not because,
according to Wilson, executive councils “oftener serves to cover, than prevent
malpractices.” The Convention voted in favor of Wilson’s single executive.253 Later in
the Convention, when an executive council was again considered, Wilson’s reasoning
reverberated. George Mason of Virginia proposed an executive council but was defeated.
As Wilson’s fellow Pennsylvanian Governeur Morris observed, the idea had already been
“considered in the Committee.” “It was judged that the President by persuading his
Council to concur...would acquire their protection.”254
In discussing the method of selecting the President, beginning on June 1 as well,
Wilson took a democratic stand just as he had on the legislature. He was apprehensive to
make his proposal “that it might appear chimerical.” Wilson was for “election by the
people.” He pointed to the success of “election of the first magistrate by the people at
large” in both New York and Massachusetts. Deriving “not only both the branches of the
Legislature from the people, without the intervention of the States but the Executive also”
would, Wilson continued, “make them as independent as possible of each other, as well
as of the States.” Here Wilson clearly revealed his belief that magisterial corruption
would be best guarded against through countervalence, not only between federal
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institutions but the federal and states governments. He also revealed a trust of the
common people that was much greater than the trust of most others in the Convention.
Nonetheless, Wilson proved far more willing to compromise on the issue of
popular election of the President than he would proportionality in the Senate. Sensing the
uneasiness of the Convention with his idea, Wilson contrived the idea of an electoral
college. One day after his proposal of popular elections, Wilson proposed a system by
which the people would elect electors and the electors would choose the President. But
Gerry came out against popular election because such a system would cause “a constant
intrigue” for the office and it would give the executive a high legitimacy that would
threaten the states. And Hugh Williamson of North Carolina saw no point in having
electors since they “would stand in the same relation to (the people) as the State
Legislatures” yet electoral colleges would require more effort and money. Apparently,
Williamson preferred selection of the President by the state legislatures. Wilson’s
proposal was defeated.255
Yet, Wilson would not let the idea of popular election of the President die so early
in the contest. On July 17, Wilson would ally with Governeur Morris to argue the
proposition again. It was Morris that breached the issue. He objected to the retained
provision in the Virginia Plan that the legislature would appoint the executive. The
executive would be a “mere creature of the Legislature.” Morris instead proposed
popular election in which the people “will never fail to prefer some man of distinguished
character, or services.” Sherman balked that the people often are “not sufficiently
informed” and would be unable to give a majority to any individual because they “will
254
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vote for some man into their own State.” If such a system would work at all he added,
the large states would most likely dominate the Presidency. Wilson rose to support
Morris and refute Sherman. He concurred with Morris that appointment of the executive
by the legislature would make the executive “too dependent to stand as a mediator
between the intrigues...of the Representatives and the general liberties and interests of the
people.” The executive was to be a counterbalance to the legislature, with its legitimacy
equally drawn from the people. The large states would never form a “cabal” to dominate
the executive because the electors would not meet in the same place to decide on their
votes. And Wilson suggested a compromise to serve Sherman’s more practical concern
for functionality. If the majority could not decide on a single man then it could be thrown
to the legislature. Pinckney and Mason sided with Sherman however, and the Convention
voted down the still unlikely measure. Luther Martin of Maryland then proposed that
electors choose the executive, and that the electors be chosen by the state legislatures.
The Convention voted down this proposal but it would soon be resurrected.256
Over the next two days the Convention’s attitude toward the legislative selection
of the executive would change, and Wilson saw a small, short-lived glimmer of hope that
the Convention might embrace popular election. In discussions over the term and reeligibility of the President many in the Convention preferred to make the executive reeligible for additional terms, because they valued experience in the executive. But the
President’s re-eligibility seemed to have made many, who had before been willing to
accept appointment by the national legislature, reconsider their views. King returned to
Luther Martin’s earlier idea of state selected electors, advancing it once again. Paterson
wholly supported King, as would Paterson’s partner in the small-state block, Ellsworth.
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It is clear that by July 19, the leaders of the small-state block had decided that Martin’s
earlier proposal was in their best interest and were waiting for the issue to be rejoined.257
Because many were turning against selection by the national legislature, Wilson
thought that “the idea was gaining ground, of an election mediately or immediately by the
people.” And Wilson’s hope was not uncalled for. Madison himself, the architect of the
Virginia Plan that had suggested executive appointment by the national legislature, had
turned against the idea of legislative appointment. When it appeared that only two
plausible choices for selection of the President existed: electors chosen by the people or
electors chosen by the state legislatures, Madison chose the people. He sided with
Wilson, saying that “the people at large was in his opinion the fittest (method of
appointment) in itself.” But Madison had made his decision too late and the small-state
block would win the day. Wilson had initially introduced the idea of an electoral college
as a compromise between his democratic preferences and the reticence of his associates.
In the hands of Martin and King, however, it became a compromise between continental
nationalists and the supporters of continued state power. Madison and Wilson would not
be won over by the formula, but enough would be in the Convention to secure its
adoption. And yet the issue was still not settled.258
At the end of the discussion on July 25 William Houstoun of Georgia and Richard
Dobbs Spaight of North Carolina proposed that the selection of the President “be
reconsidered.” The Convention agreed and the next day Houstoun, with Spaight
seconding, proposed that the electors for choosing the President should be, themselves,
chosen by the national legislature. The Convention assented to the proposal but then
257
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returned again to the re-eligibility of the executive, demonstrating the intimacy of the two
issues for the delegates. The connection laid in a general concern for the independence of
the executive from the national legislature. The state legislatures, being divided would
find it more difficult to join in manipulating the President than the national legislature.
The national legislature might hold re-election over the head of the executive thereby
controlling him. Making the President ineligible to a second term would give additional
protection to the executive. Concerns over inexperience in the executive were assuaged
by the idea of longer rather than shorter terms for the Presidency.259
Wilson disliked the idea of ineligibility for second terms and longer terms.
Reminding the Convention that he still preferred popular election, Wilson alternately
proposed that if the national legislature was to select the executive electors, the electors
might be chosen randomly by drawing lots. Daniel Carroll of Maryland seconded the
motion. Randomness would take the deliberative power to manipulate the executive out
of legislator hands. But randomness was itself considered inappropriate by Gerry and
King. “Committing too much to chance” would result in the choice of “unworthy men.”
Also the random lots may all fall to men from one or two states, allowing their electors to
dominate the choice.260
On July 25, Madison made an exceptional speech outlining the various “mode(s)
that has been, or perhaps can be proposed” for Presidential selection. He described the
frailties of every mode and again threw his support behind popular election of the
electors. “With all its imperfections he liked this best.” Ellsworth objected in a short
remark that popular election was impractical because a majority would be too difficult to
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achieve and in any case, the large states would come to dominate the executive.
Madison’s plea for popular election was again ignored.261 Eventually it was Mason’s
proposal that ended this particular row over executive selection. Chosen by the national
legislature, the President would serve seven years and be ineligible for a second term.262
But the Convention as a whole remained unsatisfied with its progress on the issue of
selection as evidenced later in the Convention.
On August 27 Carroll would, with Wilson seconding, motion for popular election
of the executive and the motion was easily defeated.263 But dissatisfaction was sufficient
that a committee of eleven, selected to consider and report on “postponed parts of the
Constitution,” felt at liberty to entirely alter the method of selecting the executive in their
report. The committee returned a report that had the electors selected in each state “as its
Legislature may direct,” in proportion to the “whole number of Senators and members of
the House...to which the State may be entitled.” This alteration set off a new row that
lasted three days, but this method of selection found its way into the Constitution along
with four-year terms and re-eligibility on September 6.264 The nebulousness of the clause
about state selection -- “as its Legislatures may direct” -- left open the possibility of
popular elections of electors in the states if the state legislatures decided to allow them.
Three allies of Wilson on popular election, Madison, Morris and Carroll, were in the
committee of eleven that proposed this wording. Though it is purely conjecture, perhaps
they made the clause nebulous deliberately to leave open the possibility of popular
Presidential elections directed by the state legislatures.
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When Wilson first made his proposal for a “unity in the executive” he assuaged
fears of despotism by saying that he envisioned purely executive powers for the national
executive. He would also be against the power of the executive to convene the Senate
when the House was not in session.265 Nonetheless, the executive powers that Wilson
envisioned were quite extensive. Wilson was far more concerned with parliamentary
tyranny than any “foetus of monarchy” and saw a powerful President as an ideal
counterbalance to the state legislatures and Congress. But concerns of tyranny by most
in the Convention ran in the opposite direction and Wilson’s ideas were often
frustrated.266
Wilson supported the power of the President to pardon both before and after
convictions as “necessary...to obtain the testimony of accomplices.”267 He agreed that the
President ought to be impeachable but demanded that Senators also be impeachable and
seemed unsure where to place the power of impeachment.268 Along with Madison,
Wilson vehemently opposed Dickinson’s early proposal that the President be
impeachable on application by the majority of state legislatures.269 Wilson was also
against requiring Senatorial consent for Presidential appointments as “blending...the
Legislature with the Executive.” The primary point of “unity in the Executive was that
officers might be appointed by a single, responsible person.” Legislative meddling in
appointments, including the appointment of judges would only weaken the responsibility
of the President.270
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Yet, perhaps most startling to a modern observer will be Wilson’s desire for the
President to have an absolute veto over federal legislation. It was not, however, an
unheard of position to take during the period. In crafting the state constitution of
Massachusetts, John Adams had unsuccessfully pushed for the governor to have an
absolute veto (an executive who would be popularly elected at that.) Men like Wilson
and Adams saw an absolute veto as a protection for the executive, preventing the
“legislature from swallowing up” the executive. But an absolute veto was not to be
accepted by the delegates at the Constitutional Convention any more than it had been
earlier in Massachusetts. Madison contrarily “supposed...a proper proportion of each
(legislative) branch...required to overrule...the Executive...would answer the same
purpose as an absolute veto.” Franklin additionally pointed out that a “negative” could
be used to “extort money.”271 Eventually, Wilson supported a 3/4ths requirement for a
Congressional override of the Presidential veto as opposed to a 2/3ds requirement to
override.272 Wilson, however, was also a loyal promoter of Madison’s idea of a joint
Judicial-Executive Council vested with the veto power and thought that there should be a
powerful federal judiciary in general.273
The later point involves the idea of how national or federal the new constitution
was to be. Wilson, like Madison, was a continental nationalist who promoted powerful
inferior national tribunals with final jurisdiction over state courts in “many cases,”
particularly admiralty cases.274 Most telling though was Wilson’s and Madison’s
insistence that Congress have a veto power over the state legislatures. Not only in the
271

Madison, Debates, 61-63; Morgan, Inventing the People, 257-260.
Madison, Debates, 464-465.
273
Ibid., 72, 79-81, 336, 342-343, 462, 539, 573.
274
Ibid., 72.
272

118

interest of comity but in the interest of preserving the new government, Congress had to
have some control over state legislation according to Wilson. The danger was greater
that the states would “sacrifice...the general interest” than that the “whole will
unnecessarily sacrifice a part.”275 Later, Wilson compared the new government to a
“wide arch” and Congressional veto of state laws was “the keystone.” Anticipating
judicial review of the constitutionality of laws Wilson held that federal judges might be
able to determine the unconstitutionality of a state law, but that was not good enough. “It
will be better to prevent the passage of an improper law, than to declare it void when
passed.”276 Congressional veto of state laws was not agreed to of course, the supremacy
clause was meant to substitute it, and over the last two hundred years the acceptance of
judicial review has given that clause some force.277
As the Constitutional Convention neared its end the thoughts of the delegates
turned to ratification. Wilson wanted the proposed Constitution to bypass Congress and
go directly to the states for ratification where only a bare majority of seven would allow it
to go into effect. Madison worried that even if the ratification of nine states was required
to affect the new government, the population of those states might consist of less than a
majority of the whole American people. The result would be a constitution forced onto
the majority by the minority. Dickinson queried whether it could be considered
appropriate to by-pass Congress since the present “Confederacy” rested on Congress.
Wilson answered the uncertainty of both Madison and Dickinson on August 30. “The
States only which ratify can be bound” Wilson suggested to Madison, those that did not
275
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ratify would not have the Constitution thrust upon them. Looking to Dickinson, Wilson
boldly asserted that “a House on fire must be extinguished, without a scrupulous regard
to ordinary rights.” “We must,” he continued “go to the original powers of Society.”
The next day Madison proposed that “seven or more States entitled to thirty three
members at least in the House of Representatives” be required to put the Constitution into
effect. “The people were” Madison remarked, “the fountain of all power, and by
resorting to them, all difficulties were got over.” “They could alter constitutions as they
pleased,” ruminated Madison, and “it was a principle in the Bills of rights, that first
principles might be resorted to.” Wilson appreciated Madison’s popular logic,
acknowledging constitutions as instruments of the people. He seconded.278 Such
exigencies were made unnecessary however, because the Convention adopted Wilson’s
doctrine that states not ratifying should not be forcibly compelled into the Union.
Though the Convention appreciated Wilson’s observation on non-ratifying states, they
rejected his attempt to by-pass Congress. Congress would have to assent to the new
Constitution before it went to the states where it would require ratification in nine states
to make it active. States not ratifying the Constitution would not be compelled to live
under it, but would be allowed to join afterward.279
The final product of the Convention was not as national or democratic as Wilson
had wanted, but it had enough of these attributes for Wilson to later argue the democratic
nationalism of the new Constitution. Indeed, Wilson would be a key proponent in its
ratification. Once the proposed Constitution had been issued by Congress to the states
for ratification, Wilson and Robert Morris easily secured preparations for a ratification
278
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convention in the Republican dominated Pennsylvania Assembly. As the federalist and
anti-federalist ranks formed in Pennsylvania, it became quickly apparent that the new
fissures followed the old factional lines very closely. Dedicated Constitutionalists tended
to become anti-federalists while Republicans became federalists, supporting the new
continental charter.280

CHAPTER VI
WILSON AND THE TWO NEW CONSTITUTIONS

In the ratification controversy that followed the Philadelphia convention, Wilson
proved to be a dogged Federalist partisan. Wilson’s dedication to popular
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instrumentalism and continental nationalism was interwoven throughout his partisan
polemics. He put forward his theoretical principle of civil revolution, embodied, he
claimed, in the amendment process of the proposed 1787 federal Constitution. And his
faith in the People to rule themselves carried through to the new Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1790.
The federal Constitution, with its bicameralism, and single executive selected by
electors, was much closer to what Republicans wanted for Pennsylvania than what the
Constitutionalists cherished in their 1776 Constitution. Adoption of the federal
Constitution would be a virtual indictment of the Constitutionalists, setting the foundation
for the destruction of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the permanent pre-eminence of
the Republicans. The Constitutionalists knew their danger, and their fears proved well
founded. The adoption of the federal Constitution was their death knell; resistance to it
was their last meaningful effort to resist. And even this last effort was doomed to failure.
The Constitutionalists became marginalized by 1787, developing into a faction of western
farmers that consistently alienated Philadelphians. Just as the Republicans dominated the
Assembly, so would they dominate the Pennsylvania ratifying convention. The
westerners only slender hope was to use the specter of tyranny to win over fence-setters
among the easterners while tiring the federalist leadership with repetitive arguments, and
that is exactly what they attempted.281 So Wilson’s defiance of the anti-federalists inside
and outside the convention was of secondary importance.
The greatest importance of Wilson’s efforts came from the contents of his
orations. The masterfulness of Wilson’s reasoning and delivery amazed his observers
and received the attention and applause of federalists in other states who often co-opted
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his arguments.282
On October 6, Wilson was elected to attend the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention. He made his acceptance speech before a large group in front of the
Pennsylvania State House. Anti-federalist polemics had already become diffused
throughout Pennsylvania and, in what posterity commonly calls the “State House Yard
Speech,” Wilson used his forum to refute some of the “insidious attempts” of the antifederalists to “clandestinely and industriously...pervert and destroy the new plan.” The
speech was telling of Wilson’s thought following the Constitutional Convention, and
predicated the arguments Wilson used against the anti-federalists in the ratification
convention.
The anti-federalists charged that the new Constitution was a tool of despotism,
evidenced by the lack of a bill of rights. Historian Edmund S. Morgan has said that this
argument was one of the most convincing made against the Constitution. According to
Morgan, the majority of federalists denied the need for a bill of rights on the basis that the
government of the new Constitution would be purely republican, resting on the principle
of popular sovereignty. The people had no need to limit their own power. Pigeonholing
James Wilson into this group opinion, Morgan claimed that Wilson thought that the
popular power of amendment was a sufficient replacement for any bill of rights. Indeed,
the bills of rights that existed in the earlier state republics were hypothetically antiquated
tools of mixed constitutionalism, relevant when the Commons needed protection from the
monarch. Morgan speculated that the presence of bills of rights in those first, purely
republican state constitutions “recognized the fictional quality of popular sovereignty.”
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Yet, Morgan’s interpretation of Wilson’s thought is simply wrong.283 Wilson never
argued that popular sovereignty and the popular amendment process replaced bills of
rights. In fact, Wilson was more than happy to acknowledge that in some instances bills
of rights were very necessary under republican government. The key determinant for
Wilson was precisely how the functional powers that the people delegated were presumed
to be transferred.
Answering for a lack of a bill of rights, Wilson stated that when the people
established their state governments they gave their representatives every legislative power
not “in explicit terms reserved” to the people. So in the states bills of rights were
necessary to limit the power of the government. In other words, the people delegated a
whole species of power with nebulous parameters and a bill of rights helped to define the
extent of government powers through negative assertions. “But in delegating foederal
powers” Wilson contradistinguished “another criterion was necessarily introduced,”
indeed, an opposite criterion. It was “positive grant,” not “tacit implication” that
legitimized federal power. So that “everything that is not given” to the federal
government “is reserved” to the people so that a bill of rights was not necessary. Only
specific and itemized functional powers were going to be transferred to the new
government upon ratification, not an entire species of governmental powers.
Wilson used a popular concern for “Liberty of the Press” as his example. It could
not be violated by the federal government because the federal government had not been
given any power to regulate the press. In fact, a bill of rights would more likely
undermine popular rights in the long run since “a formal declaration upon the subject” of
the press or any other right “might (be) construed to imply that some degree of power
283
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was given, since we undertook to define its extent.” Wilson rejected the doctrine of
implied powers that he had helped pioneer under the Articles, because of how power was
to be delegated to the new government.284
Wilson continued to engage complaints about the lack of a jury guarantee in civil
trials and the probability of a standing army under the government. On these issues
Wilson was wholly dismissive, contending that the guarantee of juries in criminal cases
was sufficient to secure liberty and that standing armies were necessary for national
security.285
Interestingly, anti-federalist polemics forced Wilson to defend the Senate. It was
an institution that he was not fond of himself because he thought it threatened
interference with majoritarian will by an arbitrary popular minority via the small states.286
Anti-federalists had predicted the development of “a baneful aristocracy in the foederal
senate.” Wilson considered the idea completely unreasonable. The Senate had “two
characters, the one legislative and the other executive.” As legislators, Senators could do
nothing without the House of Representatives. As executors, Senators could do nothing
without the assent of the President. “I do not know of any act which the senate can of
itself perform” Wilson continued, and so no chance of senatorial despotism existed. He
admitted that the Senate was the product of compromise “between contending interests,”
but that the fact “ought rather to command a generous applause, than to excite jealousy
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and reproach.”287
The anti-federalist accusation, Wilson argued, that the new Constitution would
make the state governments into irrelevancies was erroneous. He pointed out that
without the states the federal government could not function. The President and the
Senate could not be selected without the state legislatures -- neither could Representatives
to the federal House because their qualifications were attached to the state legislatures.
“The power of direct taxation” should not be feared either, Wilson told the crowd.
It would rarely be used because imposts would prove sufficient to fund the government
most of the time. Direct taxation was necessary in cases of emergency and may also raise
money to be used, he observed, to relieve the immense public debt that Pennsylvania
presently suffered under. And whether money was raised by impost or direct taxation
“no...reason to apprehend oppression” existed because the federal government would
only have such authority based on “universal assent” -- through popular representation,
was Wilson‘s implication.288
Wilson finished by accusing the anti-federalist of being interested partisans,
dedicated to preserving their “place of profit under the present establishment.” Boldly,
he admitted that he was “not a blind admirer of this plan of government, and that there
are some parts of it, which if my wish had prevailed, would have certainly been altered.”
Nonetheless, Wilson proclaimed, the proposed Constitution was, over all, a brilliant
achievement. He concluded,
When I reflect how widely men differ in their opinions, and that every
man has an equal pretension to assert his own, I am satisfied that any thing
nearer to perfection could not have been accomplished. If there are
errors, it should be remembered that the seeds of reformation are sown
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in the work itself. Regarding it then...with a candid and disinterested
mind, I am bold to assert, that it is the best form of government which
has ever been offered to the world.289
Wilson was ready for the ratification convention -- and he needed to be. He was a
renowned orator and lawyer, and the only member of the Constitutional Convention to
attend the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, and so carried the greatest responsibility on
his shoulders. But before ratification was achieved, Wilson would be worn to a frazzle
answering the constant and repetitive attacks of the western anti-federalists Robert
Whitehill, William Findley and John Smilie.290
The federalist Thomas McKean opened the main business of the ratification
convention on November 24 proposing that, though each clause should be discussed, the
whole Constitution was to be accepted or rejected and not just parts of it. Wilson
followed with an extensive explanatory speech, infused with historical observations, to
promote the proposed Constitution as a positive good. The speech touched on many
elements of Wilson’s developed political thought. He began where he left off in his State
House Yard Speech describing the political and conceptual difficulties that the
Constitutional Convention faced and according to Wilson, overcame using “general
principles.”
Establishing government “for a single city...require(d) the strongest genius,”
much less one for vast region that will hold “yet unformed, myriads of the human race”
set to expand to the west over “regions hitherto uncultivated.” Indeed, the delegates at
the Constitutional Convention had understood there to be implications in their work for
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all humanity. “The great struggle for liberty in this country, if it is unsuccessful”
according to Wilson, “will probably be the last one which she will have for her
existence...in any part of the globe.” America was to be a model to the world for liberty
and the kind of political activity and principles that would support it. So the
responsibility of the Constitutional Convention had been great and “the difficulty of the
business was equal to its magnitude.” Both the difficulty and magnitude had
“astonished” Wilson. And he thought it was amazing that a diverse group of men from
diverse regions of the continent were able to compromise and reach an acceptable
finished product. By implication the responsibility belonged to all Americans and
certainly those considering ratification of the new Constitution. It was a heavy message
designed to produce a serious atmosphere in the ratifying convention, bent in favor of
accepting the new government.291
Numerous disagreements arose among the Founders, but two general obstacles
most troubled the Convention according to Wilson. The first was that the “sense of
independence and freedom” among the people made them difficult to govern, making a
long-lasting, centralized continental government implausible. Second, contemporary
political theory contradicted the American effort to erect a government that was both
continental and wholly republican. Appended to this second concern was the more
practical concern of how national or how federal the continental government was to be -a concern exacerbated by a common understanding of the real differences between the
people of the various states.292
On the first issue, Wilson confided that the “high spirited” nature of the people
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had never worried him as it had others. Yes, they were high spirited but they also
“possess(ed) sound sense,” he declared. “They would,” Wilson continued “be...pleased
with that system of government, which would best promote their freedom and
happiness.” As a federalist, Wilson believed that the plan for such a government was
before the ratifying convention.293 He could discern no reason for the people to reject the
new constitution because it would solidly rest on their sovereign authority.
Wilson concurred with other early modern writers in their variation on
Aristotelian categories of government, a concept that had come to Americans by various
other sources not least Montesquieu. There were three “simple species of government -monarchy, aristocracy (and) a republik or democracy.”294 Wilson does not make the rigid
distinction between a republic and a democracy the way Madison later would in The
Federalist.295 The new constitution with its countervailing governmental institutions,
efficient variations in function, and federalism (pointedly NOT mixed government)
would allow the new government to have the positive attributes of all these forms of
government without their requisite failings. Yet, “in its principle” the new government
would still be “purely democratical.” “The streams of power” Wilson happily continued
“(ran) in different directions, in different dimensions, and at different heights...but...they
all originally flow from THE PEOPLE.”296 Wilson would go even further and describe
what later historians have referred to as Wilson‘s “revolution principle.”297
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“Writers on different governments will give different answers” to where
sovereignty resides, Wilson admitted. Blackstone placed it in British Parliament. Wilson
no longer refuted Blackstone but simply observed that in American governments “the
supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people.” Their “constitutions
were superior to (their) legislatures; so the people are superior to (their) constitutions.”
“The people may change the constitutions,” Wilson deduced “whenever and however
they pleased.” Once more, the Revolutionary generation had proven that political
revolutions could result in progress and that they were not inherently evil.298
Contemporary, un-transferrable popular sovereignty was to be the American
“panacea of politicks.” Bravely Wilson bellowed over his audience, some of whom must
have been astounded at the “aristocrat’s” doctrine, “there can be no disorder in the
community but may here receive a radical cure.” The one exception was a corruption in
the people at large themselves, for which “there is no remedy -- from their power...there
is no appeal.” But Wilson did not think the people corrupt. And in the new constitution
an amendment process was included that could fully realize this new American
understanding through a peaceful and lawful process. No good reason existed for the
“high spirited” people to rebel en masse against the new government.299
The second problem of the expansive republic was one that arose from a broad
acceptance among the founders of the political thought of Montesqueiu. They considered
the French philosoph a high political authority. His writing was well known by Wilson
and most of his colleagues. Montesqueiu thought that republics were most often
destroyed by internal factionalism arising from differences among members of the
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republic. Great diversity in culture or regional environment, and therefore economy, only
exacerbated differences of interest and the propensity for factionalism. On the other
hand, greater homogeny relaxed differences and the propensity for factional strife.
Because diversity only increased as the size of a state increased republics only survived
for prolonged periods when they were small; factional strife doomed large republics. So,
in the interest of stability, larger nations could not be wholly republican if at all
republican. The larger or more diverse the state, the greater necessity for concentrated
power separate from the broader community that might control violent or stagnating
divisions in the political society.300 As Wilson described Montesquieu’s thinking, “small
states (are) to be governed as a republick; middling ones, (by) a monarch; and...large
empires...by a despotic prince.”301 But the founders wanted to establish a pure republic
over a vast continent without the appended prediction of inevitable doom.
James Madison struck at the fundamental assumptions of Montesquieu both in the
Constitutional Convention and later as one of three that took on the synonym “Publius.”
According to Madison, factionalism was inevitable in even the smallest republics. And
the fewer the factions, he argued, the more likely one faction would come to dominate
tyrannically over the opposing factions. Perhaps drawing from a common American
assumption in the states that smaller legislative bodies were inherently more
conservative, Madison hypothesized that the more factions there were in relation to the
representatives of government the better. Because if there was a plethora of factional
interests no single faction would be able to long dominate a representative or
governmental policy. Therefore the deleterious effect of factionalism on republics could
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be remedied by “enlarge(ing) the sphere” of the participatory community. Inspired by
James Harrington’s and David Hume’s fictive models of ideal extended republics,
Madison proposed that a larger republic was preferable to a small one because the larger
population would magnify the diversity of interests in the state and therefore potential
factions.302
Wilson, on the other hand, denied Montesquieu’s prediction of doom obliquely,
using the concept of “Federal Liberty,” a concept imbedded in the proposed constitution,
that if applied would be a unique blessing for the United States. He did not embrace
Madison’s theory that “enlarged spheres” would counteract domineering factionalism -filtering popular passions in the legislative process.
Montesquieu had suggested that the happiest extensive territorial state was one of
many small republics confederated under a monarchy. Such a state might balance
republican liberty with monarchial dispatch and the defensive capabilities of a larger
population. The philosoph’s ideal model was really a reconfigured version of the British
concept of mixed government.303 Wilson thought that the new government combined the
best attributes of monarchy (and aristocracy) with purely republican forms. This new
republicanism would sit in the place of Montesquieu’s monarch. Once more, the federal
nature of the system itself promoted the security and even progress of American liberty.
“Civil government,” Wilson reminded his listeners “was necessary to the perfection of
society.” “Civil liberty” was formed when individuals gave up “part of (their) natural
liberty” to the community. The proper goal of civil society was to better secure and
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perfect the liberty that was retained. As Wilson put it, “The liberty of every member is
increased by this introduction, for each gains more by the limitation of the freedom of
every other member, than he loses by the limitation of his own.” Wilson then
extrapolated this broadly accepted idea into an understanding of the proposed federal
system. The states, by giving up their sovereignty and certain liberties to the federal
government, would have the liberties they retained better secured and advanced upon.
The happy effect would be felt by the citizens of the states. Perhaps inspired by Wilson,
Alexander Hamilton later used a similar argument during the ratification contest in New
York.304
Following Wilson’s speech the western and eastern factions began a day-long
argument over procedure.305 Once the real debates got underway, the argumentation
between Wilson and the anti-federalists in the convention stayed very much within the
confines of the wrangle leading up to the convention. Most interesting were Wilson’s
comments on the rejection of state sovereignty and the non-contractual nature of the
federal constitution. Wilson emphatically answered anti-federalist objections to the
activity of the earlier Constitutional Convention and their abandonment of state
sovereignty on December 11.
William Findley had mentioned that the delegates, he thought, assumed
themselves to be forming a new contract for the American states. Wilson rebutted,
I cannot answer for what every member thought; but I believe it
cannot be said that they thought they were making a contract,
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because I cannot discover the least trace of compact in the system.306
It took at least two parties in the forming of a contract, Wilson remonstrated. But in the
legitimization of the constitution only one party acted -- the People. “I am,” Wilson
sarcastically observed “unable to conceive who the parties could be.” Wilson plied his
case to the situation of ratification.
This (new government) is not...founded upon a compact; it is founded
upon the power of the people. From...their ratification alone it is to
take its constitutional authenticity; without that it is no more than tabula
rasa.
Wilson rejected the idea that the state governments were, or even could be sovereign and
concurrently any idea that a national constitution could be thought of as a treaty between
them.307
The twenty-three day long, federalist-dominated Pennsylvania ratification
convention was the first to meet and the second to ratify the constitution, following
Delaware.308 Three years after ratification and the official institution of the new form of
government, the Constitutionalist prediction of their own final defeat came true. In 1790,
Pennsylvania Republicans succeeded in calling for a state constitutional convention.
Wilson dominated the constitution-making process, forwarding a product that was similar
to the federal constitution and yet exceedingly Wilsonian.309
The 1790 Constitution had a single executive, a bicameral legislature and a
judiciary that served during good behavior. The governor held a limited veto of
legislation as in the federal Constitution but would appoint judges without the
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interference of the legislature. Popular elections selected both the governor and the
legislators of both legislative houses. Conservatives from Wilson’s own federalist ranks,
including McKean, had objected to the immediate election of Senators but Wilson had
backed them down. Wilson also secured liberal parameters for suffrage.310 A fellow
delegate remarked that “with a few exceptions” Wilson was “on the democratic or antifederal side of the house.”311 His erstwhile federalist allies must have been mortified.
Because general species of power were delegated to the Legislature and Governor
rather than specific enumerated powers, a bill of rights (perhaps more correctly
understood as points of governmental limitation) was necessary. It was a point that no
one seemed to disagree on. Article IX of the Pennsylvania Constitution involved twentysix sections limiting the powers of the Legislature and Governor in very specific ways.312
The state constitutional convention had their proposed constitution printed and
distributed to the Pennsylvanian public. After a week of receiving feedback they
reconvened and, assuming themselves capable of acting as a popular ratifying
convention, ratified the new constitution in the name of the People.313
Wilson’s arguments during the constitutional crisis of the 1780s show him to be a
continental nationalist, who trusted the People at large to choose capable leaders through
direct election. Danger in republican systems came primarily, for Wilson, through
magisterial corruption. Even the most capable men could be corrupted by power.
Wilson’s republican remedy was more adequate checks and balances in government, and
309

Smith, Wilson, 298-304.
Smith, Wilson, 300-304; Pennsylvania, “Constitution of Pennsylvania--1790” in American Charters,
3092-3099.
311
Alexander Graydon quoted in Wilson, Smith, 303.
312
Pennsylvania, “Constitution of Pennsylvania--1790” in American Charters, 3099-3101.
313
Commented on by Thorpe in American Charters, ed. Thorpe, 3092; Smith, Wilson, 304.
310

135

a full realization of popular sovereignty that included a democratic spirit in governance
and instrumental constitutionalism. Wilson could not accept the contra-popular
rationalizations of Madison’s remedy, such as larger constituencies filtering out popular
passions, because within the context of the legislative process the immediate popular will
was to be wholly trusted. But like Madison, Wilson envisioned a continental republic
and rejected the idea of the 1787 federal constitution as a Lockean contract in favor of a
view of the constitution as an instrument of the People at large.
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CHAPTER VII
THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

During his 1790/1791 law lectures at the University of Pennsylvania, Wilson
elucidated his view of popular sovereignty, describing its origins, essential nature and
limitations. He also connected his understanding of popular sovereignty and
constitutional instrumentality to a larger concept of “civil society” whose progress was to
be preserved and facilitated by government. Wilson’s overall vision of society and
ultimately constitutional government was revealed to be progressive.
Before engaging some of Wilson’s more in-depth conceptual arguments, it will be
productive to first return to exactly what Wilson thought progress was or might be in the
late eighteenth century United States. Even before his lectures, Wilson’s business
activities are telling in regard to his view of socio-economic development.
As discussed before, Wilson was a supporter of banking and governments
chartering banks. But the late 1780s brought a hypothetical embarrassment for Wilson
that, because of his professional trajectory, he avoided. In his arguments during the
ratification controversy, Wilson rejected the idea of implied powers for the 1787 federal
Constitution. Unlike the state constitutions or the Articles of Confederation, the 1787
Constitution did not grant all legislative powers to Congress, rather the instrument
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granted only very specific legislative powers. So, according to Wilson, a bill of rights
was not necessary under the 1787 federal Constitution, unlike under the state
constitutions that did grant very general categories of governmental power.
Because of his arguments during ratification it would have been difficult for
Wilson to resurrect his doctrine of implied powers that he employed under the Articles to
justify the Bank of North America, to argue the constitutionality of a federally chartered
bank under the 1787 Constitution. No clause in the enumerated powers of Congress gave
Congress the power to charter banks. But re-working Wilson’s earlier doctrine of
implied powers is exactly what Alexander Hamilton did in 1791 when he argued for a
Bank of the United States under the “necessary and proper” clause of the new federal
constitution.
Congress had let the charter of the Bank of North America terminate in 1786,
though it continued under a Pennsylvania state charter (it had been re-chartered by a
Republican dominated Pennsylvania Assembly.) In 1790 Hamilton proposed a national
bank that was rigorously resisted by James Madison, who argued that Hamilton’s notion
of implied powers were inapplicable to the federal Constitution. Congress sided with
Hamilton, however, as did President George Washington contrary to the advise of
Thomas Jefferson.314
Wilson never left a public record of what he thought about the contention between
his old Federalist allies. He would not return to Congress after 1787, but re-entered the
federal government as a founding member of the Supreme Court in 1790. He was,
perhaps blissfully, absent for the revival of the bank controversy. What can be said is
that Wilson supported the general idea of banks being chartered by governments and he
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continued to take loans from the Bank of North America to fuel his land speculations.
It was in the arena of western lands, immigration and foreign investment that
Wilson saw the best resources for American social and economic development in his own
time. Wilson became a lavish land speculator following American Independence to the
point of being addicted to the business. As early as 1790 many of his close associates
began to worry about Wilson’s mounting debt and his debt problems hindered his judicial
career. Wilson had hoped to be appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and he
wrote to President Washington offering his services. Eventually, Wilson was only
appointed Associate Justice to the chagrinned surprise of some of his friends. Whispered
rumors of Wilson’s precarious financial situation had influenced Washington‘s decision.
The lands that Wilson bought and the mills that he built on many of them simply were
not returning the profits that he had anticipated, and yet he continued to take out loans to
buy new properties.315
His obsession with land speculation says much about Wilson. On the surface it
may suggest an impulsive personality as a whole, but such a conclusion would not be
supported when looking at other areas of Wilson’s life history. Like most Americans to
this very day, for Wilson no better enterprise existed than one that would make him rich
and advance the prosperity of the whole society at the same time. The development of
western lands offered such a dual opportunity to Wilson’s generation. It was only a
matter of time until the immigrants poured across the sea in even greater numbers to
enjoy the enlightened freedoms of federal America. As Wilson observed, Americans had
“formed and now enjoy a Constitution excellent in its organization, and still more
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excellent in its...Principles.” The oppressed of Europe would clamor for American
liberty and the promised wealth of American lands.316
Among Wilson’s notes may be found a proposal made to an unknown recipient
titled “Prospectus of an Association for the Promotion of Lands for Settlement.” It is an
ambitious plan to form a private association for the settlement of western lands by
European immigrants, using excess European capital. This Association would seek out
Europeans wishing to immigrate. Given land and services in the form of loans,
immigrants were to slowly repay the Association in either capital or surplus crops over a
period of eight years. Transported across the ocean on reliable, Associate-approved
ships, the new immigrants might take carriages and wagons provided by the Association
to their new lands in the west. The plan allotted each family as much as two to three
hundred acres apiece. Necessary buildings and works for drainage were to be built by the
Association before the immigrants arrived, as well as a subsistence garden planted to
insure their survival through their first years. The immigrants also had the option of
hiring on loan, from the Association, a guide to teach them necessary farming skills.
Unfortunately for hundreds of thousands of immigrants over the following decades,
Wilson’s highly ambitious but humane plan never became more than a hazily envisioned
dream.317
Wilson’s debts mounted over the 1790s until the bottom fell out of the land
market in 1798. This recession financially ruined the Associate Supreme Court Justice.
Wilson fled from his creditors to South Carolina, where he died penniless from malaria.
His young second wife Hannah, whom Wilson had married in 1793, must have been
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devastated.318
Yet, Wilson’s ideas about progress were not confined to economics. And even
economic progress itself was intimately connected, in Wilson‘s mind, to the political
health and progress of society. In the fearful atmosphere of the later Confederation
period, Wilson jotted notes in favor of centralized regulation of commerce that, combined
with the natural “Richness of ... Soil, Numbers, and values of ... Productions” in the
United States, would make America into an economic power-house. Though politically
lacking in regard to central regulation, the United States was otherwise already sufficient
in political acumen to seize the economic prosperity that was in her reach. Wilson
complemented the people of the states, saying that “the Genius of their Governments is
favorable to Trade, because it is favorable to Equality and Industry, the ONLY pillars on
which Trade can be supported.” By “Equality,” Wilson probably meant equitable laws
and political practices. After 1787, when the problem of lax central authority was
supposedly solved, Wilson assumed that the perfected political situation of America, and
its communication across the Atlantic, would be part of the impetus for a new confluence
of freedom and immigrants.319
Nonetheless, in Wilson’s speeches and later lectures at the University of
Pennsylvania, “progress” generally had more to do with political, intellectual and moral
advancement than economic development. In a celebratory speech, glorifying the 1787
federal Constitution following a federalist parade to celebrate the first anniversary of the
Constitution’s ratification, Wilson spoke of purely moral and political advancement.
Wilson happily proclaimed that,
Society.
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A progressive State is necessary to the Happiness and Perfection of
Man. Whatever attainments may be already possessed, attainments
still higher ought to be pursued. It is our Duty, therefore, to press
forward, and to make increasing Advances in every Thing that can
support, improve, refine and embellish Society.320
The Constitution and its underlying principles Wilson defined as advancements.
Specifically, Americans had discovered a moral imperative that “all the derivative
Movements in Government must spring from the original Movements of the People at
large.” This placed the initial duty and right of progress squarely in the hands of the
people at large. Government was only a facilitator -- a helpmate.
One of the most important ways that the people exercised their duty was in voting
-- their “first connection in politics.” (Another important democratic duty, in Wilson’s
opinion, was the duty of jurors to represent the People in the legal process.) Deliberation
and voting itself therefore must be understood, according to Wilson, as a moral obligation
comparable to that of a soldier’s duty to defend his country. In a portion edited out by
Wilson, he wrote of the celebration of the Constitution itself being an advancement
because it compelled contemplation of fundamental political principles. He ended his
speech prayerfully. “The Commencement of our Government has been supremely
glorious,” Wilson proclaimed. “Let our progress in any Excellence be proportionally
great.”321 Wilson’s progressive line of thought would be continued in his law lectures.
Wilson’s reputation throughout the states for genius in law had long proceeded his
appointment to the embryonic Supreme Court. As early as 1782, Wilson’s reputation
was broadly enough known for the Virginian, General Washington, to request Wilson’s
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services in mentoring his nephew, Bushrod Washington, in the legal profession.
Ironically, it would be Bushrod who took Wilson’s empty seat on the Supreme Court
following Wilson’s ignominious and untimely death.322
In 1790 the Board of Trustees of the College of Philadelphia, that included
Wilson, approved the addition of law lectures to the school’s curriculum. And Wilson,
only recently appointed to the Supreme Court, was the most sensible choice to give the
lectures. Wilson commenced organizing his law lectures in the winter of the same year.
Considering the rapidity of their construction Wilson’s lectures are succinct and well
organized, pooling and rationalizing together most of the conceptual elements important
to Wilson and his generation.
Other than A Defense of the Constitutions of the United States by John Adams,
Wilson’s lectures in law are the closest the Revolutionary generation ever came to
producing an in-depth philosophical treatise involving the principles of their
revolutionary struggles. And the law lectures may be more representative of political
thought in the United States at the time than A Defense, a treatise that was not wellreceived.323 Wilson’s lectures both plumbed the depths of epistemology while hugging
the borders of theology and pragmatism. In them, Wilson propounded precepts of human
intellect, sociability and the human relationship to natural and divine law. These
fundamental precepts were, in turn, used to construct a theory of society, government and
political sovereignty. The middle-aged professor of law then took care to connect these
appropriate principles to the new political and legal reality of post-Confederation
America. It is not implausible that Wilson might have become the Revolutionary
Historical Society.
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generations most profound political theorist had he not drowned in debt and died early at
the age of 56.324
Of course, Wilson did not organize his lectures as a political treatise because they
were to be an introductory law lecture for students. And even a lecture centered on broad
philosophical principles demanded a different structure than that of a formal
philosophical work. To a person expecting Wilson’s lecture to read as a philosophical
treatise, Wilson’s organization will often appear illogical, if not backward.325 He gave
two introductory lectures, one for select students and a list of worthy contemporaries, and
the other just for the students. President George Washington and Vice-President John
Adams attended Wilson’s first lecture and Wilson’s purple prose flew to great heights,
explicitly glorifying America and implicitly glorifying Washington. Both introductions
stressed the importance of a law education, the need for a philosophically unique
American understanding of law and a correct sensibility of law among the People at
large.326 Throughout the rest of the lectures Wilson moved through various general
categories of law and law-related issues in each section, moving into his epistemology in
the middle of the lectures.
“A system of human nature” Wilson explained to his students “is not expected
from this chair.” It was, he continued “too vast for me; it is too vast for any one man,
however great his genius.” For Wilson the human mind was, to some extent, an inherent
mystery -- exceedingly complex, and after a point purely metaphysical.327 Yet a basic
understanding of its rudimentary functions in the daily world was not outside the human
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grasp. Indeed, it had to be grasped according to Wilson as a prerequisite for a proficient
philosophical understanding of law. “In truth” Wilson declared eloquently “law can never
attain either the extent or the elevation of science, unless it be raised upon the science of
man.” For Wilson, the science of man was inextricably entwined with an understanding
of “mind,” since “every art and in every disquisition, the powers of the mind are the
instruments.”328 And despite his initial claim, Wilson explored the depths of
epistemology quite deeply from his law chair.
As both historians Jean-Marc Pascal and Mark David Hall have remarked, the
Scottish common sense philosophers heavily influenced Wilson. Like them Wilson
rooted his epistemological and moral thought in the concept of a commonly held intuitive
sense of morality. In a section of lecture titled “Man, as an Individual” Wilson most
visibly reveals the common sense influence on his thought.329 He rejected the precepts of
men that he called “the ideal philosophers,” who argued the inability of the human mind
to perceive anything but ideas and questioned the existence of anything outside the mind.
Human perception could and did perceive external objects, said Wilson, and the contrary
assumptions of the “ideal philosophers” from Descartes to Hume were untenable.
Yet, perception was not only an impression of an external stimulus upon the mind
but also the intellectual apprehension of the stimulating object. Three kinds of perception
existed according to Wilson. Perception of external objects via the five senses was the
most obvious. “Contemplation” was another type of perception, by which a person
perceived internal, intellectual objects; that is ideas. The third, and perhaps most
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important type of perception to Wilson (certainly the most fundamental) was moral
perception. Moral perception apprehended the laws of God. This perception was
intuitive or “self-evident” in nature and was immune to demonstrative or logical proofs.
“Laws may be promulgated by reason and conscience, the divine monitors within us”
declared Wilson. A primal understanding of very basic truths was “engraven by God on
the hearts of men ... the promulgator as well as the author of natural law.”330 An example
of a self-evident truth would be the tautological statement that material existence exists.
Another self-evident truth was the inalienable human rights to life and liberty.331 But
some inconclusive historical evidence might be found for the general notion of selfevidential and universal truths. Wilson cited fundamental moral precepts common to
most civilizations during most periods of time, such as the assumption that the majority
of what was sensed was real, or that general moral concepts and human desires could be
commonly found represented in every language.332
Yet, the moral law of God was general in its command. Though the human
“heart” or intuitive perception might inform humanity of general precepts it did not
inform human beings on how to apply those general precepts within their specific
situation. Neither did divine law compel obedience. Human beings possessed free wills
and the power to reason (more examples of self-evident truths) and people attempted
reason to extrapolate and apply God’s general law to their specific and ever-changing
situations. All human beings possessed the intuitive perception equally, but not all would
choose to follow God’s law or had an equal ability to reason. Poor reasoning or
judgment corrupted the application of God’s law or even created fictions that caused
330
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humanity to doubt the veracity of the intuitive laws. Proper reason and obedience to the
“self-evident” was the root of good in the world while poor reasoning was the intellectual
root of evil and corruption in the world. Wilson thought that as civil society advanced in
its morality the less likely that society would fall into error. But if a society fell into error
it would suffer from social or spiritual diminution -- again, history offering its evidence.
That diminution might be evident in either the extremes of anarchy or tyranny.333
The people of the United States had achieved a great advance in the progression
of civil society during their Revolution, according to Wilson. The travails of American
Whig opposition during the Imperial Crisis of the 1760s and 70s and then the Revolution
itself had allowed, or perhaps pushed, Americans to discover the great truth of
contemporary popular sovereignty. Forced to focus on certain self-evident truths, and to
reject old perversions of reasoning Americans had discovered the moral imperative that
all legitimate Earthly power had to be derived from the People at large.
“Sovereignty,” the idea that there could only be one highest power in any civil
society, was a natural law. Like the source of the Nile River, analogized Wilson,
philosophers had long searched for the source of sovereign power. But all had either
oversimplified the issue or clung to pre-extent assumptions so closely that their reasoning
corrupted the idea of sovereignty or failed the realization of its true source. And Wilson
hypothesized that the corruption of the idea of sovereignty lay at the root of the Imperial
Crisis that necessitated the Revolution; the corrupt worldview turned into corrupt
political assumptions that misled British policy.334
Wilson covered some of the least appreciable concepts of sovereignty through
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history in his lecture on “Law and Obligation.” The centerpiece of the lecture was his
definition of law. In his basic definition of law Wilson conjoins elements of legal
commentators William Blackstone and Richard Hooker. From Blackstone, Wilson drew
the concept of the law as a rule. As such it was “an instrument...distinguish(ed)...from a
sudden, or transient, or particular order (command)...and to denote that it carries along
with it a power and principle of obligation.”335 But why that obligation existed, and from
where law derived its authority was a point of disagreement between Wilson and
Blackstone. Wilson also appended to Blackstone’s “rule of action” what Wilson
considered to be Hooker’s “fuller and stronger conception of law.” Law, according to
Hooker and Wilson “assigns to each the kind, that it moderates the force and power, that
it appoints the form and measure of working.” Wilson’s preference for the less brutish,
more utilitarian definition of law is telling. He wanted to think of the law as a
constructive tool in its own right, not just a curmudgeon of the powerful.336
Wilson turned then to the central issue on his mind -- the nature of morally
legitimate authority -- the proper source of sovereignty. Blackstone had continued in his
definition of law to say that the “rule of action” was “prescribed by some superior, and
which the inferior is bound to obey.” Wilson railed “A superior!”
Let us make a solemn pause-Can there be no law without a superior?
Is it essential to law, that inferiority be involved in the obligation to
obey it? Are these distinctions at the root of all legislation?337
To all of these questions, in Wilson’s analytical, drawn-out way, he answered “no,” at
least in regard to human law.
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Two approaches to thinking about superiority existed according to Wilson: either
superiority derived from power alone or superiority derived from a combination of power
and moral right. In other words, either superior authority was right because of might
alone, or it was right for reasons distinct of the power that made it effective. Wilson
rejected the first “strange” position out of hand, denying that power in and of itself
granted any special right. Governors who ruled by strength alone had no greater or lesser
right to rule than the right of a People who could muster enough strength, to rebel against
their governance. The position was strange and unacceptable because it involved no real
sense of obligation and was inherently dangerous to liberty. Wilson added, “Bare force,
far from producing obligation to obey, produces an obligation to resist.”338
Wilson preferred the second general position. But in many instances thinkers
who, likewise, took up the moralistic position fell into an equally damaging set of errors,
or had been erroneously interpreted. To “superiority of power” they had “superadded
pre-eminence or superior excellence of nature.”339 Dionysus of Halicarnasus, Cicero, and
Aristotle (according to some interpretations that Wilson found dubious) had all fallen into
this error of political thinking that the most virtuous ought to rule.340
The philosophical position of rule by the most virtuous was practically untenable,
claimed Wilson. “How is excellence to be rated or ascertained?” Wilson queried with an
implicative question. No objectively satisfactory way existed, neither was there any
individual or group objective or all-knowing enough to make a sufficiently trustworthy
judgment. Even if it was not a virtual impossibility, Wilson continued that few would be
all virtuous -- there would be gradations of excellence. Was “there to be a gradation of
338
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law as well as excellence?” No, all would be confusion.341
Some had tried to overcome the problem of determining the superior right to rule
by two other distinctive means. One line of thought, derived from Pauline biblical text
and culminating more contemporarily in the work of Jean Domat, claimed that rulers -monarchs in particular -- had been given their positions by God and ruled by divine right.
God had chosen those most appropriate for his own designs, which was always for the
good of humanity. Wilson scoffed at Domat’s logic, saying no evidence supported his
assertion; indeed, princes had often been found destructively inept. Quoting a
commentator during the reign of Charles II, Wilson quipped that “the greatest part of
mankind” had not “come into the world with saddles on their backs and bridles in their
mouths.” Neither had a “few” been born “ready booted and spurred to ride the rest.” And
it was no surprise, Wilson continued, that such an absurd doctrine of “superiority” would
be embraced by men of pride, and that such an “inverted way of teaching and thinking”
would turn “kings into tyrants, without knowing or even suspecting that they are so.”342
Another way of overcoming the moral problem of the right to rule under the
precept of superiority was through a theory of prehistoric social contract. Wilson returned
to William Blackstone’s Commentaries On the Laws of England. Blackstone, like John
Locke, thought that society had come together for mutual protection and instituted
government for self-preservation. The institution of governance involved a contract
between those who would be ruled and those who would rule: those who would submit
and those who would legislate in superiority. The product of the contractual relationship
was civil society through law. Wilson declaimed Blackstonian doctrine with horrific
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imagery. “What is left the people?” Wilson asked. “Nothing. What are they? Slaves.
What will be their portion? That of beasts -- instinct, compliance, and punishment.”
Wilson was also happy to point out an inconsistency in Blackstone’s historicism.
Blackstone had made superiority a requirement of law, yet he envisions a state of natural
society authoritatively legislating a contract in which the much vaunted superior is itself
constructed.343
Wilson could not accept any of these solutions for superiority above, or even the
necessity of superiority in the making of laws, for three basic reasons. First, the very
notion of superiority always “contained the germ of...the divine right...to rule.” As such
it was impious, presupposing a single person or group as wielding the authority of a
demigod over the human race.344
Second, the theory of superiority, particularly as proponents of rule by excellence in
virtue and contract theorists envisioned it, inverted the order of things. Their doctrines
made government the end of society, but the truth was, according to Wilson, that
advancement in civil society was the end of government.345 Wilson lamented,
How often has the end been sacrificed to the means! Government was
instituted for the happiness of society: how often has the happiness of
society been offered as victim to the idol of government! Let government
-- even the constitution, be...the handmaids; let them not be...the mistresses
of the state (civil society).346
Jean Barbeyrac had said that society was the “scaffolding” upon which the “building” of
government was constructed. The reverse was true.347
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According to Wilson, two general kinds of society could be understood: natural
society and civil society. Human beings were inherently social animals, began Wilson in
his lecture “Of Man, As a Member of Society.” He rejected the egoist principle that
human beings were wholly motivated by selfishness. Self-love was a real and primal
force, but sociability was also an equally primal force of its own, not a mere derivative of
self-love. Human beings had always socialized, at least in loose groups. It was this loose
socialization that Wilson called “natural society.” Civil society or the “state” occurred
when a group entered into a mutual, collective contract. “These engagements are
obligatory, because they are mutual,” he argued. And so the state was “a complete body
of free persons, united together for their common benefit, to enjoy peaceably what is their
own, and to do justice for others.” The implicit result is “an artificial person,” in “a state
of natural liberty” with other civil societies. In that “person” the incorporated “wills and
power of all the members (will) be united in such a manner, that they shall never act nor
desire but one and the same thing, in whatever relates to the end, for which the society
was established.”348
One of the best reasons for the formation of civil society (and eventually
government), aside from base preservation, was the enhancement of liberty. Civil society
lessened some of humanity’s natural liberties but enhanced other liberties by restraining
the actions of other humans. Wilson was optimistic, believing that there could be and
ought to be a net gain of liberty in the development of civil society. In “a natural state”
claimed Wilson, humanity would “enjoy less liberty, and suffer more interruption and
inconvenience” than in a properly constructed civil society, because “every other
individual would act uncontroulled by others.” In other words, anarchy was its own kind
348
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of tyranny.349
What was most important to Wilson was that civil society pre-dated civil
government. Government was a construct of civil society and part of civil society once
constructed, but unlike other political thinkers, for Wilson government was not
essentially necessary for civil society to exist. So for Wilson, change in government did
not have to mean the dissolution of civil society as it did for other thinkers, and the
American Revolution offered Wilson his own best evidence. Government was
functionally necessary, however, for the prolongation and “perfection” of civil society,
particularly as the society grew and became more complex. “Without government,
society, in the present state of things, cannot flourish; far less can it reach perfection.”
And so the purpose of government was to aid civil society in its own preservation and
advancement, and ultimately therefore, in attaining the goals to which a civil society
might properly aspire. Government was a utility, an instrument of a civil society that was
the People at large, bound together by a web of orderly and respectful community
relationships.350
The final reason that Wilson accepted no doctrine of right to rule by superiority is
that it was practically contrary to the manifestation of liberty. The American concept of
liberty, one that Wilson wholly embraced, was inseparable from what modern civil
libertarians might call positive rights -- the right to be represented and to be ruled by
some kind of consent. Obligation was not the result of superior power over an inferior,
whether defined by brute force, a supposed excellence or an impious claim to divine
support. After showing the logical inconsistencies and dangerousness of all these models
349
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of obligation through superiority, Wilson proclaimed that obligation to human authority
can only be established through consent. Both an individual’s obligation to legislative
and common law authority derived from an implicit consent to them, extrapolated from
the explicit consent to membership in the civil society.351
But according to Locke, Puffendorff and Barbeyrac, the People had already
transferred their sovereign power to the governments that they formed.352 “I see no
necessity for it” raked Wilson.
I see no propriety in it: it is derogatory...from the genuine principles of
legitimate sovereignty, and inconsistent with the best theory, and the
best exercise too, of supreme power.353
The power given to the government was purely functional, not the sovereign power. And
in America at least, a “free state, such as ours, the sovereign or supreme power resides in
the people.”354 Blackstone had argued that the legislative power was (and had to be) the
sovereign power in any state. Wilson convincingly argued the contrary by using
historical examples from British and recent American history. Even when a legislature
was not considered the sovereign its laws could be obligatory and effectual.355
The People at large in the United States could be trusted to rule. Though not all
could reason well all had an intuitive sense of right and wrong, so that if a majority of
Citizens thought a general principle correct or the character of a person sufficient to hold
office, their judgment could be trusted. Out of necessity it would have to be the majority
that actual exercised the sovereign power of the whole. Mistakes could be expected, but
the majority, particularly one drawn from a large populace could be trusted to have good
351
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judgment in relation to their self-preservation and the preservation of the larger society
(in which they had more vested by definition of being the majority.) The human heart
was its own divine oracle receiving general principles, and the more people who thought
a moral position to be correct the less likely the moral position was to be incorrect -- the
less likely it was being corrupted by poor reasoning. Wilson’s political cosmology
juggled ideas of divine will, probability in good judgment and democracy.356
Yet, a majority (perhaps even a whole society) could hypothetically become
corrupt, but apparently for Wilson, the people of the United States were sufficiently
virtuous to healthfully govern themselves. The fact that sovereignty resided in the People
at large and was to be exercised by the majority did not mean that morality was
subjective, prostrated to the will of the majority. An objective morality commanded for
Wilson -- a law of God. Popular sovereignty itself was a valid derivative of that law, a
law perceptible by the intuitive sense. But sovereignty simply gave a supreme political
power over Earthly human affairs -- moral legitimacy for political preeminence, but not
moral or social omnipotence. God’s general law was still higher and demanded
obedience, even of the majority. The inalienable rights of humanity, including life,
liberty, obligation by consent, free immigration, to name but a few, formed part of that
law. The majority had no moral right to contravene God’s law and in fact had the prime
responsibility of determining it and realizing it on Earth. No human intervention ought to
exert itself, denying the will of the majority in a civil society, but if the majority did
contravene God’s law they could expect a diminution in their civil society. The laws of
nature were another conduit of God’s law. Nature would insure the diminution of an
355
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immoral society through tyranny, civil war, and anarchy.357
In his lecture, “Of Government,” Wilson made a startling claim for a Whig writer
of eighteenth century political philosophy. He suggested that of all forms of government,
monarchy was probably the first because it was the simplest.358 The oft held notion that
antiquity of practice was concurrent, at least loosely, to primal truths was abandoned.
The historicism of Thomas Paine, for example, spoke of the first government as being
some kind of direct democracy. Monarchy was a later corruption. Like Paine, Wilson
envisioned communities coming together under their own free compunction and
organizing without monarchs.359 The difference is, for Wilson, that was not
“government.” Community law and therefore communal governance could and did exist,
at some pre-historic point, without institutional government. And admitting that
monarchy was first of all officiated governments was of no danger within the Wilsonian
doctrine because of how progress fit into Wilson’s moral and political matrix of
thought.360
Government, like anything else in civilization and of humanity, was in a constant
state of either advancement or devolution. Or as Wilson put it, “perfected” or
“degraded.” The application of God’s law required variation in varying situations and the
human ability to realize those laws might improve as human consciousness and
civilization improved.361 Wilson maintained that all “the works of human invention are
progressive:”
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And frequently are not completed, till a slow and lengthened series
of gradual improvements, remotely distant from one another both in
place and time. To the theory and practice of government, this
observation is applicable with...peculiar force. If the discoveries
...are difficult and slow, how much more arduous must it be to obtain,
in practice, the advantage of those discoveries!362
In other words, it was one achievement to conceptualize a right political principle, quite
another to understand how best to apply it. The American Revolution had facilitated a
rapid advance in both principles and applications. Americans had not only discovered the
true root of sovereignty but had experimented with its realization in politics and
government.363 Wilson’s implication was that monarchy, as a governmental institution,
was antiquated and unworthy of a politically advanced people.
The sociopolitical discoveries of Americans, or their factual corroboration of what
was before mere shadowy theory, was multiplicitous according to Wilson. Again,
government was itself only a tool, essentially devised to advance and stabilize civil
society. And civil society was a tool to promote and secure survival and human liberty.
But it was not only life and liberty that civil society and government were meant to
promote and secure. In a more general sense, civil society existed to facilitate human
happiness which ultimately required human progress in mental processes, knowledge,
morality, society, economics, the arts and government. And for Wilson progress was not
a morally neutral concept that only denoted a rapid and brute increase in resources and
utility. Progress was a moral idea that denoted a qualitative increase in right versus
wrong. As such, progress described the proper velocity of civilization: the drive of civil
society to its moral goals.
In his lecture “Of the Law of Nations,” Wilson declared that God vested the
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People at large of every state with the supreme power, and therefore supreme obligation,
“for the happiness of each, and for the happiness of all.”364 The civil state had general
functions discernable by its nature and purpose. It was, “in general, the duty of the state
to preserve itself” and “its members.” And it had the “right, and is under the obligation”
to do all that was necessary, not contravening higher moral laws, to achieve that goal.365
It was the “right, and generally is the duty,” according to Wilson, of the state to do
numerous general acts. Wilson’s list is long and tells a tales of an Enlightenment mind,
both pragmatic and highly moralistic. Of his list, three hold the highest ground along
with self-preservation: happiness, justice and progress.366
“Happiness is the center, to which men and nations are attracted: it is therefore
the duty of a nation to consult its happiness,” Wilson told his students. “The arts, the
sciences, philosophy, virtue, and religion, all contribute to happiness, all” he continued,
“ought to receive the encouragement of the nation.” Wilson loosely hinted at a need for a
broader, more rigorous and uniform system of education, warning that “impressions that
are made first, sink deepest” and what is taught will either “produce abundance of good,
or abundance of evil.”367
“Justice” was another part of the “sacred law of nations.” Like any moral person,
it was the duty of the state “to do no wrong or injury” and, in fact, “to contribute to the
perfection and happiness of others” -- “not only forbidden to do evil” but “commanded to
do good to one another.”368
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And finally, “it is the glorious destiny of man,” Wilson had earlier observed “to
be always progressive. It is his happiness, to press on towards” the future.369 Both
happiness and justice rested on the ability to progress within the parameters, and
according to the direction of God’s law. “A nation should aim at its perfection,”
proclaimed Wilson.
The advantage and improvement of the citizens are the ends proposed
by the social union. Whatever will render that union more perfect will
promote these ends. The same principles, therefore, which show that
a man ought to pursue the perfection of his nature, will show, likewise
that the citizens ought to contribute everything in their power to the
perfection of the state.
In order to approach perfection, or a higher refinement, citizens should resist “everything,
which would...retard the progress of the state” and “acquire everything, without which its
perfection cannot be...obtained.”370
The federal Constitution was a progressive plan of government, not only because
it had advanced the understanding and application of political truth but because it
facilitated the progress of the civil society -- fulfilling the purpose of government. It
facilitated progress by adhering the political process to the broader civil society as closely
as possible.
“Representation is the chain of communication between the people and those, to
whom, they have committed the exercise the powers of government,” declared Wilson in
his lecture “On the Legislative Department.” And the government under the 1787 federal
Constitution was the first government in post-Antiquity to be “founded solely on
representation” of the rightful sovereign, the People at large.371
369

Ibid., 126.
Ibid., 146.
371
Ibid., Volume II, 7-11.
370

159

Both the House of Representatives and the Senate represented the People, though
“some have considered the senators as...representing the sovereignty...of the several
states. While the members of the other house immediately represent the people.” But
such an opinion was “founded” in the fallacious doctrine “that the legislative power is the
supreme power of the state.” Wilson vehemently reiterated, “The supreme power I
showed to reside in the people.” “The people have delegated to the several legislatures”
he continued, “the choice of senators, while they have retained in their own hands the
choice of representatives.”372
The Presidency too, was rooted in the representative principle. Wilson, always
eager to take another jab at Blackstone, pointed out that Blackstone had purported that
the Saxons had originally elected their rulers but switched to hereditary succession
because “dear-bought experience ... evinced the convenience.” “If elective title is a
distemper in the body-politic” quipped Wilson incredulously, perhaps to the amusement
of his students, “the history ... of England would (suggest) that a hereditary title is a
remedy still worse than the disease.”373 Whatever “intrigues ... cabals ... tumults, and
convulsions” might be produced by the “election of our first magistrate, are avoided” by
making the election mediate rather than immediate -- through the use of electors.
Moving through the various duties and powers of the chief executive Wilson
came to the pardon power and made an interesting observation, again counter-arguing
Blackstone. Blackstone had maintained that “the power of pardoning is a power
incommunicatable to the democratical species of government.” Contrarily, Wilson spoke
of the American experience. “The best and purest of all” governmental species was “the
372
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democratical,” being defined as “that, in which the supreme power remains with the
people.” And it “is capable of being formed...in such a manner, as to exclude the
inconveniences, and to secure the advantages of all the others (species of government.)”
It was a “principle of democracy...that the law is higher than the magistrate...the
constitution is higher than both...and the people (are) higher than all three.” The pardon
was perfectly compatible with democracy because it was simply another possible
governmental function that the people at large had delegated, as it happened, to the
President.374
Though the Judiciary was not elected, the principles of representation and rule by
consent penetrated even that branch of government. Judges sat during good behavior,
which meant that they might be removed by the representatives of the People if they
violated the People‘s trust. But more importantly, the common law bound and limited the
judiciary. Wilson pointed out in his lecture “Of Juries” that jurors “must decide for law
as well as fact” in the eighteenth century. It was an attribute of jurisprudence that Wilson
whole-heartedly embraced, particularly in criminal cases where the consequences of
conviction would be the heaviest.375 “The sentiments of the majority shall govern” after
all “is...the general rule of society.” And juries were representatives of the broader civil
society.376 Because juries could interpret the law, they could direct its progress. The
process by which common law came into existence and changed involved the People at
large. It was only the broad acceptance or rejection of certain legal principles by multiple
generations of the People that gave common law its force and existence through tradition.
So, common law was a conduit of popular sovereignty, much like political representation
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itself.377
The realization of sovereignty was important for progress because the exercise of
sovereign power by the People, through representation and governance by consent, gave
them the highest power to move the government in “the true line of public liberty and
happiness.”378 But the American Constitution went one step further still. The sovereign
People of the United States held the power to amend their constitution through a plausible
civil process whenever they chose to do so. As such, the United States Constitution
related to the People “as clay in the hands of the potter...to improve...refine...and
finish...as they please.” That was not to say that the people would often amend their
constitution, because they probably would not. Wilson did not think that the people
would change their government fundamentally “without a proportioned propelling
cause.” But that government would eventually have to be altered by the People was
inevitable as civil society changed, hopefully for the good. To place the amendment
power in some other body would have been an invitation to tyranny; allowing for no
amendments at all would produce “mistakes and mischeifs of...different kinds” including
“giddy inconsistency...unthinking rashness (and) unmanly languor.” But no such
mistakes had been made in forming the United States Constitution. The principles of
popular sovereignty had been realized and allowed America “her preservation, her
happiness, and her perfection.”379 And humanity’s “own perfection and happiness” was
the divine purpose of human government.380
Wilson’s United States was a progressive state, guided by a free and sovereign
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American people. The 1787 federal Constitution was their chief political and legal
instrument of limited government and sociopolitical liberty.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

Neo-Whig interpretations have dominated the historiography of the American
Revolution for better than thirty years, but the conspiratorial sensibilities of the older
materialist scholars have not been entirely abandoned. Some historians, while accepting
the integrity of much of what the Revolutionary generation said, have nonetheless
claimed to detect a cabalistic deceit among the American elites of the era.
Historian Gordon S. Wood had a particularly untrusting view of the federal
Constitutional framers. The framers used Revolution era concepts, according to Wood,
twisting populist ideas to legitimize the aristocrat-friendly government that their distrust
of the people demanded. As historian George M. Dennison later described Wood’s
opinion, “Federalists transformed a viable revolutionary tradition into a rhetorical facade
to maintain a system of aristocratic politics.”381 An eighteenth century anti-federalist
could not have said it better. And more recently the historian Edmund S. Morgan has
taken a broadly suspicious view of popular sovereignty and its historical application. The
elite revolutionaries of the English Civil War and the American Revolution used the
concept of popular sovereignty to justify their rebellion and usurpation of power. It was a
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tool, according to Morgan, to gain the support of the masses who had the numbers
necessary for successful rebellions. But once embraced by the unwashed masses, the
“fiction” of popular sovereignty had to be perpetuated in the new order. The illusion of
control had to be given to the populous through various governmental mechanisms like
voting for representatives (constituency/representation itself being a mere fiction) and
popular ratification that supposedly realized popular sovereignty.382 Through this
historical lens the Founding Fathers become like the pigs in George Orwell’s Animal
Farm whom, in order to secure their preeminence, perverted the ideas of the revolution
that brought them to power.383
If the professional lifeblood of the historian is the words of the past, then critical
thinking is the heartbeat of their interpretations. Some of the challenges to the profession
are implicit in its directives. A desire to interpret human record may slide easily into an
uncritical acceptance of a record’s holistic veracity. And a critical sensibility may
devolve into a prejudicial cynicism. However much the less-than-sparkling interpretation
of the Wood/Morgan stamp is or is not deserved by the American Revolutionary
generation will continue as a contentious question.
Yet what is certain, after viewing Wilson’s efforts during the constitutional
conventions of 1787 and 1790, and the contents of his law lectures, is that such mistrust
has no veracity in interpreting the ethos of James Wilson.384 For Wilson, popular
sovereignty and the instrumentality in government and law that it required, was no mere
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contrived fiction but a fundamental truth discovered through the fiery baptism of the
American Revolution.
Wilson was not without his inconsistencies. Like many of the Founders he held a
domestic slave while glorifying and developing a philosophy of liberty. Though he
demanded that juries were necessary in criminal trials he equivocated on their need in
civil cases, and his explanation was never quite satisfactory. He thought it was sufficient
to point out the impracticality of having juries in all civil cases without bothering to
revisit his overall moral philosophy concerning the need for juries.
Also, Wilson placed a great deal of emphasis on the importance of intellectual
development, headed one of America’s earliest post-Confederation law lecture, and
pronounced the need for a general understanding of law and government by the common
people. The idea of public education, however, was conspicuously missing from
Wilson’s writings. As the historian Mark David Hall observed, Wilson seemed to have
assumed that the public could learn what was necessary from observing a virtuous
leadership and the equitable processes of free government.385
Yet, all human beings are full of inconsistencies and what is more interesting and
important about Wilson is not his inconsistencies, but his philosophical consistencies. As
a whole, Wilson’s political thought is remarkably consistent and cohesive, easily
blending what many historians have traditionally understood as conceptual
contradictions. And reading Wilson’s works, one would have a difficult time doubting
the sincerity of Wilson’s theories of popular sovereignty, progressive civil society and the
instrumentality of law and government. His was a sincere doctrine both populist,
constitutional and progressive.
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The historian James H. Read has actually criticized Wilson for being too
consistent -- stubbornly doctrinaire in the face of confuting experience. As Wilson made
clear in numerous speeches and in his law lectures, the majority exercised the sovereignty
of the People (and perhaps pluralities when majorities cannot be formed, though Wilson
never spoke of pluralities.) There was to be no non-majoritarian human check on the will
of the majority. Read accused Wilson of naïveté, contrasting his faith in the People to
Madison’s more “realistic” skepticism. Wilson foolishly ignored the possibility of
majoritarian tyranny, according to Read, veiling his own eyes with a common sense
doctrine of human morality. What made Wilson’s philosophical failure more damning is
not only his association with men like Madison who knew better, but Wilson’s own
experience as the victim of a riot.386
However, on final analysis Read’s criticism is unfair. Even Madison understood
that the minority could be protected only with the assent of the majority: consenting to
lawful rule through representation or tradition. Under this consideration the difference
between Wilson and Madison appears to be the depth of their particular philosophical
considerations, rather than the essences of them. Wilson simply peeled the conceptual
onion closer to the core, and felt it more important to dwell there. Such a thought brings
to the fore the next greatest difference between the thought of Wilson and Madison. The
particular threats to American republicanism and liberty was viewed differently by the
two men.
Read found it difficult to understand how Wilson could have continued to be the
doctrinaire majoritarian that he was, following the attack of his house by what Wilson
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believed to be a politically motivated mob. Wilson never put the Fort Wilson incident
into conceptual perspective, not in writing anyway. He does not mention Philadelphian
mobs in his law lectures. But the Wilsonian answer to Read’s criticism is easily
surmised. The crowd that attacked Wilson’s home was not a majority, they were a
scurrilous and populous minority. And if that minority had obeyed the spirit of the
majority of people in the city of Philadelphia (who were not out attacking houses) the riot
would never have happened. The crowd was a misinformed minority of malcontents,
misled by corrupt Constitutionalist leaders.
Then there was the problem of mobs breaking out against creditor-friendly courts
throughout the states in the mid to late 1780s. Many founders, it is undeniable, saw these
problems as symptoms of too much democracy in the states. But Wilson did not see the
problem as one of too much democracy (or it does not appear so when looking at his
contributions in the Philadelphia Convention.) Wilson supported continental nationalism
in 1787 because he always had been a continental nationalist. Unlike other men, he did
not need fear to motivate his support for central government. And the crowd violence
exercised against the governments of the states could also be rationalized as the activities
of rogue minority groups within the political society. Again, Wilson did not ever write
on the issue but such a rationale would make sense within the context of his overall
thought.
In our post-Holocaust, post-Civil Rights movement age it may indeed seem naive
to put too much trust in the majority. Read’s reaction to Wilson is understandable. But
Read’s criticism is not wholly consistent with the material that Wilson proffered in his
writings. Read claimed that Wilson never even thought of the possibility of majority
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tyranny, though most within his generation certainly did worry over it. But in Wilson’s
law lectures he did mention the possibility that a whole political society might be
corrupted.387 And in his opening speech before the Pennsylvania ratifying convention,
Wilson warned that there could be no appeal from a corrupt majority.388 These kinds of
comments cannot come from a man for whom the possibility of majoritarian tyranny was
beyond the intellectual horizon. Wilson did understand that a majority could
hypothetically be tyrannical, though he assumed the probability of it to be slight. And the
only cure for such a corruption was the providence of God acting in the flow of history.
He did not think that a truly willful and constant majority could be (or ought to be)
denied their will by human coercion.
The fact that Wilson never went into detail concerning majoritarian corruption
and tyranny does not suggest simple-mindedness but a particular understanding of the
problems of his time. The majority had not oppressed humanity in the generations
immediately preceding his, or in his generation, and he did not consider it a probability in
the foreseeable future. For Wilson, the problem of corruption and tyranny had always
been a problem of grasping minorities and poor governance. Few people making an
argument in favor of a solution to their contemporary problems will counter-argue
themselves for the sake of holistically-turned future philosophers and historians. If denial
of the popular will was the chief problem of Wilson’s own time, why would Wilson
confuse his listeners by remonstrating deeply on the hypothetical possibilities of popular
tyranny? He would not and he did not.
Wilson, whether considered a naive doctrinaire or an insightful but shrewd
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polemicist, has something to offer to the modern historian and American citizen. With
Wilson, the researcher can peek into the thinking of a radical American mind of the
revolutionary generation. In some respects that mind was representative of the
generation, while in others Wilson’s thought may be considered eccentric, demonstrating
the plasticity of eighteenth century radicalism (Wilson’s refusal to distinguish between
American republicanism and democracy comes to mind.) Either way, Wilson’s thinking
is suggestive and is made up of the same philosophic essentials that compose the cultural
foundations of the American republic. The extent that Wilson’s thought was
representative of his overall generation, both inside and outside of the Revolution’s elite
leadership, certainly deserves more study.
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